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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the importance of commercial banks in
the financing decisions of corporations. The first chapter focuses on syndicated loans. The syndicated
loan market is an increasingly important source of corporate finance, with over $1 trillion in new
syndicated loans signed annually. The first chapter empirically explores the syndicated loan market with
an emphasis on how information asymmetry and renegotiation considerations influence syndicate
structure and the choice of participant lenders. There are two principal findings. First, when the borrower
requires more intense investigation and monitoring effort by a financial institution, the lead arranger
retains a larger portion of the loan, forms a more concentrated syndicate, and chooses participants that are
closer to the borrower (both geographically and in terms of previous relationships). The evidence is
consistent with moral hazard in a setting of information asymmetry. The lead arranger attempts to
guarantee due diligence effort by increasing its risk exposure, and the lead arranger chooses lenders that
minimize information asymmetry. Second, when the borrower is more likely to need to renegotiate the
loan agreement, lead arrangers add participants with very small portions of the loan to the syndicate.
Given that unanimity of lenders is needed to renegotiate major terms of the loan, adding participants with
small portions of the loan reduces the renegotiation surplus expected by the borrower. The evidence
suggests that lenders form syndicates to reduce inefficient behavior and strategic default by borrowers.
The second chapter focuses on the use of bank lines of credit by corporations. Commercial bank
lines of credit are used by more U.S. corporations than any other type of debt financing. Using novel data
from annual 10-K SEC filings for a random sample of public firms, I analyze how corporate lines of
credits are used by firms, how they are managed by banks, and which types of firms obtain lines of credit.
The evidence suggests that lines of credit are the incremental source of debt financing for firms, and that
banks carefully manage their use through covenants on profitability. Among firms that have lines of
credit, a negative earnings shock leads to a restriction of the unused portion of the lines. Among all firms,
only firms with high profitability are able to obtain lines of credit. The results suggest that lines of credit
provide bank-managed flexibility for the firms that are able to obtain them, but only profitable firms are
awarded this flexibility.
In the third chapter, I examine the increasing prevalence of commercial banks in the corporate
debt underwriting market. The relaxation of restrictions on commercial bank underwriting, culminated in
the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, has initiated a major change in debt
underwriting markets facing borrowing firms. For the first time since the 1920s, financial institutions are
able to jointly produce private lending and underwriting services. Using fixed effects regressions on a
panel of 4,553 debt issues by 509 firms from 1990 to 2003, I find that issuing firms receive a 10 to 15
percent reduction in underwriting fees, which is driven by commercial banks jointly offering lending and
underwriting services. I show firms are no more locked in to financial relationships after deregulation
than before, and that issuing firms add multiple lead managers to prevent a lending commercial bank
underwriter from gaining too much power over the firm. While a number of papers analyze commercial
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bank entry, this work in this chapter is the first to use the effect of exogenous deregulation on within-firm
variation over time to estimate key parameters. This methodological contribution is important; I show
that cross section (or pooled) regressions produce biased and inconsistent estimates of the effect of
commercial banks on yield spreads. The fixed effects strategy employed here calls into question the
result in previous research that commercial banks obtain lower yield spreads for borrowing firms.
Thesis Supervisor: James M. Poterba
Title: Mitsui Professor of Economics
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Introduction
Commercial banks play an increasingly important role in the financing decisions of corporations.
Existing theoretical and empirical research focuses mainly on the role of commercial banks in the
financing decisions of firms without access to public equity and debt markets. In this dissertation, I
depart from the existing research by focusing on the importance of banks in financing decisions of public
corporations. The consolidation of the banking industry and the removal of regulatory constraints on the
underwriting activities of commercial banks have led to a rise in the interaction between large
corporations and commercial banks. Currently, there are over $1 trillion in new syndicated loans made to
corporations annually by banks, and commercial banks underwrite over 90 percent of the public debt
offerings by corporations. Over 85 percent of public firms have used some form of bank debt financing
between 1996 and 2003.
The central research question I attempt to answer in this dissertation is: Why and how do
corporations with access to public debt and equity markets use bank financing in their capital budget
decisions? The existing theoretical frameworks developed in the banking and incomplete contracting
literature provide guidance in the empirical analysis of this question. In the theoretical banking literature,
the existence of commercial banks is motivated by the need for monitoring due to problems of
information asymmetry between borrowers and creditors. More recent theoretical research uses
advancements in incomplete contract theory to motivate the use of bank debt by corporations. This line
of theoretical research emphasizes how dispersed public debt holders are unable to waive default
provisions when corporations face difficulties. Banks therefore play a fundamental role in facilitating
renegotiation when corporations experience financial or economic distress.
The existing theoretical research implies that banks play a fundamental role in reducing
information asymmetry and facilitating renegotiation. This dissertation empirically examines the use of
commercial banks in corporations' financing decisions, with a particular emphasis on these two issues. I
use the theoretical frameworks described above to empirically explore the two main services provided by
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banks to corporations: lending and underwriting securities. The first two chapters focus on lending, and
the third chapter examines corporate debt underwriting.
The first chapter focuses on syndicated loans, which are the main product through which
commercial banks offer funding to corporations. I explore this market with particular emphasis on how
information asymmetry and renegotiation concerns influence the structure of syndicates and the choice of
participant, or third-party, lenders. Consistent with the monitoring role of commercial banks, I find
evidence that the lead bank in a syndicated loan retains a larger share of the loan when problems of
information asymmetry are severe. When less is known about the borrowing firm, the lead arranger
retains a larger share of the loan in order to be properly motivated to conduct the due diligence and
monitoring that is required. In addition, when the borrower is more informational-opaque, the lead bank
in the syndicate is more likely to choose participant lenders that are closer to the borrowing firmn, both in
terms of geographic proximity and previous lending relationships. These findings suggest that
information asymmetry has a real effect on behavior in the syndicated loan market; they provide support
for the view that commercial banks' interaction with corporations is motivated in part by issues of
information asymmetry.
The first chapter also examines how the ability to renegotiate covenants in the syndicated loan
market influences syndicate structure. In particular, I find evidence that the lead bank in the syndicate
adds participant lenders with very small portions of the loan when the borrower is more likely to need to
renegotiate the agreement. Given that unanimity of all syndicate members is required to renegotiate
major terms of the loan, adding participants with small portions of the loan reduces the renegotiation
surplus expected by the borrower. This evidence suggests that lenders form syndicates to reduce
inefficient behavior and strategic default by the firm. The findings on renegotiation provide support to
the view that renegotiation considerations are an important element in the syndicated loan market.
The majority of bank financing provided to public corporations is extended in the form of lines of
credit. The second chapter of this dissertation represents, to my knowledge, the first comprehensive
empirical study of the use of lines of credit in the corporate financing decisions of public firms. I find
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evidence that a bank line of credit provides a flexible financial instrument that is the marginal source of
increases and decreases in debt for the firms that obtain them. Lines of credit do not, however, represent
unconditional extensions of unused financing capability. Instead, banks carefully monitor and manage
lines of credit through covenants on profitability. I find evidence that banks place covenants on
profitability more than any other financial measure; firms that experience a negative shock to their
profitability subsequently lose access to the unused portion of their line of credit. I also find evidence that
firmns with low profitability do not obtain lines of credit. The evidence suggests that banks provide a
flexible debt instrument that can be used with speed and discretion, but this flexibility is managed
carefully by the bank. The evidence also suggests that banks have an advantage over other providers of
debt financing in their ability to renegotiate and restrict lines of credit.
The third chapter focuses on commercial banks and the corporate debt underwriting market. The
types of interactions between commercial banks and corporations was limited to lending relationships
before the relaxation of restrictions on commercial bank underwriting, culminated in the passage of the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. Since 1999, commercial banks are able to jointly produce
private lending and underwriting services. The results have been dramatic; the share of commercial bank
underwriting of corporate debt securities has risen from less than percent in 1990 to over 90 percent by
2003. I find evidence that commercial banks have increased their presence in the corporate debt
underwriting market by using their information advantages from private lending relationships.
Commercial banks jointly produce corporate debt underwriting and lending services, and offer significant
fee discounts in this joint provision. The empirical methodology of this chapter is novel. I use fixed
effects regressions that exploit the exogenous deregulation of restrictions on underwriting activity, and I
am able to show that, in contrast to the findings of previous literature, commercial banks do not obtain
lower yield spreads on the public debt offerings of their clients.
Rajan (1992) develops a model where commercial banks exploit their information advantages
over clients in order to extract project rents. In the third chapter, I examine whether commercial banks
exploit firms because of the information advantage they have over outside creditors. I find no evidence of
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such exploitation. Commercial banks charge lower fees to corporations that stay low on debt issues two
years after the initial underwriting. Firms are no more likely to be exclusively reliant on their lending
commercial bank for future underwriting services than on non-lending banks. Overall, the findings of the
third chapter suggest that commercial banks have a unique advantage in underwriting corporate debt
because of their private lending relationships. At the same time, banks are not able to exploit this
information advantage to extract rents from firms.
Theoretical research argues that commercial banks reduce information asymmetry and facilitate
renegotiation. I find evidence that, even among public corporations, information asymmetry and
renegotiation considerations are important factors in explaining the role of banks in corporate finance.
Banks provide a monitoring and due diligence function that is necessary even among corporations with
access to public equity and debt markets. Banks also serve an important role in providing flexible and
renegotiable debt instruments to corporations.
Introduction References
Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and
Arm's Length Debt, Journal of Finance, 47: 1367-1400.
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Chapter 1
Agency and Renegotiation in Corporate Finance: Evidence from Syndicated Loans
1.1 Introduction
Non-financial U.S. businesses obtain over $1 trillion in new syndicated loans each year, which
represents more than 15 percent of their aggregate debt outstanding. Of the top 500 non-financial firms in
the Compustat universe in 2002, over 90 percent obtained a syndicated loan between 1994 and 2002.
According to the American Banker, syndicated lending represents 51 percent of U.S. corporate finance
originated and represents more underwriting revenue for the financial sector than both equity and debt
underwriting (Weidner (2000)). The market has experienced strong growth, going from $137 million in
1987 to over a $1 trillion today. Despite the importance of syndicated loans in corporate finance, research
on the role of syndicated loans in U.S. corporate finance is limited.'
A syndicated loan is a loan where at least two lenders jointly offer funds to a borrowing firm.
There is (at least) one "lead arranger" that establishes a relationship with the firm, negotiates terms of the
contract, and guarantees an amount for a price range. The lead arranger then turns to "participant"
lenders that fund part of the loan. In this chapter, I analyze 14,021 syndicated loan deals to 5,011 U.S.
non-financial firms from 1991 to 2003. I use this sample of syndicated loans to explore two of the
theoretical foundations of modern corporate finance: information asymmetry and renegotiation. More
specifically, I exploit variation in the credit reputation of borrowing firms to explain how information
asymmetry and ex-post renegotiation considerations affect the structure of syndicates and the choice of
participant lenders. Syndicated loans are especially promising as an empirical laboratory because, unlike
most financial products, firms from all points of the credit spectrum (privately-held, high yield,
investment grade, etc.) utilize this form of finance. I find evidence that both information asymmetry and
renegotiation concerns affect syndicate structure and participant choice in a manner consistent with
previous theoretical research.
' Exceptions include Simons (1993), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), and Lee and Mullineaux (2004). There is also
a literature on syndicated loans to non-U.S. companies, the pricing and default risk of syndicated loans, and the
effect on firm value of loan announcements. I discuss these papers below.
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The first contribution of this paper is to document that information asymmetry shapes syndicate
structure and the choice of participants in a manner consistent with prominent theories of agency and
moral hazard (Holmstrom (1979); Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). A basic assumption in these models is
that firms with limited public information require investigation and monitoring by an "informed" lender
before "uninformed" lenders invest in the firm. In this framework, there exists a moral hazard problem
for the informed lender because the informed lender's monitoring and investigation effort is
unobservable. In order to ensure diligence, a lender with monitoring and investigation responsibilities
must retain a large financial stake in the borrowing firm; only a bank with a stake in the firm's
performance exerts the necessary effort in due diligence and monitoring. My findings support this
theoretical prediction. When borrowing firms require more intense investigation and monitoring (by a
variety of measures), the lead arranger (informed lender) retains a larger share of the loan, there are fewer
participants (uninformed lenders), and the syndicate structure is more concentrated. For example, after
controlling for the size of the loan and the size of the firm, I find that syndicated loans to firms without
publicly-available SEC filings have 25 percent fewer participant lenders and the lead arranger holds 10
percent more of the loan. This result is robust when comparing firms with and without publicly-available
SEC filings, and when using within-firm variation (when the same firm goes from private to public or
vice versa). I also find evidence that information asymmetry shapes syndicate structure among firms with
publicly-available SEC filings. Following previous literature, I use the ratio of positive accruals to total
assets and the ratio of R&D investment to sales as measures of the need for monitoring and due diligence
among public firms. Using these alternative measures, I find similar results: lead arrangers on loans to
public firms that require more intense monitoring and due diligence retain a larger share of the loan and
form a more concentrated syndicate.
This finding underscores the importance of "informed" capital in the financial health of firms that
require more investigation and monitoring by a financial institution. The evidence presented in this
chapter supports the foundation of models that predict that small, informational-opaque companies are
disproportionately affected by shocks to balance sheets of commercial banks (Holmstrom and Tirole
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(1997); Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993)). In the syndicated loan market, firms that require
investigation and monitoring obtain financing from third parties only after an informed lender takes a
large financial stake in the firm.
I further document the importance of information asymmetry in syndicate formation by analyzing
which participants are chosen as syndicate members. When the borrowing firm has no publicly available
SEC filings or no publicly available credit rating, participant lenders on syndicates are "closer" to the
borrowing firm, both geographically and in terms of previous relationships. In other words, when there is
limited information about a borrower, lead arrangers attempt to reduce the need for information gathering
by choosing participants that already "know" the firm.
I also examine whether reputation "build-up" may improve the ability for lead arrangers to
successfully originate loans for borrowers with limited information. That is, repeated interactions
between a lead arranger and a participant may lead to reputation effects that reduce the moral hazard
problem when originating loans for opaque borrowers. However, the evidence is weak. First, previous
lead arranger-participant relationships influence participant choice, but previous lead arranger-participant
relationships are much less important (both in magnitude and statistical significance) than previous
relationships between the borrowing firm and the participant lender. Second, while it is true that
relationships between the borrowing firm and participants are stronger among firms without SEC filings,
relationships between lead arrangers and participants do not appear to vary systematically across the
credit reputation spectrum. The results suggest that a lead arranger selects participants based on the
participant's familiarity with the borrowing firm, not based on the participant's familiarity with the lead
arranger itself This finding is in contrast to syndicates in IPO issues and venture capital, and suggests
that potential information asymmetry problems cannot be overcome by lead arranger reputation alone.
The second contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate that ex-post renegotiation considerations
influence the ex-ante structure of the syndicate in a manner consistent with incomplete contract theory
and strategic default (Hart and Moore (1988); Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)). Renegotiation is an
important aspect of the syndicated loan market, and the number of creditors is a choice variable. Both of
15
these factors make this market a promising empirical laboratory for analyzing these models. Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996) document two opposing effects of renegotiation considerations on the optimal number
of creditors. When firms are more likely to strategically default, lending syndicates should be larger and
make renegotiation more difficult to discourage inefficient behavior by the firm. When firms are more
likely to default due to exogenous shocks ("liquidity default"), lending syndicates should be smaller to
facilitate renegotiation. Both theoretically and empirically, the two propensities are highly correlated;
only firms with a realistic probability of liquidity default have the ability to "lie" and strategically default.
The model therefore provides an ambiguous and testable prediction in the syndicated loan market: is
liquidity or strategic default the more important factor in syndicate formation?
I find evidence that strategic default is the more important consideration in syndicate formation.
Lenders appear to add participants to the syndicate to make renegotiation more difficult when firms are
more likely to default. I isolate the analysis to rated firms with public filings, and I use variation in
default risk across firms (proxied by senior unsecured debt ratings and leverage ratio) and within firms
(proxied by credit downgrades). I find that loans to high yield firms, which are more likely to renegotiate
loan terms due to default, have 15 to 20 percent more participant lenders. This result does not appear to
be driven by diversification alone; while the number of participants increases with firm default risk, the
actual concentration of the loan and the percentage (or amount) held by the lead does not. Finally, the
larger number of participants is driven by lenders who hold very small amounts of the loan. The average
number of lenders holding less than 2 percent of a loan for firms likely to renegotiate is 65% higher than
loans to other firms. Given that unanimity of syndicate members is required for renegotiation of loan
terms, the evidence suggests that lenders form larger syndicates to make renegotiation more difficult. In
other words, each syndicate member has veto power over renegotiation, and so "participant-loading"
reduces the expected payoff to the borrowing firm from renegotiation. By reducing the expected value
from renegotiation, lenders can reduce strategic default by borrowers. This result implies that ex-post
renegotiation considerations affect ex-ante contract structure in a manner consistent with incomplete
contract theory.
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The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. The next section describes the syndicated loan
market, the syndication process, and existing research related to this chapter. The third section describes
the data and basic summary statistics. The fourth section explores how information asymmetry affects
syndicate structure and the participants chosen as syndicate members. The fifth section focuses on
renegotiation in the syndicated loan market and how it affects syndicate structure. The sixth section
concludes.
1.2 The syndicated loan market: background and existing research
1.2.1 Background 2
A syndicated loan is a loan made to a firm jointly by more than one financial institution. As
Hitchings (1994) notes, "... it is fundamental to syndicated lending that the terms and conditions of the
loan are similar for each of the lenders (32)". Members of the syndicate fall into one of two groups: lead
arrangers and participant lenders. The distinction is important, and the two groups vary on three major
dimensions. First, participant lenders rarely directly negotiate with the borrowing firm, and typically
have an "arm's-length" relationship with the borrowing firm through the lead arranger. Lead arrangers
establish and maintain a relationship with the borrower, and take on the primary information collection
and monitoring responsibilities. (An often-cited "advantage" of a syndicated loan for a borrowing firm is
being able to deal with only one bank while accessing funds of many banks.) Second, the lead arranger
typically holds a larger share of the loan than any of the participants. Third, in terms of renegotiation
rights, unanimity of all syndicate members is always required to change terms related to principal,
interest, maturity, or collateral.3 For example, if a borrowing firm enters into a state of default by missing
a payment, all members must agree to change contract terms in order to avoid acceleration of the loan.
Renegotiation of contracts is common, and is done through amendments to the original loan agreement.
2 The information in this section comes from practitioners working in financial institutions and lawyers who
specialize in syndicated loan contracts. In addition, Wienke (1994), Hitchings (1994), and Esty (2001) are excellent
descriptions of syndicated loan arrangements.
3 Of the syndicated loans in my sample where the number of votes needed to change terms is available, 99.5 percent
require unanimity of syndicate members to agree to a change in the contract. Minor changes that do not involve
principal, interest payments, maturity, or collateral do not always require full unanimity.
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The syndication process works as follows. The lead arranger signs a preliminary loan agreement
("mandate") with the borrowing firm that specifies covenants, fees, and collateral. The preliminary loan
agreement also specifies a loan amount, and a range for the interest rate. Once the preliminary loan
agreement is signed, the lead arranger then turns to potential participant lenders to fund part of the loan.
The lead arranger provides potential participants with an information memorandum on the borrowing
firm. Once the participants (and the amount they are to fund) agree to fund part of the loan, the loan
agreement is signed by all parties.4 Each participant member is responsible for a share of the loan. As
noted above, the terms of the loan are identical for all syndicate members. In addition to interest and
commitment fee income, the lead arranger receives a fee for arranging and managing the syndicated loan,
which is paid by the borrowing firm.5 During the life of the loan, the lead arranger typically also acts as
the "agent" bank that monitors the firm, governs the terms of the loan, administers the drawdown of
funds, calculates interest payments, and enforces financial covenants.
Three additional facts about the market are important. First, borrowing firms can hire more than
one lead arranger. Lead arrangers are sometimes assigned a particular function (origination, loan
administration, publicity, documentation, etc.), and work by Francois and Missonier-Piera (2004)
suggests that multiple lead arrangers are the result of competitive advantages in various duties. Second,
there is an "agency" section of the loan agreement that gives conditions for the removal of the lead
arranging bank. As is noted in Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), the agreement usually exculpates the lead
arranger from liability except where it results from gross negligence or willful misconduct. Third, a
borrower defaults on a loan if it misses any required interest payment or if it violates any of the financial
or non-financial covenants listed in the agreement. Covenants, default, and renegotiation are very
important in this market, and I explore them in greater detail below.
41 I use the language that participants are "chosen" on deals by the lead arranger throughout this paper. In reality, the
choice process can be more complex. Lead arrangers typically select a group of potential participants and the
participants may agree or refuse to be part of the syndicate.
5 This fee is an up-front payment from the borrower to the lead arranger and is not listed on the contract. Lead
arrangers typically retain the largest portion of the fee, but can share the fee with participant lenders. Interviews
suggest that fees vary between 25 and 175 basis points of the total loan amount.
18
The loan sales market is an important parallel to syndicated loans. There are a few key
distinctions. First, the contracting behavior for a syndicated loan is distinct. As noted in Gorton and
Pennachi (1995), a loan sale leaves the existing contract between the firm and the original lender
unaltered. A new secondary participation contract is signed that gives the loan buyer access to cash
flows. The terms of the new loan agreement can be altered significantly from the original contract.
While the theory of loan sales presented in Gorton and Pennachi (1995) applies to syndicated loans, the
problems of moral hazard are less severe in a syndicated loan setting. Lenders are mutually tied to one
contract, and the lead arranger holds part of the loan. Second, as Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders (2003)
demonstrate, the market for loan sales has developed into a market for mostly distressed debt. Over half
of the firms in their sample of loan sales file for bankruptcy within 3 years of the initial sale of one of
their loans. By 2001, according the Loan Pricing Corporation, over half of the loan sales in the
syndicated loan market were distressed. The majority of the syndicated loan market consists of firms
outside financial distress.
1.2.2 Existing research
Previous research on syndicated loans is limited when compared to research on public equity and
debt underwriting markets. Most relevant to my analysis are three papers that evaluate syndicate
structure. Simons (1993) examines the incentives to syndicate and finds evidence that diversification is
the main reason behind syndication. She also finds that lead arrangers syndicate more of"quality" loans,
where quality comes from ex-post examiner ratings. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) find that lead
arrangers are more likely to syndicate loans when the loan is large, the borrowing firm is public, and
when the lead arranger has a strong reputation. They also find that, conditional on a loan being
syndicated, a larger percentage of the loan is syndicated when there is public information on the
borrowing firm and when the lead arranging bank has a strong reputation. Lee and Mullineaux (2004)
find that syndicates are more concentrated when the quality of information on firms is worse. They also
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find that syndicate structure is more concentrated with fewer lenders when firms have a higher default
probability.6
There are also two recent working papers that evaluate syndicate structure. Jones, Lang, and
Nigro (2000) find that information asymmetry, loan credit quality, capital constraints, and maturity affect
the amount of the loan retained by the agent bank. Panyagometh and Roberts (2002) find evidence that
the lead bank syndicates a larger proportion of loans that are subsequently upgraded, which they interpret
as evidence that the lead bank does not exploit any additional information unavailable to participant
lenders.
The work presented here extends the existing research on syndicated loans in several new
directions. First, with regard to information asymmetry, this paper is the first, to my knowledge, that
explicitly addresses how the characteristics of lenders might mitigate or exacerbate information
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. It is also the first to explore how relationships among
syndicate members evolve. The participant choice analysis in the syndicated loan market is new and
helps enrich the understanding of how information asymmetry affects relationships. Second, this paper is
the first, to my knowledge, that explores how information asymmetry affects syndicate structure among
public firms. Third, there is an implicit assumption in the previous literature that adverse selection is the
key result of information asymmetry and little attention is given to moral hazard. I distinguish between
adverse selection and moral hazard predictions, and I show that moral hazard is the more prominent
feature of this market. Fourth, this paper is the first, to my knowledge, to find evidence that renegotiation
considerations influence syndicate structure in the U.S. market in a manner consistent with incomplete
contract theory and strategic default.
In addition to these papers on syndicate structure in the U.S. market, there are other lines of
research on syndicated loans. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) and Megginson, Poulsen, and Sinkey (1995)
do event studies using the market value of the firm and syndicated loan announcements. Esty and
Megginson (2003) evaluate syndicate structure on project finance syndicated loans to firms in 61 different
6 This finding is in contrast to the findings of my analysis. I give reasons for this discrepancy below.
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countries. They find that loans in countries with weaker creditor protection have more syndicate
members, which they interpret as a mechanism to prevent strategic default by borrowers. Esty (2004) and
Qian and Strahan (2004) examine syndicated loans to firms in different countries with a focus on how
legal and financial systems affect syndicated loan composition. There is also a recent literature on the
pricing of syndicated loans and default risk (Thomas and Wang (2004); Altman and Suggitt (2000); and
Angbazo, Mei, and Saunders (1998)).
This paper also fits into a wider area of research that examines the importance of syndicate
structure in venture capital and securities underwriting markets. Corwin and Schultz (2005) examine IPO
syndicates and find evidence that co-managers serve an important information production role and
previous relationships among syndicate members are strong determinants of future syndicate
relationships. Narayanan, Rangan, and Rangan (2004) examine SEO syndicates and find evidence that
commercial banks with lending relationships with the borrower tend to co-manage with reputable
investment banks. Lerner (1994) and Amit, Brander, and Antweiler (2001) evaluate venture capital
syndicates. This paper is the first, to my knowledge, that explores how syndicate relationships are formed
and how they persist in the syndicated loan market.
1.3 Data and summary statistics
1.3.1 Data
The primary data source used to evaluate syndicated loans is Dealscan by the Loan Pricing
Corporation. Dealscan contains detailed information on syndicated loan contract terms, lead arrangers,
and participant lenders. The primary sources of data for Dealscan are attachments on SEC filings, reports
from loan originators, and the financial press. The sample I employ includes 14,021 syndicated loan
deals to 5,011 U.S. non-financial firms from 1991 through the first half of 2003. The full Dealscan
database includes 19,892 unsponsored confirmed syndicated loan deals to firms for these years. I drop
syndicated loans without data on industry (1,383), firm sales information (3,381), or firm state (142). Of
the remaining 14,986 loans deals, I drop any loan to a firm that has a ticker available, but I could not link
the firm to Compustat. The remaining sample contains the final 14,021 loans. Firms in the sample with
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ticker and/or credit rating data available are subsequently matched to Compustat to get a richer set of
financial variables. This matching process yields detailed financial data for 10,703 of the loans in the
sample (76 percent).
The analysis presented here evaluates syndicated loan deals. A syndicated loan deal may contain
more than 1 loan tranche. In my sample, 75 percent of the loan deals contain only tranche, 20 percent
of the loan deals have 2 tranches, and there are a total of 18,993 loan tranches for the 14,021 loan deals.
A deal-level analysis, as opposed to a tranche-level analysis, is the appropriate technique for two reasons.
First, the actual syndicated loan contract is drafted at the deal level, and covenants and all lenders are
listed together on this contract, even if a lender loans only on 1 tranche. While the maturity and pricing of
the loan tranches can vary within a syndicated loan deal, there is one contract, and all lenders are chosen
on the tranches collectively, not independently. Second, multiple tranches on the same syndicated loan
deal cannot be treated as independent observations, and such an analysis produces standard errors that are
improperly small. All results presented below are robust to a tranche-level analysis; the results are very
similar quantitatively and significance levels are actually stronger in the tranche level analysis (as should
be expected given a larger number of tranches than deals). For this analysis, the number of lenders and
the amount held by each lender are calculated at the deal level.
Part of the analysis below focuses on which participant lenders are chosen as syndicate members.
For this analysis, I collect data on the characteristics of the lenders. For the sample of loans, there are 689
financial institutions that ever serve as lead arrangers and 2,341 that serve as participants.7 To make data
collection manageable, I collect data on the top 100 lead arrangers and top 125 participants, by number of
loans.8 These "top lenders" represent 96 percent of the total number of lead arrangers serving on loans
and 83 percent of total number of participants serving on loans. Data on lenders comes from (1) the
7I use two variables to classify lenders as either lead arrangers or participants. Both are available using the custom
report feature in Dealscan's web-based LoanConnector. One variable is labeled "Lenders-Lead Arranger" and the
other is "Lenders-All Lenders." If the variable "Lenders-Lead Arranger" is available, I classify the lender listed in
this field as the lead arranger, and all other lenders are considered participants. If this field is unavailable, any
lender listed as having a "Lead Role" in the "Lenders-All Lenders" is a lead arranger. A data appendix is available
upon request to further explain the data construction.
8 A full list of all lenders and all mergers is included in a data appendix available upon request.
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Federal Reserve Y9C filings for U.S. regulated commercial banks, (2) the Compustat Industrial Annual
tapes for other U.S. financial firms, and (3) the Compustat Global Financial Services tapes for non-U.S.
financial firms. From these sources, I extract data on location, total assets, and equity to asset ratios for
participants in my sample.
All financial institutions are aggregated to their parent company and inherit the characteristics of
the parent company. I am careful to control for mergers among my sample, and acquired firms are
aggregated to their acquirers at the effective date of the merger. In addition, acquiring financial firms
inherit both previous lead arranger-participant relationships and previous borrowing firm relationships of
the acquired firm. Using the entire sample of syndicated and sole lender loans from 1990 to 2003, I
calculate measures of previous relationships for any firm that has a previous loan in the Dealscan sample.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents syndicated loan summary statistics. Borrowing firms on average have $3.1
billion in sales, and median sales is $629 million. About 46 percent of loans are to firms with an S&P
senior unsecured debt rating, and the average firm has a rating of BBB-. I also include summary statistics
for firms linked to Compustat and show data on assets (data6), leverage ((data9+data34)/data6), return
on assets ((datal4+datal18)/data6)), the R&D to sales ratio (data46/data 2), and the accruals to total
assets ratio.9 In terms of loan characterstics, the average loan is $358 million with a maturity of 1,140
days. About 23 percent of deals include a term loan tranche.
For syndicate structure, the average loan has 8.1 lenders, 1.8 lead arrangers, and 6.3 participant
lenders. For a sub-sample of 5,066 loans, I have the share held by each lender in the syndicate. I use this
data to construct a variety of measures. First, I construct the percentage of the loan kept by the lead
arranger (which is the average of all lead arrangers' shares if more than one lead arranger is present).
Second, I use a Herfindahl index as a measure of the concentration of holdings within a syndicate. The
Herfindahl is calculated using each syndicate members' share in the loan; it is the sum of the squared
individual shares in the loan, and varies from 0 to 10,000, with 10,000 being the Herfindahl when a lender
9 I follow Sloan (1996) in defining accruals as: [(AData4 - ADatal) -(AData - Data34- AData71) - Data4].
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holds 100% of the loan. Third, I create measures of how many participants hold "small amounts" of the
loan, defined as less than $5 million or less than 2 percent of the loan.
Table 2 lists the top 5 lead arrangers (by volume) and top 5 participants (by number of deals) for
syndicated loan deals to private and public firms from 2001 to 2003. With the exception of Fleet and
Deutsche Bank, the top 5 lead arrangers are the same in both markets. The third column of Table 2 lists
the most common syndicate participant for each of the top 5 lead arrangers, and the percentage of the lead
arrangers' arranged loans on which the participant was a syndicate member. Column 3 shows that repeat
interactions among syndicate members are not extreme; for example, Bank of America chose Fleet as a
participant on only 20 percent of its arranged loans. While repeat interactions are higher with Citigroup
and JPMorganChase, this is an exception. On average, a given participant for a lead arranger has been on
13 percent of the arranged loans for the lead arranger in the past year. Corwin and Schultz (2005)
examine IPO syndicates in the 1990s and find higher average persistence in relationships between
syndicate members.' 0
1.4 Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry between firms and their investors and the resulting agency problems are
key aspects of models that explain macroeconomic fluctuations (Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Holmstrom
& Tirole (1997)), external financing constraints (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)), and the
fragility of the small business sector (Rajan (1992); Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993)). Models of
information asymmetry in corporate finance, such as Diamond (1991), have been used empirically to
explore the differences between relationship-driven bank loans (where an informed lender retains the
entire loan), and public debt issues (where an informed lender/underwriter sells the entire loan).
Syndicated loans are positioned between these two extremes, having characteristics of both private sole-
lender loans and public debt issues underwritten by a financial institution. In addition, firms from the
'0 For example, Corwin and Schultz (2005) show that Solomon Smith Barney served as a syndicate member on 83
percent of IPOs where the book manager was DLJ, and Merrill Lynch served as a syndicate member for 57 percent
of IPOs where the book manager was Lehman Brothers.
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entire credit spectrum use syndicated loans. These two facts make empirical analysis of how information
asymmetry affects financial arrangements promising in this market.
1.4.1 Theoretical framework & empirical implementation
The basic theoretical framework I use is inspired by models in Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997), and Gorton and Pennachi (995). In this framework, the lead arranger is an "informed
lender" who is able to monitor and learn about the firm through unobservable and costly effort. Potential
participant lenders are "uninformed lenders" who rely on the information and monitoring provided by the
informed lender to make profitable investments in firms. There exists a moral hazard problem at the lead
arranger level, given that informed lender effort is unobservable. The informed lender's potential loss is
increasing in the portion of the loan it holds, and so the amount of effort exerted by the lead arranger in
due diligence and monitoring is declining in the portion of the loan it syndicates out to participants. At
the extreme, only long run reputation considerations govern due diligence by the lead arranger if the lead
arranger holds none of the loan (as in a debt underwriting, for example). In this framework, a lead
arranger exerts less effort than it would if its actions were fully observable. Participant lenders correctly
predict such "shirking" by the lead arranger, and they choose to hold less of the loan. Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) succinctly describe this aspect of their model by noting that "[uninformed lenders] invest
directly in the firm, but only after the monitor has taken a large enough financial interest in the firm that
the investors can be assured that the firm will behave diligently" (674).
In order to empirically implement this framework, I classify borrowing firms based on the need
for monitoring and due diligence; I refer to firms that need more monitoring and due diligence as
"opaque." When borrowers are relatively transparent and easy to monitor, the moral hazard problem for
the lead arranger is less severe. With transparent firms, traditional diversification incentives likely
determine the syndicate structure, and the lead arranger does not need to hold a relatively large share of
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the loan. " As the borrowing firm becomes more difficult to investigate and monitor (more "opaque"),
lead arrangers cannot credibly commit to the proper effort, and so they must hold a larger share of the
loan.
I use a variety of measures to classify firms as "opaque" and "transparent"; they are shaped both
by previous literature and by data limitations. The Dealscan data contain information about borrowing
firms limited to three variables: firm sales, ticker, and S&P senior unsecured debt rating. Using these
measures, I rank firms into three categories. First, "private" firms are firms with no ticker and no S&P
senior unsecured credit rating which lack publicly available SEC filings. Although audited accounting
information may be available for private firms, the identifying assumption is that participant lenders are
more dependent on the lead arranger for both its monitoring skills and its ability to collect detailed
information when the borrowing firm is not registered with the SEC. In addition, the penalties for
falsifying accounting information are less severe when a borrower is not SEC-supervised, which makes
monitoring by a lead arranger more important. The second group includes "unrated" firms; these are
public borrowers with publicly available accounting data that lack an S&P senior unsecured debt rating.
Finally, "transparent" firms are public with S&P senior unsecured debt ratings; these firms have publicly
available accounting information with credit quality measured by an independent third party. Information
asymmetry between lenders and the borrower and moral hazard are least severe on loans to these firms.
As noted above, I link all public firms (unrated and transparent) to Compustat. Among these
public firms, I follow previous literature and use the ratio of R&D investment to sales and the ratio of
accruals to total assets as measures of opacity among firms with publicly available SEC filings. Firms
with high R&D investment to sales ratios have earnings that depend on the realization of future
investment opportunities (Lorek, Stone, and Willinger (1999)); the evaluation of such future earnings
realizations is difficult and requires additional effort by the lead arranger. The use of positive accruals
has been shown to be associated with earnings inflation and opacity of cash flows (Teoh, Welch, and
" When borrowing firms are perfectly transparent, one prediction is that the monitoring and due diligence duties are
completely independent of holding a portion of the loan. This is precisely the case in a debt underwriting, when the
underwriter holds none of the debt issue.
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Wong (1998); Sloan (1996)). Firms that report positive accruals require more rigorous monitoring by a
financial institution, which exacerbates the moral hazard problem. I also use alternative measures which I
describe in the results.
Table 3 presents cell means and standard errors for private, unrated, and transparent borrowing
firms. Transparent firms are larger and obtain larger loans. In terms of syndicate structure, transparent
firms have a larger number of lenders, lead arrangers, and participant lenders. On average, the lead
arranger holds almost twice the share of the loan when the borrowing firm is private (38 percent) or
unrated (35 percent) compared to transparent (20 percent), and the syndicate is more concentrated
(Herfindahls of 3400 and 3100 compared to 1600). These last two facts give preliminary evidence of the
effect of information asymmetry on syndicate structure; I show in the next section that these patterns are
robust in a more rigorous empirical specification that controls for size differences.
1.4.2 Information asymmetry syndicate structure regressions
In this section, I examine how variation in the opacity of borrowing firms affects syndicate
structure, and whether the effect is consistent with the information asymmetry hypotheses outlined above.
The general formulation of equations estimated in Table 4 is:
12
Syndi = a + E Yeardumt + XWi + Opaqueiy + i (1)
/=1
The left hand side variables are measures of the syndicate, such as number of lead arrangers, number of
participants, and the percentage retained by the lead arranger. The key right hand side variable of interest
is Opaque, which represents measures, described above, of the need for a financial institution to
investigate and monitor the borrower. The control variables (X) include industry indicator variables, the
natural log of firm sales, the natural log of maturity of the loan in days, the natural log of the number of
loan tranches, and an indicator variable for whether a loan deal contains a term loan. 12 As is evidenced in
Table 3, the size of the loan varies widely between private, unrated, and investment grade firms; I control
12 Another loan characteristic available for some loans in the sample is whether the loan is collateralized.
Unfortunately, these data are available for only about 40 percent of the sample. For this sub-sample, I have run all
regressions with the inclusion of a collateral indicator variable. The core results are unchanged.
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for the size of the loan by sorting the sample into three groups based on the size of the loan, and allowing
the intercept and the natural log of the size of the loan to vary by each group. 13 The key coefficient of
interest is y, or how increased "opacity" affects syndicate structure. In other words, measures whether
lead arrangers hold more of the loan, form a more concentrated syndicate, or select fewer participants
when the borrowing firm is more difficult to investigate or monitor. Finally, all standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the firm level. ' 4
Table 4, Panel A presents the estimates using transparent borrowing firms as the omitted group.
The top 2 rows show that loans to private and unrated firms have fewer participant lenders, a more
concentrated syndicate, and the lead arranger holds more of the loan (whether measured by the percent or
amount of the loan). Columns (1) and (2) show the results on the full sample. Column (2) shows that
private firms have 25 percent fewer participant lenders than transparent firmns at the mean, after
controlling for the size of the loan and the size of the firm. Columns (3) through (7) isolate the sample to
loans where the amount held by each syndicate member is available. In the sub-sample, the number of
lead arrangers does not appear to be different, but the number of participants for more opaque firms is
lower. The percent held by the lead arranger is 10 percent higher for private firms at the mean, and the
syndicate structure is 10 percent more concentrated using the Herfindahl index.
The results in Table 4, Panel A are consistent with the theoretical framework of agency and moral
hazard outlined above. Firms that lack SEC filings are more difficult to investigate and monitor, which
exacerbates the moral hazard problem of the lead arranger. When borrowing firms lack publicly available
SEC filings, participant lenders are more reliant on the lead arranger for detailed information on the
borrower. Also, the absence of SEC oversight reduces the penalties for borrowing firms from
manipulating or overstating financial health or earnings. Thus, firms that lack SEC filings also require
additional monitoring. Unrated firms have public SEC filings, but lack a publicly available third party
13 In robustness checks in Section 5, I address the concern that syndicate structure and the size of the loan are jointly
determined, and so the size of the loan should not be treated as exogenous.
14 Between and random effects estimation yields almost identical results as the clustering on firm approach. I also
do fixed effects estimates that I report in the text.
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debt evaluation. The point estimates in Table 4, Panel A present an ordering consistent with moral hazard
in a setting of information asymmetry. Lead arrangers retain the largest share of the loan and form the
most concentrated syndicates with the fewest participants when borrowing firms are private. The same
pattern is observed, to a weaker degree, when borrowing firms are public but unrated. The ordering of the
estimated coefficients in column (2) for private and unrated firms is statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
Table 4, Panel B offers additional specifications to test the robustness of these results. One
possible problem with the results in Table 4, Panel A is that private and unrated borrowing firms are not
comparable to transparent firms given differences in unobservable characteristics correlated with (but not
perfectly captured by) size.15 In columns (1) through (3), I limit the sample to all transparent firms and
only private and unrated firms above median sales ($250M). When comparing the largest private and
unrated firms, the point estimates are very similar (with standard errors slightly higher due to a smaller
sample). I use various measures from Compustat to see if the core predictions of the information
asymmetry framework hold true when looking among public firms. Columns (4) through (6) use an
alternative measure of opacity for public firms based on the R&D to sales ratio. Firms with higher R&D
to sales ratio have fewer participants and a more concentrated syndicate. In columns (7) through (9), I use
the accrual to assets ratio as a measure of the necessity of monitoring. Public firms that require more
intense monitoring, measured with the accruals to total assets ratio, have a higher percentage of the loan
retained by the lead arranger, and a more concentrated syndicated. In addition to these two measures, I
also use years since IPO (older firms are more transparent) and the number of times a firm has accessed
the syndicated loan market (firms that have already accessed market are more transparent). All results are
robust to these two measures. Even among public firms, when the borrowing firms requires more intense
effort for due diligence and monitoring, the lead arranger retains a larger share in the loan and forms a
more concentrated syndicate.
151 use a set of comprehensive controls for the size of the loan and size of the firm in order to partial out this effect.
Below, I also address this worry using fixed effects regressions and evaluating the within-firm change in syndicate
structure when a given firm goes from private to transparent or vice versa.
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I interpret these results as evidence of moral hazard with respect to lead arranger effort in
monitoring and due diligence. An alternative explanation is a signaling model based on adverse selection.
If a lead arranger has private information on a borrower unavailable to participant lenders, it may be
tempted to syndicate out more of a loan when private information is negative. Participant lenders
correctly predict such behavior, and the lead arranger is forced to "signal" that the loan is of high quality;
the lead arranger retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when
information asymmetry is severe. Can these two hypotheses be empirically distinguished? The key
distinction in the adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses is the assumption of where information
asymmetry lies. In the adverse selection hypothesis, the lead arranger has private information on the firm
that is unknown to participant lenders. In the moral hazard hypothesis, all lenders are unfamiliar with the
borrower and the moral hazard problem is most severe when the lead arranger must itself learn about the
firm.
To distinguish these two hypotheses, I use previous lending relationships between the borrower
and the lead arranger as a measure of the information advantage of the lead arranger with respect to
participant lenders. If the adverse selection hypothesis is true, then a lead arranger with a previous
relationship with the borrower should be forced to retain more of the loan and form a more concentrated
syndicate. The prediction is the opposite under the moral hazard hypothesis; a lead arranger with a
previous lending relationship with the borrower has already put in the effort required to learn about the
firm, and so should be able to retain less of the loan and form a more diffuse syndicate. Table 4, Panel C
tests these alternative hypotheses. I group both private and unrated firms into an "opaque" group and
include an indicator variable for the presence of a previous lending relationship between the borrower and
lead arranger. In addition, I interact these two variables and control for the number of previous loans by a
borrower. The results support the moral hazard hypothesis. On deals where a previous lending
relationship is present, the lead arranger retains a smaller portion of the loan and forms a more diffuse
syndicate with more participants. While the result is true for all firms for the percentage retained by the
lead arranger and the concentration of the syndicate (the level effect of a previous loan is significant), it is
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only true for opaque firms for the number of participants (the interaction term is significant). The results
suggest that problems of information asymmetry are less severe when the lead arranger has a previous
lending relationship with the borrower, which supports the moral hazard interpretation.
1.4.3 Participant choice and information asymmetry
1. Characteristics of Participant Lenders
This section explores how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the
syndicated loan market affects which participant lenders end up as syndicate members. I examine
whether lead arrangers select potential participants that are more familiar with the borrowing firm when
information asymmetry problems are potentially severe.' 16 In particular, I focus on two different
questions. First, what are the characteristics of the lender given that the lender is chosen as a participant,
and how do these characteristics vary with the opacity of the borrower? Second, what lender
characteristics affect the probability that a given lender is chosen as a participant, and how do these
characteristics differentially affect the probability when the borrower is opaque? For example, I am
interested in the percentage of chosen participants that are foreign financial institutions, and whether that
percentage increases or decreases when the borrowing firm is opaque. I am also interested in how being a
foreign financial institution affects the probability of being chosen as a participant, and how this effect
varies with the opacity of the firm.
The analysis in this section focuses only on lenders in the top 125 participants or top 00 lead
arrangers, by number of deals. These top lenders account for 72,401 out of the total of 87,956
participants in the sample, or about 83 percent. The inclusion ratio is similar across all types of firms: 78
percent for opaque firms, 81 percent for unrated firms, and 84 percent for transparent firms. There is one
important limitation in the Dealscan data with regard to lead arranger-participant relationships. When
more than one lead arranger is present, I cannot distinguish which lead arranger brought a given
16 use the language that the lead arranger "chooses" the participant lenders. This is the most common direction of
"choice" in the market, but it is a simplification. All theoretical predictions are identical if participants "choose"
deals on which to serve. I am interested more in the efficiency of syndicate membership than how that efficiency is
reached.
31
participant to the syndicate. For example, if Bank 1 and Bank 2 are lead arrangers and Bank 3 is a
participant, I cannot infer which lead arranger brought Bank 3 to the deal. This presents a problem in
tracking previous relationships between lead arrangers and participants, and in analyzing how the
relationship affects the current deal. When I analyze lead arranger-participant relationships, I limit the
sample to loans where there is exactly one lead arranger. This limitation reduces the sample to 8,960
loans and 44,845 participants.' 7
Table 5 presents the characteristics of chosen participants by the credit reputation of the
borrower. Participants on loans to private borrowers are smaller and better-capitalized. The participants
are more likely to be foreign when the borrowing firm is transparent. Relative to when borrowers have
public credit ratings, chosen participant lenders are 8 percent more likely to be in the same region or
census division, and 4 percent more likely to be in the same state as the borrowing firm when the
borrowing firm is private or unrated. In other words, participant lenders for rated companies are more
likely to be foreign banks, and more likely to be further away from the borrowing firm even conditional
on being a domestic bank. Compared to rated firms, the lead arranger chooses participants that are
geographically closer to the borrowing firm when the borrowing firm has no public financial information.
In terms of previous direct lending relationships, chosen participant lenders are more likely to
have been a former lead or former participant for the borrowing firm when the borrowing firm is
transparent. A total of 18 percent of participants on transparent deals are previous leads for the borrowing
firm, and 65 percent are previous participants. The numbers are 10 percent and 48 percent when the
borrowing firm is private. This last result, however, should be viewed with caution. Transparent firms
have far more previous loans in the sample, and more lead arrangers and participants per previous loan.
Transparent firms thus mechanically have a higher probability of having a previous relationship with a
given participant. Using the fraction of previous firm loans on which a participant lender was a previous
lead or participant is one way to adjust for this problem, and the results show no statistical difference
17 limit the sample to deals with exactly 1 lead arranger only when evaluating relationships between lead arrangers
and participants. For the rest of the analysis, I use the entire sample.
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between transparent, unrated, and private firms. However, even this statistic is problematic because
transparent firms have more leads and participants per previous loan, so again there is a mechanical
relationship. As I demonstrate below, a better way to understand how previous relationships impact the
choice of participants is to ask the converse question: how do previous relationships with a firm affect the
probability of being chosen as a participant?
The bottom section of Table 5 displays the basic differences in lead arranger-participant
relationships for the sub-sample of loans with exactly 1 lead arranger. The overall percentage of
participants that are in the same region, census division, or state as the lead arranger is relatively small
compared to the percentage in the same region as the borrowing firm. 8 In addition, the variation across
the credit spectrum is limited. In terms of the fraction of previous deals led by the lead arranger,
participants are on a lower fraction when the borrowing firm is private or unrated. These results suggest
that lead arranger-participant relationships are in fact slightly more persistent on transparent loans.
2. Participant choice probit analysis
The second part of the participant analysis asks the converse question: what factors influence the
probability of a lender being chosen as a participant on a given deal? To answer this question, I employ a
maximum likelihood probit choice model similar to the model used in Corwin and Schultz (2005) to
describe the choice of IPO syndicate members. I define the "potential" participant choice set as all
financial institutions that represent at least 0.5 percent of all participants for syndicated loans for the year
of the loan in question. The probit analysis seeks to explain what factors influence the probability of a
financial institution being chosen. More specifically, I estimate a probit of the following form:
Pr(Participant = Bank
.
) = f (a + /J * Loani + y * Bankj + e0 ) (2)
I am interested in how the characteristics of loan i and the characteristics of bankj influence the
probability that bankj is chosen as a participant on loan i. The critical parameter of interest is y, and I am
particularly interested in how y varies with the opacity of the borrowing firm. For example, how does the
8 Foreign participants are considered in the same state and census division if they are in the same country as the
lead arranger, and the same region if they are from the same continent.
33
existence of a previous relationship between a lender and a borrowing firm influence the probability of
being chosen as a participant, and how does this vary by the opacity of the borrowing firm?
This analysis is not a standard multinomial choice model as in McFadden's (1974) multinomial
logit framework where there are x potential outcomes and one is chosen. Instead, there are x potential
outcomes and any number of them can be chosen. Amemiya (1974) addresses maximum likelihood
probit estimation in a setting where multiple outcomes can be simultaneously chosen. His analysis
implies that the proper maximum likelihood technique in this setting is to fit a probit estimation where
one analyzes the probability that any given potential lender is chosen as a participant. One critical
component of the analysis is the correlation structure of the error terms within a choice set. For example,
the fact that bankj is chosen on deal i affects whether or not bank k is chosen on deal i. Instead of
imposing any specific structure on the joint distribution of error terms for potential participants on the
same loan, I allow the correlation to vary through clustering. My approach is more rigorous than that
proposed by Amemiya (1974); I allow the error terms to be freely correlated across all potential syndicate
members on a given loanfor all of a given firm's loans. Some firms have more than 1 loan, and I allow
errors to be correlated for all potential participants on any of the loans.
Table 6 presents the estimates. Transparent firms are the omitted group. Coefficients in Table 6
are marginal changes in probability and coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. In
addition to the variables reported, the estimation includes all deal level variables included in the syndicate
structure analysis in Table 4, the size and capital position of the potential participant lenders, and the
intercept is allowed to vary by credit reputation. Columns (1) and (2) ignore previous lending
relationships between the borrowing firm and potential participants in order to examine the entire sample
that includes first time borrowers. The results in column (1) demonstrate that being in the same region as
the borrowing firm increases the probability of being chosen as a participant by 6.5 percent (on a mean of
8.3 percent), and being a foreign or unregulated domestic financial institution is negatively related to
being chosen as a participant. Column (2) examines how these effects vary as firms require more intense
due diligence and monitoring effort. The results in column (2) show that being in the same region as the
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borrowing firm increases the probability that a lender is chosen by 5.3 percent for transparent firms; the
interaction terms show that this effect becomes 6.7 to 7.1 percent for private and unrated firms.
Columns (3) and (4) limit the sample to borrowing firms that have at least one previous loan in
the entire Dealscan data set of loans from 1990 to 2003. One result is immediately apparent: there is a
large amount of persistence in lender-borrowing firm relationships. Column (3) shows that a former
participant for a borrowing firm is 26.7 percent more likely to be chosen as participant on the current deal.
When I interact previous relationships with the credit reputation of the borrowing firm (column 4), I find
that former relationships are relatively more important when the borrowing firm is private or unrated. For
example, a lender that is a former lead arranger for a borrowing firm is 5.9 percent more likely to be
chosen as a participant, but the effect is 50 percent stronger when the borrowing firm is private. A lender
that is a former participant for a firm is 25 percent more likely to be chosen as a participant, but the effect
is more than 10 percent stronger if the borrowing firm is private or unrated.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 provide further evidence to support the moral hazard interpretation
of earlier results. If the lead arranger cannot commit to exert costly and unobservable effort in its
monitoring and investigation of the firm, one strategy is to choose participants that are closer to the
borrowing firm (both in terms of geographical location and previous relationships). The results in Tables
5 and 6 show that lead arrangers pursue this strategy, and do so more strongly when public information on
the borrowing firm is limited.
How do lead arranger-participant relationships affect participant choice? Table 7 presents a
probit analysis identical to Table 6, but on the sub-sample of loans with exactly one lead arranger and
with the inclusion of lead arranger-participant relationship measures. The results in columns (1) and (3)
imply that being in the same region as the lead arranger and having been on a recent syndicate with the
lead arranger both positively affect the probability of being chosen as a participant. However, the effects
are rather small, especially when compared with the effects of being a former lead or participant for the
borrowing firm. Column (3) shows that a lender that served on a syndicate with the lead arranger in the
previous quarter is 2.4 percent more likely to be chosen as a participant. A lender that served as a
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participant for the borrowing firm is 27.5 percent more likely to be chosen as a participant. Moreover, the
effect of lead arranger-participant relationships does not vary by borrowing firm opacity. Neither the
effect of being in the same region as the lead arranger nor the effect of being on a recent syndicate with
the lead arranger differs when the firm is private or unrated. The overall results in Table 7 suggest that
previous lead arranger-participant relationships are relatively less important than previous borrowing
firm-participant relationships, and that lead arranger-participant relationships are no more persistent on
loans to private or unrated firms. The findings suggest that a lead arranger selects participants based on
the participant's familiarity with the borrowing firm, not based on the participant's familiarity with the
lead arranger itself
1.5 Renegotiation
Incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1988); Hart and Moore
(1990); and Hart (1995)) emphasizes the importance of control rights and renegotiation when contracts
cannot be made contingent on all possible future outcomes. Incomplete contract theory has been used to
explain corporate financial policy (Hart (1995); Dewatripont & Tirole (1994)), the structure and terms of
debt contracts (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)) and the instruments used by venture capital firms (Kaplan
and Stromberg (2002)). While there is an increasing empirical literature on the impact of control rights on
financial contracts, empirical research that examines the importance of renegotiation on ex-ante contract
structure remains scarce.
Renegotiation is a prevalent and important part of the syndicated loan market. Amendments to
original loan agreements are common and practitioners say that renegotiation considerations are a factor
when the original loan agreement is signed. In the syndicated loan market, unanimity of all syndicate
members is required for any change in major terms of the original loan. Both the prevalence of
renegotiation and the unanimity provision in renegotiation make this market a promising empirical
laboratory for exploring incomplete contract theory and renegotiation.
1.5.1 Theoretical framework & empirical implementation
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The theoretical framework presented here is based on models by Hart and Moore (1988) and
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). In this framework, borrowing firms are able to engage in actions, such as
cash diversion, that are observable to lenders but non-verifiable in a court of law. Diversion makes
default (violating a financial covenant or missing a payment) on a syndicated loan more likely. Once the
borrowing firm enters into a state of default, it wants to renegotiate the terms of the loan. Given the
required unanimity of syndicate members to change loan terms, renegotiation occurs when there is
enough surplus to induce all lenders to agree to a new contract. While renegotiation may be desirable ex-
post, the ability of the borrower to easily extract renegotiation surplus is ex-ante bad for managerial
incentives at the borrowing firm. If management at the borrowing firm can extract a large portion of the
renegotiation surplus, shirking and diversion of cash flows will be more common. If the lead arranger
wants to prevent diversion, then it may choose a syndicate structure that reduces the expected value from
renegotiation for the borrower in order to improve managerial incentives. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
show that lenders are able to discipline managers by increasing the number of lenders. Through Nash
bargaining, more lenders lead to a smaller surplus retained by the borrower in the renegotiation.
The Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) model predicts a larger syndicate when firms are more likely
to strategically default. Of course, borrowers may default through no fault of their own (liquidity
deJault). Both in theory and practice, the firms that are more likely to have a liquidity default are the
same firms that are able to strategically default. In the context of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) where
outcomes are observable but not verifiable, courts will likely be able to dismiss a claim by cash-rich high
quality borrowers with low leverage ratios that true default is pending.' 9 In an alternative model where
outcomes are not fully observable to lenders, a borrower that lacks a credible probability of liquidity
default is fully revealed as lying when it attempts to strategically default. In theory, therefore, firms that
are more likely to default through no fault of their own are precisely the same firms that are able to
strategically default. There are two effects that ultimately shape the optimal number of syndicate
19 In the model, a borrower strategically defaults by claiming it has low earnings when it actually has high earnings.
Such a claim is only reasonable if the low earnings outcome is possible. That is, firms that have very low
probabilities of low earnings are "outside" the framework of strategic default.
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members for loans to these firms. Lenders want to facilitate renegotiation when a true liquidity default
occurs. At the same time, lenders want to make renegotiation more difficult when borrowers attempt to
strategically default. The key question I answer in this section is: which type of default is more
influential in syndicate formation?
I answer this question by examining the differences in syndicate structure on loans to "safe" firms
versus firms that have an ex-ante non-trivial probability of default. In order to limit the interaction with
information asymmetry predictions, the empirical analysis in this section focuses only on firms with
publicly available credit ratings. I use credit ratings, leverage ratios, and interest coverage ratios to
measure the ex-ante probability that default and subsequent renegotiation will occur.
Standard diversification motivations also influence the optimal number of creditors. Lenders
want to limit exposure on loans where potential losses are more likely. A main empirical challenge is to
determine whether the optimal number of creditors is shaped by renegotiation considerations or standard
diversification motives. The unanimity clause in the syndicated loan market is the key feature I use to
distinguish between the two. Absolute unanimity is required to renegotiate major terms of the loan
(amount, principal, interest, or maturity). In some cases, unanimity is also required to renegotiate
financial covenant violations. This disproportionate voting power for syndicate members holding even
small amounts of the loan is a key feature I exploit in my empirical strategy.
Table 8 presents data that show the importance of financial covenants and renegotiation in the
syndicated loan market. Panel A of Table 8 shows the prevalence of covenants restricting asset sales and
mergers, and financial covenants. Asset sales and financial covenants are more common on loans to high
yield firms (37 percent and 62 percent, respectively) than loans to investment grade firms (5 percent and
38 percent respectively). Table 8 also lists the 3 most common types of financial covenants.
A syndicated loan is technically in "default" if the borrower fails to meet one of these financial
covenants or fails to make a specified interest payment. The lending syndicate has the option to
accelerate the loan which can force the borrower into Chapter 11 proceedings. However, immediate
acceleration of the loan is not common. Instead, syndicate members usually agree to a loan
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"amendment," or a restructuring plan or new set of covenants, in exchange for a renegotiation fee paid by
the borrowing firm. If the amendment changes any aspect with regard to interest payments, maturity, the
amount of the loan, or collateral, all syndicate members must agree to the new contract amendment.
Practitioner interviews suggest that even lenders holding very small portions of the loan have the effective
power of rejecting the renegotiated contract and forcing the acceleration of the loan.
Panel B of Table 8 examines renegotiation data available in Dealscan. The Loan Pricing
Corporation only reports amendment data where they are self-reported by the lending syndicate members.
The renegotiation data are therefore incomplete, and should be viewed only as a window into the types of
renegotiation, not a comprehensive inventory of all renegotiations that occur. The data are more widely
reported on deals to high yield firms (21 percent versus 5 percent). Table 8 also lists the 4 most common
amendments to the loan, which include a relaxation of financial covenants, increasing the amount of the
loan, changing the pricing of the loan, and relaxation of covenants restricting asset sales.
1.5.2 Renegotiation syndicate structure regressions
In this section, I use syndicate structure regressions to examine how variation in the default risk
of borrowing firmns affects syndicate structure. I examine this effect to see whether strategic or liquidity
default considerations are more important in syndicate formation. The analysis is limited to loans to
public firms with S&P senior unsecured debt ratings. The general formulation of equations estimated in
Table 9 is:
12Syndi = a + E Yeardumt + Xi, + Defaulti + i (3)
t=1
The left hand side variables are measures of the syndicate, such as number of lead arrangers, number of
participants, and the percentage retained by the lead arranger. The key right hand side variable of interest
is L)efault, which is a measure of the borrower's likelihood of missing an interest payment or violating a
financial covenant. The likelihood of default is measured with the senior unsecured debt rating and the
leverage ratio. Firms with a rating of BB+ or worse are classified as "high yield" and firms with a rating
of BB- or better are "investment grade." The leverage ratio is a continuous measure of the default
39
probability.20 The control variables are identical to those described in Section 4. All standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the firm level.
Table 9, Panel A presents the estimated coefficients. Columns (1) and (2) use the entire set of
loans to rated companies, and show that the number of participants is higher for high yield firms, a result
that is statistically different from 0 at the 5 percent level. Columns (3) through (8) limit the sample to
only loans where the share held by each syndicate member is available. As shown in columns (3) and (4),
the number of lead arrangers is higher on loans to high yield firms and firms with high leverage.
Consistent with column (2), columns (5) and (6) show that firms more likely to default, whether measured
by credit ratings or leverage ratios, have more participant lenders.2' Columns (7) and (8) show that lead
arrangers do not hold less of the loan when borrowing firms are more likely to default. In other words,
the lead arranger adds participants to the syndicate, but it does not syndicate out more of the loan. This
finding suggests that lead arrangers do not add participants for their own diversification needs.
Table 9, Panel B further explores the effect of renegotiation considerations on syndicate structure.
Columns (1) and (2) show that lending syndicates for borrowers more likely to default are no less
concentrated. In fact, the point estimates imply that the syndicate structure is slightly more concentrated
(although the results are only significantly different than 0 at the 20 percent level). Columns (1) and (2)
point to a conundrum; lead arrangers add more participants to the syndicate when the borrowing firm has
a higher probability of default, but they do not syndicate out more of the loan, and do not spread the loan
more evenly among more participants. This moves us away from diversification as a sole explanation for
the added lenders. Syndicates on loans to firms more likely to default have more lenders, but the same
20A1l results in this section are robust to using the interest coverage ratio and the lagged three year standard deviation
of return on assets as alternative measures of default probability.
2'This result is the opposite of those in Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Table V, who find that syndicate size is
decreasing in credit risk. This discrepancy is due to the fact that Lee and Mullineaux (2004) do not control for
borrower size. Investment grade firms are on average 3 times larger than high yield firms in my sample. In
addition, Lee and Mullineaux (2004) control only for the level of the loan amount. In my sample, the natural
logarithm of loan amount is significantly stronger in predicting syndicate size; univariate R2 is 0.27 when regressing
syndicate size on the level of the loan amount and 0.49 when using the natural logarithm of the loan amount. I am
able to replicate very similar findings as Lee and Mullineaux (2004) when using their specification, but show that
the findings change when controlling for log assets and log amount (all data work available from author upon
request).
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concentration. This is possible only if some lenders hold very small portions of the loan. Columns (3)
through (6) document this phenomenon. When the borrowing firm has a higher probability of default, the
lead arranger is more likely to add participants who hold very small portions of the loan. The result is
robust whether I measure "small portions" using an absolute amount (less than $5 million) or a share of
the loan (less than 2 percent). The coefficient on the high yield indicator indicates that a firm likely to
default has on average 0.62 more participants holding less than 2 percent of the loan (on a mean of 1.5 in
this sample).
All lenders can veto renegotiation; therefore, participant lenders holding even small portions of
the loan have disproportionate voting power in the syndicate. The results suggest that lead arrangers add
participant lenders holding small amounts to make renegotiation more difficult. If lead arrangers form
large syndicates only to better diversify risk, then larger syndicates would be more disperse and the lead
arranger would choose to hold a smaller portion of the loan. This is not the case. Diversification alone
cannot explain the fact that participant lenders with very small amounts are added to the syndicate.
Distinguishing between diversification incentives and renegotiation considerations is difficult.
Clearly, both play an important role in syndicate formation to firms with high default probability. Figure
1 provides further evidence that it is not diversification alone that drives syndicate formation. It maps the
difference in the number of participants on loans to high yield and investment grade firms that hold a
given percentage of the loan, after controlling for the size of the loan. The difference between the number
of lenders holding a given percentage of the loan is most pronounced among very small percentages (< 2
percent) and quickly disappears at 4 percent of the loan and above. High yield firms have on average 1
more participant holding less than 2 percent of the loan than investment grade firms, which is 65 percent
more at the mean. To put this into perspective, 2 percent of the average loan to rated firms is about $11
million, or less than /2 of 1 basis point of the total average assets of a lender in the sample. A standard
diversification argument implies that participant lenders want to limit their exposure; it does not explain
why the difference is so pronounced at extremely small portions of the loan, and non-existent at levels
just above 2 percent.
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One alternative explanation of the above result is that the choice set of participant lenders facing
lead arrangers for high yield firms is different than the choice set for investment grade firms. Perhaps the
types of lenders in the high yield market are peripheral players that only accept small amounts of the loan.
This, however, does not appear to be the case. Of the top 20 lenders that most often hold less than 2
percent of loans to high yield firms, 19 are commercial banks and none are small peripheral participants.
Bank of America, Bank of New York, and ABN-AMRO are major players for all sectors of the
syndicated loan market, and are the top 3 participants that hold less than 2 percent of loans to high yield
firms.
Overall, the results suggest that lenders choose to make renegotiation more difficult when
borrowers have a high probability of default. The results suggest that potential strategic default is more
influential in syndicate formation than liquidity default.
1.5.3 Robustness of results
1. Fixed effects estimates
All identification of coefficients in Tables 4 and 9 come from between-firm variation in credit
reputation. One possible concern is that a regression analysis comparing different firms might be biased
due to firm-specific omitted variables. Table 10 exploits within-firm variation for 2,889 firms which have
2 or more loans in the sample in order to see if the core results are robust to a within-firm analysis. Of
these firms, there are 89 firms that go from private to the unrated or transparent category (mostly through
IPOs) and 93 that go from the transparent or unrated category to private (mostly by emerging from
bankruptcy). In addition to variation in the availability of public filings, there is also within-firm
variation in credit ratings. To exploit the within-firm variation in the sample, I estimate the following
fixed effects specification:
12
Synd
.
= a1 + Yeardumt + Xij fJ + fi CreditQualityij + c0 (3)
t=1
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That is, I estimate how within-firm variation in the credit quality of firmj affects the syndicate structure
for loan i. Standard errors reported in the tables are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the
borrowing firm level.
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 10 test whether the core information asymmetry results in
Table 4 are robust to a fixed effects specification. The result that private and unrated firms have fewer
lenders on their syndicates is robust and is driven by a fall in the number of participants. The point
estimate in column (3) indicates that a given private firm has almost 25 percent fewer lenders relative to
the period when the same firm is public with a credit rating. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 10 test whether
the core renegotiation results in Table 9 are robust to a fixed effects specification. In these tables, I
isolate the sample to rated firms. The point estimate in Column (4) shows that a given firm has more
participants when it is high yield relative to when it is investment grade, but the estimate is not
statistically distinct from 0 at the 10 percent level. Column (5) uses a sharper measure of the within-firm
change in credit rating. I construct an upgrade and downgrade indicator variable that is turned on if the
firm switches from investment grade to high yield or vice versa, respectively. Column (5) reports an
increase in the number of participants when a firm experiences a downgrade. The point estimate is even
stronger than the cross-section analysis, and is significant at the 5 percent level.
The results in Table 10 show that the core results of the between-firm analysis are robust to a
fixed effects specification. In other words, syndicate structure responds in the hypothesized manner even
when looking at within-firm changes in credit reputation. This helps to allay concerns that unobservable
firm differences are inducing bias in the cross-section estimates in Tables 4 and 9.
The sample size for fixed effects analysis of the shares held by each lender is too small to obtain
precise estimates. As noted above, the amount of the loan held by each lender is available only for about
one third of the overall sample, and even a smaller share for the fixed-effects sample. I do not report
coefficients from the fixed effects regressions where the Herfindahl of the syndicate or the amount held
by each lead arranger is the dependent variable. In these regressions, the coefficient estimates are similar
to those reported in Tables 4 through 9, but none of the estimates are statistically significant.
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2. Exogeneity of loan characteristics
One important concern with the results in the syndicate structure regressions is the proposed
exogeneity of loan characteristics to the structure of the syndicate. I use loan amount and loan maturity as
exogenous right hand side variables when explaining syndicate structure, but they may implicitly be a
function of the syndicate structure itself. The exogeneity assumption is motivated by the actual process of
loan syndication; the general terms of the loan are decided before the lead arranger forms the syndicate.
However, loan characteristics could be determined by potential syndicate structure considerations. For
example, a lead arranger could know with certainty that 5 participants will each contribute $5 million for
a given firm, and the amount of the loan becomes a function of the number of participant lenders. The
core empirical tests of this chapter are not concerned with the coefficients on the loan characteristics such
as loan amount or maturity. Instead, the key coefficient estimates of interest are those measuring the
effect of the credit reputation of the firm on syndicate structure. However, if endogeneity of loan
characteristics (loan amount, maturity, etc.) affects syndicate structure in a manner that also biases
coefficients on credit reputation, then the core results may be questioned.
I do a variety of robustness checks to address this concern. First, all core results are robust to the
complete exclusion of all loan characteristics. Even without controlling for the loan amount, the loan
maturity, the number of loan tranches, and the presence of a term loan tranche, I find that firms that are
more opaque, by a number of measures, have fewer lenders with more concentrated syndicates. I also
find that firms with higher ex-post default probabilities have more participants but no less concentrated
lending syndicates. Second, I use an instrumental variables strategy to instrument for the loan amount.2 2
I instrument loan amount using lagged capital expenditures at the borrowing firm, with the identifying
assumption being that lagged capital expenditures affect the syndicate structure of a given loan only
though its effect on the loan amount. All results from the IV specification are almost identical to those
found in Tables 4 and 9. These results are not reported but are available from the author.
22 instrument for loan amount, as opposed to loan maturity or any other loan characteristic, because it is the only
loan characteristic that has a meaningful effect on the credit reputation variables.
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1.6 Conclusion & future research
Syndicated lending represents an important source of corporate finance. Privately-held, high
yield, and investment grade firms all utilize this financial product, and almost $1 trillion in new
syndicated loans are signed every year. The Federal Reserve Shared National Credit program reports
over $1.3 trillion in outstanding syndicated loan commitments to non-financial businesses in 2003. This
chapter explores this market and finds important results that help explain how it functions. In particular, I
focus on two hypotheses derived from corporate finance theory: how information asymmetry and ex-post
renegotiation concerns affect syndicate structure and choice of participants.
My results suggest that syndicate structure and the choice of participant lenders reflect basic
hypotheses of existing theory literature on moral hazard and renegotiation. First, I find that when
borrowing firms need more intense investigation and monitoring effort by the lead arranger, the syndicate
structure has fewer participants, a higher percentage retained by the lead arranger, and a higher general
concentration. In addition, lead arrangers are more likely to choose participants that are "close" to these
firms. These results are robust when using numerous variables to measure "opacity," or the need for
monitoring and investigation. These findings are also robust to within-firm, fixed effects analysis. The
evidence suggests that, when the borrower requires more intense investigation and monitoring, the lead
arranger commits by taking a large financial stake in the credit. These findings also provide support for
models that emphasize the importance of "informed" capital to the financial health of small firms with
little or no public information (for example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). The importance of lead
arranger capital in syndicated loans to opaque firms provides insight into why these firms might be the
most adversely affected in banking credit crunches.
Second, I document the importance of renegotiation in this market, and find evidence that ex-ante
syndicate structure is influenced by ex-post renegotiation concerns. In my results, lenders appear to form
syndicates in order to make renegotiation difficult and deter strategic default. I conduct several empirical
tests to show that lead arrangers appear to engage in "participant-loading" when borrowing firms have
non-trivial probabilities of default; that is, lead arrangers add participants with small portions of the loan
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to syndicates when renegotiation is a real possibility. The core results are robust to within-firm and
between-firm variation, and to a variety of measurements of default probability. Given that unanimity of
syndicate members is required to renegotiate terms of the loan, participant loading decreases both the
probability of and payoff to successful renegotiation. The disproportionate voting power of lenders with
even very small portions of the loan allows me to distinguish between renegotiation and standard
diversification motives. The evidence suggests that lead arrangers attempt to reduce strategic default
behavior by reducing the attractiveness of default. Liquidity default considerations do not appear as
important in syndicate formation as strategic default considerations.
The findings of this chapter point to new avenues for future research, two of which I outline here.
First, I have not explored what explains the rapid growth of the syndicated loan market in the last two
decades. In a related area, I have not focused on whether the growth of the syndicated loan market has
resulted in a lower cost of capital or improved liquidity management for borrowing firms. There is
anecdotal evidence that the syndicated loan market is an attractive alternative to the high yield bond
market (in terms of lower prices and the ability to renegotiate), and that it allows privately-held firms
access to previously untapped large sources of capital. The primary data source used by corporate finance
researchers, Compustat, does not break out bank debt from public debt, and contains no information on
unused lines of credit. An examination of 10-Ks is the most direct research strategy for answering these
questions, and something I am currently pursuing.
Second, syndicated loans are an avenue for continued empirical research on the importance of
renegotiation in corporate finance. While this chapter analyzes the effect of renegotiation on ex-ante
syndicate structure, another important line of research would help explain how larger lending syndicates
affect ex-post renegotiation and Chapter 11 filings when firms become financially distressed.2 3 In other
words, this chapter asks, how do future renegotiation considerations affect initial syndicate structure? An
equally interesting question is, how does the syndicate structure affect future renegotiation in financial
23Renegotiation in financial distress has been examined by Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) and Gilson,
John, and Lang ( 990). These papers do not, however, focus specifically on syndicated loans.
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distress? Further exploration of the exact contracting strategies used by banks (and the renegotiation
outcomes) would be informative for researchers focused on the importance of renegotiation.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Syndicated
This table presents summary statistics on the sample of 14,021
5,011 firms from 1991-2003.
Loan Deals
syndicated loan deals representing
Firm Characteristics
Total sales ($M)
S&P unsecured debt rating (1 = AAA)
Compustat data available
Total assets (book value, $M)
Leverage (book debt/book assets)
Earnings to assets
R&D expense to sales ratio
Accruals to total assets ratio
Syndicated loan characteristics
Size of deal ($M)
Maturity (days)
Number of loan tranches
Deal includes term loan
N
14021
6464
10703
10703
10703
4659
9909
14021
14021
14021
14021
Mean
3127
10.1
4970
0.35
0.08
0.03
-0.04
358
1140
1.35
0.23
SD
9715
3.78
14249
0.2
0.08
0.04
0.08
706
801
0.69
0.42
Distribution
l0oth 5 0 th
72 629
6 10
132
0.1
0
0
-0.12
1020
0.33
0.08
0.01
-0.04
35 150
364 1095
1 1
0 0
Syndicate structure
Total number of lenders
Total number of lead arrangers
Total number of participant banks
% of loan kept by each lead
Concentration of syndicate (herfindahl)
# participants holding < $5 M
# participants holding < 2%
o90 th
7800
14
13307
0.6
0.16
0.08
0.05
809
2113
2
1
14021
14021
14021
5066
5066
5066
5066
8.1
1.8
6.3
29
2495
0.49
0.83
7.8
2.4
7.2
20
1820
1.97
3.21
2
1
0
8
604
0
0
5
1
4
24
2000
0
0
18
3
18
56
5098
1
1
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Table 3
Information Asymmetry Evidence
This table presents cell means and standard errors, by group, for the sample of 14,021 syndicated
loan deals representing 5,011 firms from 1991-2003. A "private" firm is a firm with no publicly
available SEC filings. An "unrated" firm is a firm with publicly available SEC filings and no
S&P senior unsecured debt rating. A "transparent" firm is a firm with publicly available SEC
filings and an S&P senior unsecured debt rating
Private Unrated Transparent
Percentage of sample loans 0.21 0.33 0.46
Total sales ($M) 797 1039 5692
(68) (71) (162)
Size of deal ($M) 153 171 586
(6) (4) (12)
Maturity (average, days) 1100 1203 1118
(16) (11) (10)
Number of loan tranches 1.42 1.35 1.32
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Deal includes term loan 0.31 0.24 0.18
(0.01) (0.01) (0.1)
Syndicate Structure Characteristics
Total number of lenders 4.83 6.06 11.02
(0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
Total number of lead arrangers 1.46 1.54 2.18
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Total number of participant banks 3.37 4.52 8.84
(0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
% of loan kept by each lead (avg) 37.8 35.3 19.9
(0.8) (0.4) (0.3)
Conc. of syndicate (herfindahl) 3357 3107 1641
(68) (38) (32)
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Table 5
Characteristics of Participants, by Borrowing Firm Credit Reputation
This table examines the characteristics of 72,401 participants on 14,021 syndicated loan deals. There are
7,345 participants for private firms, 17,125 participants for unrated firms, 47,931 for transparent firms.
Lead arranger-participant relationships are calculated on a subsample of 44,845 participants on 8,960 deals
where there is exactly one lead arranger.
Private Unrated Transparent
General Characteristics
Total assets ($bln)
Equity to total assets ratio
Unregulated, domestic (Finance company/I-Bank)
Foreign
Borrowing Firm-Participant Variables
Conditional on being in U.S.
In same region as borrowing firm
In same census division as borrowing firm
In same state as borrowing firm
239*
0.066*
0.072
0.41*
0.44*
0.31 *
0.14*
230*
0.065*
0.046*
0.41*
0.44*
0.30*
0.14*
290
0.061
0.066
0.51
0.36
0.23
0.10
Conditional on firm having previous loan:
Former lead for firm indicator variable
Fraction of previous firm loans lead on
Conditional on firm having previous syndicated loan:
Former participant for firm indicator variable
Fraction of previous firm syndicated loans participant on
Lead Arranger-Participant Variables
Calculated on sample where only 1 lead arranger
In same region as lead arranger
In same census division as lead arranger
In same state as lead arranger
On a deal with lead arranger in previous quarter
On a deal with lead arranger in previous year
Fraction of syndicated loans with L.A. in previous qtr
Fraction of syndicated loans with L.A. in previous year
*Significantly different from transparent firms at 5% level
0.10* 0.11*
0.05 0.05*
0.48*
0.34
0.23*
0.16
0.09
0.52*
0.34
0.23*
0.16*
0.09*
0.65* 0.66*
0.84* 0.84*
0.18
0.06
0.65
0.34
0.20
0.14
0.10
0.75
0.90
0.12* 0.13* 0.14
0.12* 0.13* 0.14
(errors clustered at firm level)
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Table 6
Participant Choice Probits
This table presents coefficient estimates for a probit specification estimating how bank characteristics affect
the probability of being chosen as participant. All coefficients represent the effect on probability when
indicator goes from 0 to 1, and coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. The choice set
includes all banks with at least 0.5 percent market share in the year of the loan. Estimations include deal
level controls described in Table 4, Panel A, year and industry dummies, and the constant is allowed to
vary by group. In addition, the natural log of the total assets and the leverage ratio of the potential
participant is included in all specifications and allowed to vary by group for columns 2 and 4. Columns 2
and 4 have transparent firms as the omitted group. Standard errors are allowed to be correlated for all
potential participants for all of a given firm's loans in the sample.
Without Relationships
(1) (2)
8.26 8.26
With Relationships
(3) (4)
9.53 9.53
Former lead for borrowing firm indicator
Private
Unrated
Former participant for borrowing firm indicator
Private
Unrated
Same region as borrowing firm indicator
Private
Unrated
Foreign indicator
Private
Unrated
Unregulated domestic indicator
Private
Unrated
D)ependent variable mean:
6.14*
(0.66)
26.74*
(0.68)
6.47*
(0.21)
5.88*
(0.66)
3.17*
(1.25)
-0.22
(0.57)
24.94*
(0.70)
2.50*
(1.06)
2.10*
(0.51)
3.21 *
(0.22)
1.30*
(0.43)
1.21*
(0.31)
-2.87*
(0.17)
0.31
(0.39)
-0.13
(0.28)
3.91*
(0.18)
-2.89*
(0.13)
-3.10*
(0.14)
5.32*
(0.27)
1.39*
(0.39)
1.80*
(0.32)
-4.61*
(0.21)
1.06*
(0.40)
0.33
(0.29)
-5.31
(0.11)
3.76*
(0.92)
0.69
(0.67)
-4.34*
(0.15)
-5.15*
(0.09)
-3.06*
(0.17)
0.84
(0.75)
-0.58
(0.54)
N 799796 799796 545493 545493
Number of Loans 14021 14021 9628 9628
Pseudo R 2 0.11 0.12 0.26 0.26
* Significant at the 1 percent level
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Table 7
Participant Choice Probits, on Sub-Sample of Deals with One Lead Arranger
This table replicates Table 6 on the sub-sample of deals with exactly one lead arranger. In addition to all
variables included in estimation in Table 6, two new variables (same region as lead arranger indicator and
on syndicate with lead arranger in previous quarter indicator) are included.
Dependent variable mean:
Without Relationships
(1) (2)
7.94 7.94
With Relationships
(3) (4)
9.22 9.22
Former lead for borrowing firm indicator
Private
Unrated
Former participant for borrowing firm indicator
Private
Unrated
Same region as borrowing firm indicator
Private
Unrated
Same region as lead arranger
Private
Unrated
On syndicate with lead arranger in last quarter
Private
Unrated
7.12*
(0.66)
27.50*
(0.72)
6.27*
(0.22)
6.78*
(0.68)
3.25*
(1.32)
-0.16
(0.61)
24.80*
(0.76)
2.52
(1.53)
2.86*
(0.62)
3.17*
(0.24)
0.94
(0.44)
0.70
(0.32)
0.59*
(0.17)
0.33
(0.45)
0.25
(0.30)
2.31*
(0.17)
-0.22
(0.45)
0.22
(0.29)
3.75*
(0.20)
0.73*
(0.14)
2.39*
(0.13)
5.37*
(0.30)
0.97*
(0.40)
1.15*
(0.33)
1.15*
(0.21)
0.04
(0.36)
0.03
(0.29)
3.65*
(0.16)
-0.63
(0.26)
0.22
(0.25)
1.21*
(0.15)
3.63*
(0.11)
N 520069 520069 348746 348746
Number of Loans 8960 8960 6029 6029
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 0.30 0.30
* Significant at the 1 percent level
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Table 8
A Window into Covenants & Renegotiation
This table presents covenant and renegotiation data on the syndicated loans sample from 1996 to 2003 for
public firms with an S&P senior unsecured debt rating. Of the 4,946 syndicated loan deals for this time
period, 2,499 contain financial covenant data and 674 contain renegotiation data. Renegotiation data is for
a random sub-sample of 200 deals where renegotiation data is available. A high yield firm has an S&P
senior unsecured debt rating of BB+ or worse. An investment grade firm has a credit rating of BBB- or
better. Standard errors are in parentheses.
PANEL A: Covenants High yield Investment grade
Asset sales/merger covenant listed, percent 0.374 0.051
(0.01) (0.005)
Financial covenant listed, percent 0.623 0.377
(0.010) (0.010)
Conditional on FC listed:
Debt to cash flow 0.633 0.279
(0.012) (0.015)
Interest coverage 0.531 0.376
(0.013) (0.016)
Fixed charge coverage 0.470 0.141
(0.013) (0.012)
PANEL B: Renegotiation High yield Inv. grade
Renegotiation data available 0.214 0.051
(0.008) (0.005)
Conditional on data available:
Financial covenants relaxed 0.252 0.153
(0.046) (0.07)
Amount of loan increased 0.103 0.109
(0.032) (0.062)
Pricing of loan terms changed 0.151 0.110
(0.038) (0.062)
Asset sales/merger covenants relaxed 0.141 0.186
(0.037) (0.076)
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Chapter 2
Managed Flexibility: Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance
2.1 Introduction
Public firms in the United States utilize bank lines of credit, or revolving credit agreements, more
than any other debt instrument. Draw downs on lines of credit represent more than 25 percent of
aggregate debt outstanding for public firms. Over 80 percent of bank financing extended to public firms
is in the form of lines of credit, and unused lines of credit on corporate balance sheets represent 11
percent of total assets. Despite the importance of bank lines of credit, the absence of data has limited
existing empirical research on their role in corporate financing decisions. While a number of articles
discuss the theoretical foundations for the existence of lines of credit,' empirical evidence is limited.2
A line of credit, also referred to as a loan commitment or revolving credit facility, provides a firm
with a nominal amount of debt capacity against which the firm draws funds. In this chapter, I examine a
novel data set to analyze how lines of credit fit into the overall financial structure of U.S. public firms.
The data cover 298 randomly sampled Compustat firms from 1996 to 2003 for an unbalanced panel of
1,725 firm-year observations. In constructing this data set, I collect detailed information on the sources of
corporate debt and the amount of used and unused bank lines of credit. I use this dataset to explore how
firms use lines of credit, how banks manage lines of credit, and which types of firms use lines of credit.
This paper is the first, to my knowledge, to explore these questions in a large sample of publicly traded
firms.
The central finding of the empirical analysis conducted in this chapter is that bank lines of credit
are not, as implicitly assumed in the existing literature, unconditional obligations by banks to firms.
Instead, banks condition lines of credit on the borrower's maintenance of a variety of financial covenants.
Examples of articles that discuss the theoretical foundations of lines of credit include Berkovitch and Greenbaum
(1991); Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987); Duan and Yoon (1993); Holmstrom and Tirole (1998); Maksimovic (1990);
Martin and Santomero (1994); Morgan (1994); and Shockley and Thakor (1997).
2 Empirical papers that examine lines of credit in the corporate financing decisions of firms include Agarwal,
Chomsisengphet, and Driscoll (2004) and Ham and Melnik (1987). Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Driscoll (2004)
also note the lack of empirical research on corporate demand for lines of credit.
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When firms experience a negative earnings shock, they default on these covenants and lose access to the
unused portion of the line of credit.
The exposition of this central finding is developed in three steps. First, conditional on a firm
having a line of credit, I find evidence that draw downs (pay downs) on bank lines of credit are the source
of marginal increases (decreases) in debt levels. I also find that firms use lines of credit at the margin to
adjust leverage ratios. This finding suggests that lines of credit provide a particularly flexible source of
financing for the firms that obtain them. Theoretical research hypothesizes that lines of credit are the
marginal source of debt financing, and the results presented here are consistent with this hypothesis.
In the second section of the chapter, I argue that the flexibility provided by lines of credit makes
the standard agency problems associated with debt particularly severe. In a world of complete
information and complete contracts, bank lenders would condition the availability of the unused portion
of a line of credit on the particular investment that the firm is undertaking. In other words, firms would
be able to draw down on their unused line of credit only when projects are profitable and the bank is
guaranteed a return. If banks cannot write such a contract and there exists an asymmetry of information
between borrowing firms and lending banks, then lines of credit are especially prone to corporate abuse.
There are three examples of potential abuse from the existing literature. First, as in the debt overhang
model of Myers (1977), borrowing firms may draw down on lines of credit during economic distress to
pay off more immediate or senior claims. Second, firms may draw down on lines of credit to undertake
particularly risky investments as the probability of bankruptcy increases, as in the "asset substitution"
model of Jensen and Meckling (1979). Third, firms may draw down on lines of credit to maintain
operations at a firm with negative returns because of private benefits of operation. While these problems
are generally true of all corporate debt, they are particularly acute for lines of credit because of their
flexibility.
The second result in this chapter is to document that banks condition the availability of lines of
credit in order to limit these potential abuses. More specifically, I find that availability under lines of
credit is contingent on numerous financial covenants, of which the maintenance of profitability is the
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most common. Using within-firm variation in profitability, I document that negative earnings shocks lead
to "technical defaults," or violations of these covenants by borrowing firms. I find that such violations
are in turn associated with a restriction of the unused portion of the line of credit. In particular, a one
standard deviation decrease in profitability increases the probability of technical default by 0.12 (on a
mean of 0.10). In turn, a technical default for a given firm one year ago is associated with a reduced
unused line of credit capacity of more than 20 percent at the mean. The results imply that banks contract
on profitability as the key performance measurement associated with the true return of incremental
projects, and "manage" the unused portion of the line of credit through this measure.
This finding suggests that, in practice, a line of credit is a different financial product then is
implicitly assumed in much of the theoretical literature. Most of the theoretical literature implicitly
assumes that lines of credit are unconditional obligations of banks (see for example Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998) and Boot, Thakor and Udell (1987)). In these papers, lines of credit solve a time inconsistency
problem in which borrowers are unable to raise "spot-market" financing in future periods (often due to
moral hazard). In these models, unconditional lines of credit (partially) solve this problem because they
cannot be renegotiated at a future date when more financing may be needed. Lines of credit only
represent an improvement over future spot-market financing if banks cannot renege on the commitment at
a future date. If the bank can renege, then the reasons behind the firms' inability to raise spot-market
financing at future dates will also make the line of credit unavailable. The findings of this chapter suggest
that banks have the ability to restrict access to unused portions of lines of credit when firms experience
economic or financial distress. To further document this finding, I provide anecdotal evidence by
exploring language in annual 10-K SEC filings that documents how closely lines of credit are managed by
banks. Lines of credit provide flexibility, but that flexibility is carefully managed.
The first two findings imply that lines of credit are flexible debt instruments; given the agency
problems associated with flexibility, banks use covenants on profitability to manage the unused portion of
lines of credit. The third finding is a logical extension of the first two findings. Contrary to the finding
prevalent in the literature that more profitable firms use less debt, I find that more profitable firms are
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more likely to use bank lines of credit. Profitable firms are both more likely to hold unused balances of
lines of credit, and more likely to draw down on lines of credit. This result holds among all firms, not
just those that use some form of debt. The strongest results suggest that a firm with earnings one standard
deviation below the mean is 12 percent less likely to have a line of credit. This result suggests that the
finding in the previous literature that more profitable firms use less debt is driven in particular by non-
bank debt, something I confirm in the results.
Taken together, these three findings imply that lines of credit are a flexible source of financing
obtained only by firms with a polished record of earnings. Even among firms that obtain lines of credit, a
negative earnings shock limits the availability of the unused portion. The findings suggest that lines of
credit are closely monitored and managed by bank lenders, and that they are not available to fund projects
in times of economic or financial distress.
Overall, the empirical findings in this chapter lend support to theoretical frameworks that
motivate lines of credit for reasons other than moral hazard or time inconsistency. For example, Martin
and Santomero (1997) argue that secrecy, flexibility, and speed are the primary reasons for the use of
credit lines. Consistent with their findings, Federal Reserve survey data report that flexibility and speed
of action are the primary reasons for the use of lines of credit (Avery and Berger (1991)). My findings
suggest that firms with lines of credit can adjust debt levels and leverage ratios more easily, but only
firms with positive earnings history obtain access to the lines of credit that provide such flexibility.
The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows. In the next section, I briefly describe the basic
characteristics of lines of credit, and I explore the existing theoretical and empirical research. The third
section describes the data collection and presents summary statistics. The fourth section documents that
lines of credit are the marginal source of debt financing. The fifth section explores how banks manage
lines of credit through covenants. The sixth section documents which types of firms use lines of credit,
and the seventh section concludes.
2.2 Lines of credit: description and existing research
2.2.1 Description and theory
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A firm that obtains a line of credit receives a nominal amount of debt capacity against which the
finn draws funds. Lines of credit, also referred to as revolving credit facilities or loan commitments, are
almost always provided by banks or financing companies. In the sample I describe below, 96 percent of
the lines of credit described in annual reports are explicitly listed as being from banks or financing
companies. The used portion of the line of credit is a debt obligation, whereas the unused portion of the
line of credit remains off the balance sheet. In terms of pricing, the firm pays a commitment fee on the
unused portion of the line of credit that is a percentage of the unused portion, and a pre-determined
interest rate on any drawn amounts. In a sample of 19,523 lines of credit obtained between 1996 and
2003 in the Dealscan data base by the Loan Pricing Corporation, the average commitment fee is 33 basis
points above LIBOR, and the average interest rate on drawn funds is 195 basis points above LIBOR.
Existing lines of credit are detailed on annual 10-K SEC filings by corporations. For example,
Lexent Inc., a broadband technology company, details their line of credit in their FY 2000 10-K filing as
follows:
At December 31, 2000, the Company had notes payable to banks aggregating $2.0 million under
a $50 million collateralized revolving credit facility, which expires in November 2003.
Borrowings bear interest at the prime rate or at a rate based on LIBOR, at the option of the
Company. This credit facility is to be used for general corporate purposes including working
capital. As of December 31, 2000, the prime rate was 9.5%. The line of credit is secured by
substantially all of the Company's assets, including its membership interests and stock in its
subsidiaries, and is senior to $5.1 million of subordinated indebtedness to a principal common
stockholder (Lexent Inc. (2000)).
In the 10-K filing, companies typically detail the existence of a line of credit and its availability in the
liquidity and capital resources section under the management discussion, or in the financial footnotes
explaining debt obligations.
Lines of credit may contain a variety of covenants that fall broadly into four categories: (1)
covenants that require the borrower to maintain certain financial ratios, (2) covenants that require
prepayment of the debt obligation if the firm sells assets, issues equity, or issues new debt ("sweeps
covenants"), (3) covenants that restrict dividend payments or other uses of cash, and (4) covenants that
restricts the total amount of the line of credit to a "borrowing base" of some liquid asset of the firm (cash,
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accounts receivable, etc.). Covenants are a very important component of understanding lines of credit,
and something I explore further in the results.
There is a large body of theoretical research on lines of credit. The first class of models uses
problems of time inconsistency between borrowers and future creditors to motivate the use of lines of
credit. These papers are in the spirit of the optimal contracting literature, and include Berkovitch and
Greenbaum (1991); Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987); Duan and Yoon (1993); Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998); Morgan (1994); and Shockley (1995).
I focus here on two of these papers that I believe demonstrate the core ideas of these models. The
paper by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) motivates the use of lines of credit by embedding a moral hazard
problem within a three-period model where an interim liquidity shock is realized in the second period.
When the liquidity shock is realized in the second period, the borrower must retain a large enough portion
of the third period return to motivate him to be diligent; in other words, there a standard moral hazard
problem that forces the borrower to retain a large stake in the project. Given this agency problem, the
first best is unattainable. If the liquidity shock is high enough, the borrower will not be able to obtain
funds, given that he must retain enough of the project return to maintain diligence. The second best
solution requires that the borrower buy liquidity insurance. One mechanism is a line of credit.3 In the
first period, borrowers obtain a commitment to lend in the second period up to a certain point. When the
liquidity shock is realized, the borrower then has access to funds. In some states of the world, the
creditors end up losing money in the second period, but they break even in expectation. This is the
intuition of the liquidity insurance in the model.
Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987) also use a basic agency problem to motivate corporate demand
for lines of credit. They also have a three-period model with an agency problem, where borrowers select
an effort level in the first period and choose whether to invest or not in the second period. The moral
3 Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) emphasize that the line of credit must be irrevocable, and that the liquidity shock is
verifiable. In other words, there is no possibility that borrowers misallocate the funds available under the line of
credit. In addition, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) emphasize that other types of financing arrangements may serve
the purpose of a bank line of credit in their model, as long as the arrangement provides unconditional financing.
70
hazard problem arises because the effort decision is unobservable to creditors. In the Boot, Thakor, and
IJdell (1987) model, there is stochastic interest rate realized in the second period that serves the same
purpose as the liquidity shock in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). If interest rates are too high in the second
period, borrowers anticipate a low expected return from the project and thus choose low effort. In other
words, high interest rates in the second period lower the return to effort, which leads managers at
borrowing firms to shirk. In the second period, banks fully predict such behavior, and thus ration credit.
A line of credit signed in the first period solves this problem by charging an up-front fee and guaranteeing
a low rate of interest in the second period. Thus, the line of credit serves as interest rate protection which
can guarantee that borrowers put in high effort initially.
What are the empirical implications of these types of models? First, banks cannot renegotiate the
line of credit in the interim period if the contract is to improve on spot-market financing. The critical
element in these models is some time inconsistency that leads spot market creditors at a future date to
deny credit. If a line of credit is conditional on future outcomes, then lenders extending the line of credit
also deny credit. In the models described above, the optimal behavior for the bank in some states of the
interim period is to actually refuse to allow the line of credit to be drawn. According to these models, if
bank lines of credit are to solve these problems of time inconsistency, they must be extended
unconditionally.
The second main empirical hypothesis that comes from these models is that it can be difficult for
firms to raise capital in spot markets when investment opportunities arrive and/or change. Lines of credit
provide a particularly flexible source of debt financing that can be drawn upon with fewer difficulties. At
the margin, lines of credit should be the incremental form of debt financing.
Martin and Santomero (1997) provide a different approach to motivate the existence of lines of
credit; they motivate lines of credit by assuming that firms desire speed and secrecy in pursuing
investment opportunities. Given the need for speed and secrecy, their model assumes that lines of credit
are optimal relative to other forms of debt, and explores the types of firms that will use lines of credit.
There is an implicit assumption that spot market financing requires time and makes investment decisions
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known to the product market competitors of the borrower. The first empirical prediction is that firms in
high growth industries more heavily utilize lines of credit. The second empirical prediction is similar to
the second prediction of the models discussed above; firms use lines of credit because of their speed and
flexibility, and lines of credit should therefore be the incremental source of debt financing. Unlike the
models above, the model by Martin and Santomero (1997) does not require lines of credit to be
unconditional obligations, because there is no interim agency problem for the borrower.
Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) and Gatev and Strahan (2005) focus on the role of bank lines of
credit in providing liquidity insurance during temporary negative supply shocks in commercial paper
markets. The theoretical framework of these papers focuses on the liquidity advantages of banks, where
deposit reserves typically increase when credit crunches occur. These papers focus on aggregate liquidity
shocks that are independent of the investment opportunities or earnings potential of the borrower;
borrowers draw on lines of credit when these aggregate shocks occur.
2.2.2 Empirical evidence
Empirical research on the use of lines of credit by borrowers is limited. There are two articles
that are directly related to the research presented here. Ham and Melnik (1987) collect data from a direct
survey of 90 corporate treasurers. Based on answers to the survey, they estimate a drawn line of credit
demand function, and find that draw downs on lines of credit are inversely related to interest rate cost and
positively related to total sales. Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Driscoll (2004) examine the use of lines
of credit for 712 privately-held firms that obtained loans from FleetBoston Financial Corporation. Their
analysis focuses only on firms that obtain lines of credit. They find evidence that firms with higher
interest rates and fees have smaller credit lines. They also find that firms with higher profitability and
higher working capital obtain larger credit lines. Finally, they find that firms that experience more
uncertainty in their funding needs commit to smaller credit lines.
These papers increase our understanding of the use of lines of credit, and my findings are largely
complementary. These two papers do not focus on the use of lines of credit by large public corporations,
and do not focus on how corporations manage their lines of credit over time. In contrast to these two
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papers, my data focus on a large sample of public firms which I follow over a period of 8 years. In
addition, these papers examine lines of credit in a setting independent of other debt. My analysis
explicitly compares when firms obtain lines of credit versus other types of debt financing.
There is also empirical research examining the supply side of lines of credit. Sufi (2005);
Shockley and Thakor (1997); and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) focus on contract structure of credit
lines and the types of financial institutions that provide them. Saidenberg and Strahan ( 999) and Gatev
and Strahan (2005) use aggregate data on loans and commercial paper to show that lines of credit are
drawn when commercial paper markets experience negative supply shocks.
2.3 Data and summary statistics
2.3.1 Data
The existing empirical research on lines of credit is limited partially due to the lack of data. The
most commonly used database for financial characteristics of public corporations is Compustat.
Compustat contains valuable information regarding the debt structure, but does not detail the source of the
debt or whether the debt is in the form of a line of credit. Compustat item 34 represents "debt in current
liabilities," and is broken down into "notes payable" (item 206) and "debt-due in one year" (item 44).
Compustat item 9 represents "long-term debt," and is broken down into "convertible debt" (item 79),
"debt-subordinated" (item 80), "debt-notes" (item 81), "debt-debentures" (item 82), "long-term
debt-other" (item 83), and "long-term debt-capitalized lease obligations" (item 84).
Using these variables, it is not possible to determine whether debt comes from public issues,
banks, private placements, shareholders, or from non-bank private sources. These data are available,
however, in the debt schedules of annual 10-K SEC filings. As Johnson (1997) notes, Regulation S-X of
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requires that firms identify the sources of debt. For
example, the firm almost always reports the amount of a given debt issue or loan, if it is public or private,
what is the source of the debt, and, in particular, whether the debt obligation is from a bank or other
institution. Although all of this information is available in 10-K filings, none of these variables are
available in Compustat. In addition, Regulation S-K of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
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requires firms to discuss explicitly their liquidity, capital resources, and result of operations (Kaplan and
Zingales, 1997). All firms filing with the SEC therefore provide detailed information on the used and
unused portions of lines of credit.
This paper is not the first to collect data on the sources of debt from annual 10-K SEC filings.
Johnson (1997) collects these data for a cross-section of 847 firms in 1989. In two papers, Houston and
James (1996, 2001) use a sample of 250 firms for which they collect these data in years 1980, 1985, and
1990. Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) collect these data for a sample of 102 financially-
distressed junk bond issuers which they follow during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the summary
statistics below, I compare the data that I have collected with that of Houston and James (1996). To my
knowledge, this paper is the first to collect these data on a large sample of public firms after 1995.
I construct the universe and sample set of firms as follows. I begin with all non-financial U.S.
firms with at least 4 years of continuous positive data on total assets (item 6) and continuous non-missing
data on total sales (item 12) from 1996 through 2003. I focus on the period from 1996 through 2003 for
two reasons. First, existing research by Houston and James (1996, 2001) and Johnson (1997) focuses on
earlier periods. Second, annual 10-K SEC filings are available electronically for all firms in the years
after 1996, which makes the costs of data collection much lower for this time period. I restrict the sample
to firms with at least 4 years of continuous data on total assets and total sales because I am particularly
interested in how debt structure evolves within a given firm over time, something that is not done widely
in previous research. The universe of Compustat firms meeting these criteria includes 5,807 firms. I then
randomly sample 300 firms from this universe, and follow them from 1996 through 2003.
The random sample begins with an unbalanced panel of 300 firms and 2,095 firm-year
observations. For these 300 firms, I collect detailed data on the sources of debt and used and unused lines
of credit from annual 10-K SEC filings. Firms filing their initial 10-K with the SEC typically include up
to 2 years of historical data in their initial 10-K. Although these historical data generate Compustat
observations with non-missing information on earnings and assets, the actual 10-K and financial footnotes
on debt are not available for these historical data. I therefore include only firm-year observations where
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an actual 10-K exists for the year in question. I drop 118 firm-year observations due to this restriction. I
also drop 140 observations where book leverage is greater than 1. Finally, I drop 112 firm-year
observations where share price (item 199), tangible assets (item 8), or EBITDA (item 13) is missing. The
final sample includes 298 firms and 1,725 firm-year observations. This dataset has at least twice the
number of firm-year observations of other studies using similar data from annual 10-K SEC filings.
Core financial variables are defined as follows. Similar to Baker and Wurgler (2002), I define
book leverage as the book value of assets less book value of equity, all divided by total assets. The book
value of equity is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) less the book value of total liabilities (item
181) plus deferred taxes (item 35). Book debt is short-term debt plus long term debt (item 34 + item 9),
all divided by total assets (item 6). A measure of asset tangibility is defined as tangible assets (item 8)
divided by total assets. The market to book ratio is defined as total assets less the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity, all divided by total assets. The market value of equity is defined as
common shares outstanding (data 25) multiplied by share price (data 199). Finally, the primary measure
of profitability and cash flow is EBITDA (data 13), divided by total assets. In the analysis beginning in
the next section, I follow the literature and Winsorize the market to book ratio and profitability at the s'
and 9 9 th percentile. Outliers are a real problem in Compustat, and this is the standard procedure used in
the literature to correct such problems (see Baker, Stein, & Wurgler (2003)).
Table 1 compares the sample of 300 firms used in this chapter with the full set of Compustat
firms and the sampling universe. It presents the distribution of firm characteristics related to size,
profitability, tangibility, and market to book ratios. I report the 10th, 5 0th, and 9 0 th percentile instead of
means and standard deviations because of the problem of outliers in Compustat. The first three columns
present the distribution of firm characteristics for the set of all Compustat firm-year observations with
positive assets data and non-missing sales data. The second set of three columns present the distribution
of characteristics for the sampling universe, which includes only firms that have at least 4 years of
contiguous positive assets data and non-missing sales data. The third column presents the distributional
properties for the randomly sampled 300 firms. As expected, the distribution of firm characteristics in the
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random sample is very similar to the distributions of all Compustat firms, and for the sampling universe.
I am therefore confident that this is a representative sample with similar distributional characteristics as
the full sample of Compustat firms.
2.3.2 Summary statistics
Table 2 contains the summary statistics for the sample of 298 firms from 1996 to 2003, for a total
unbalanced panel of 1,725 firm-year observations. Both aggregate book debt and book leverage come
directly from Compustat as described above; debt is then broken up into its components using the data
collected from annual 10-K SEC filings. Book leverage is on average 0.45, and the book debt to total
assets ratio is on average 0.21. Using the data collected from annual 10-K SEC filings of firms, I break
down the debt into various categories. First, unused lines of credit represent on average more than 11
percent of total assets. As noted above, unused lines of credit are not debt obligations; they are recorded
off of the balance sheet. Used lines of credit represent 5.5 percent of assets, or more than 25 percent of
total book debt (0.055/0.208). Term bank debt represents 3.3 percent of assets. I classify public debt,
private placements, and industrial revenue bonds as "arm's length" debt (Diamond (1991)), which
accounts for 6.1 percent of total assets, or almost 31 percent of total book debt. Convertible debt accounts
for about 2.2 percent of total assets, and non-bank private debt accounts for 1.6 percent of total assets.
Non-bank private debt includes debt primarily from shareholders, related parties, and debt from vendors.
When compared to Houston and James (1996), the summary statistics show similarities and
discrepancies. It is important to note that the Houston and James (1996) sample is limited to firms with
long-term debt outstanding in 1980 that were traded on an exchange or with the National Association of
Securities Dealers. I make neither of these restrictions on my sample. Therefore, the average book debt
to total assets in their sample is higher (0.39 versus 0.21). The average market to book ratio in my sample
is slightly higher (2.07 versus 1.46), which is consistent with the finding that firms with high market
valuations relative to book value use less debt. Our percentages of total debt in the form of public debt
(0.15) and commercial paper (0.02) are almost identical. The bank debt to total debt figure in Houston
and James (1996) is considerably higher than in my sample (0.63 versus 0.42). The discrepancy is due to
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the fact that convertible debt and private placements are not broken out specifically in their analysis, and
may be included in the bank debt figure. Houston and James (1996) "define bank borrowing broadly to
include borrowing referred to as 'bank' as well as private borrowing where the identity of the lender is not
provided (1870)." It is possible that over time the annual 10-K SEC filings of firms have improved the
reporting of the sources of non-bank private debt such as convertible debt and private placements.
Houston and James (1996) note that the percentage of debt held by banks in their sample is high
compared to data from the business sector and Federal Reserve; this is most likely a result of some debt
being classified as bank debt when it is from non-bank debt sources.
In column (3) of Table 2, I present the mean fraction of all firm-year observations where the type
of debt obligation in question is greater than 0. Almost every firm in the sample has some type of
liability, and 82 percent have some type of debt. Among debt obligations, 70 percent of firm-year
observations have positive unused lines of credit, and 47 percent have used lines of credit. Overall, 73
percent of firm-year observations have some unused or used line of credit, and 82 percent of firms in the
sample have a lines of credit some time between 1996 and 2003; these numbers are higher than any other
type of financial debt instrument. Term bank debt is used by 33 percent of firm-year observations,
whereas public debt and commercial paper is used by only 15 percent and 5 percent respectively.
Convertible debt and non-bank private debt are used by 14 percent and 23 percent of firm-year
observations, respectively.
Table 2 also presents the yearly means for the sample of firms that have data available in all 8
years of the sample (114 firms). Used lines of credit appear to peak at the same time as the economic
cycle in 1998 and 1999. There is a secular trend upwards in the amount of arm's length and convertible
debt employed by these firms, whereas there appears to be a downward trend in the percentage of non-
bank private debt. The trend in commercial paper is similar to the trend in used lines of credit.
2.4 Lines of credit and adjustments in debt
One common hypothesis in the theoretical models described above is that lines of credit provide
financial flexibility. In Table 3, I test this hypothesis by exploring which type of debt financing firms
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adjust when adjusting their overall level of debt. In other words, I am interested in answering the
following question: when firms adjust their levels of debt, what type of debt is the marginal source of the
adjustment? If firms adjust using lines of credit more than any other type of debt, then the evidence
supports the theoretical hypothesis of the models discussed above that lines of credit provide flexibility
and are the marginal source of debt financing.
Consistent with these models, Table 3 presents evidence that lines of credit are the marginal
source of financing. I split the sample into two types of firms: firms that have a line of credit at any point
in the sample and firms that do not. In Panel A, I explore adjustments in the leverage ratio, which can be
interpreted as increases of the share of debt to current assets. I split the sample into 6 groups based on the
size of the adjustment. There are very few firm-year observations with major adjustments in the leverage
ratio, defined as an upward or downward adjustment of 30 percentage points or more. I break out these
extreme adjusters to make sure that outliers are not driving any of the key results. Among firms that use
lines of credit at any point in the sample, approximately 16 percent of firm-years have a decrease in the
leverage ratio by 5 to 30 percentage points, and 19 percent have an increase in the leverage by 5 to 30
percentage points. Among large adjustments in leverage ratios upward and downward, used lines of
credit are the largest source of these adjustments. When firms experience an adjustment upward of their
leverage ratio between 5 and 30 percentage points, firms increase their used lines of credit to assets ratio
by 4.5 percentage points. Even in relatively small adjustments to the leverage ratio of 1 to 5 percentage
points, lines of credit are the largest source of the adjustment. It is important to note that these firms on
average have a higher percentage of their debt in the form of arm's length debt, but lines of credit appear
to be the marginal source of changes in leverage.
There are two interesting observations when examining adjustments in the leverage ratio for firms
without lines of credit. First, the total number of large adjustments as a fraction of the total number of
firm-year observations is much lower. For example, for firms that have lines of credit at any point in the
sample, over 20 percent of firm-year observations are associated with an adjustment upward in the
leverage ratio of more than 5 percent. The equivalent number for firms without lines of credit is 13
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percent. The same trend is true for downward adjustments in the leverage ratio. While this result does
not necessarily imply that firms without lines of credit are unable to adjust their ratios, the results suggest
that firms that have lines of credit adjust their capital structures more frequently. Second, the margin of
adjustment for firms without lines of credit appears to be convertible debt and private non-bank debt,
although these results are not statistically significant given the small number of total adjustments. There
are systematic differences in the types of firms that use lines of credit and those that do not, which is
something I explore in the results below.
In Panel B, I analyze the nominal adjustment in debt as a percentage of lagged assets. The trends
in the data are quite similar. When firms adjust their levels of debt upward and downward, they use lines
of credit more than any other type of financing. Overall, in every category of adjustment in either
leverage ratios or the levels of debt (with one exception), lines of credit are the largest source of the
adjustment. The evidence suggests that firms use lines of credit as the marginal source of debt financing,
and that flexibility is a key characteristic of this financial product.
2.5 Managing flexibility through covenants
2.5.1 Large sample evidence
Table 3 presents evidence that firms draw down on their lines of credit at the margin to increase
their debt levels. As the marginal source of debt financing, potential agency problems are particularly
severe with this financial product. I give three examples of such agency problems: asset substitution, debt
overhang, and private managerial benefits of operation. First, following Jensen and Meckling (1976),
managers (representing shareholders) with outstanding debt obligations have incentives to engage in
activities with small probabilities of large payoffs because they have a call option on the value of the firm.
In this asset substitution theoretical framework, management (representing shareholders) experiences no
downside to failure and thus has a strong incentive to draw down on the line of credit to pursue risky
projects when bankruptcy is imminent. Second, similar to the debt overhang problem described by Myers
(1977), managers may draw upon bank lines of credit to pay off senior debt claims that may be close to
default. Banks want to restrict such uses of the line of credit when existing debt obligations are
79
outstanding and senior to the claim of banks. Third, if information asymmetry exists and managers have
private benefits of ownership, then management may pursue non-profitable projects using lines of credit.
These agency problems are generally true of all debt obligations, but they are especially severe
with lines of credit. Lines of credit are existing obligations against which firms can draw with speed and
discretion. Alternative types of term debt require investigation by the debt holders upon initiation of the
contract, and rigorous documentation. Lines of credit are especially prone to abuse precisely because of
their flexibility. The case of Enron Corporation provides an interesting anecdote. In late October 2001,
Enron drew down $3 billion on bank lines of credit (Emshwiller, Smith, and Sapsford (2001)). Four days
later, Moody's downgraded Enron's debt, and two weeks later, the SEC announced its accounting
investigation that would eventually lead to the demise of the corporation. Upon the Chapter 11 filing in
December, 2001, JPMorganChase announced that it had over $500 million in unsecured exposure and
Credit Lyonnais had over $250 million in unsecured exposure.
In this section, I present evidence that banks understand these agency problems and employ
covenants to address them. In particular, I focus on financial covenants, or covenants that require the
maintenance of specified financial ratios. Financial ratios are specified in the initial contract, and the
borrower is in default of the loan agreement if a ratio is not satisfied. These defaults are typically referred
to as "technical defaults," and the lender has the legal right to accelerate the loan. Technical defaults are
usually renegotiated; terms, maturity, and amounts are often changed, but the lender only rarely
accelerates the loan.
Table 4 presents evidence from Dealscan by the Loan Pricing Corporation on financial covenants.
The sample includes 19,523 sole lender and syndicated lines of credit obtained by non-financial business
from 1996 to 2003.4 Almost half of all lines of credit in the sample have covenants based on financial
ratios. The most common type of financial covenant is a cash flow or profitability based covenant,
occurring on 38 percent of the lines of credit. Covenants on total net worth and balance sheet based
4 The Dealscan sample here is different than the sample employed in Chapter 1 in three ways. First, this sample
includes only line of credit tranches and ignores term bank debt. Second, this sample includes both sole lender and
syndicated loans. Third, this sample evaluates loans from 1996 through 2003, as opposed to 1991 through 2003.
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covenants are also common. The most common covenant in the Dealscan sample is a debt to cash flow
covenant, which is on 24 percent of the lines of credit. According to interviews with people at the Loan
Pricing Corporation, the data in Dealscan represent a lower bound for the frequency of covenants. In
other words, lines of credit often contain covenants that are not reported in Dealscan.
The factors leading the presence of covenants on bank debt has been explored by Bradley and
Roberts (2004). They find evidence that small borrowers, highly-levered borrowers, and borrowers with
high growth opportunities are more likely to have covenants on their bank credit agreements. They
interpret this as evidence that supports the agency theory of covenants; covenants on debt prevent
opportunistic behavior by managers acting on behalf of shareholders and at the expense of debt holders.
Their evidence is consistent with the interpretation of covenants provided in this chapter. Covenants exist
to prevent corporate abuse by management at the expense of the bank providing the line of credit.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, I report coefficient estimates from fixed effects regressions that
attempt to determine when defaults on covenants occur. Data on defaults is collected from the annual 10-
K SEC filings for the firm. The exact specification is a linear probability fixed effects model, where the
left hand side variable is 0 if no default occurs and 1 if default occurs. Formally, I estimate:
Defaultit = ai + at + fiXi + it (1)
In this specification, X,, represents a matrix of firm profitability, net worth, and leverage measures. As
documented above, these measures are subject to covenants. The coefficient estimate offl examines
whether reductions in earnings, reductions in net worth, or increases in leverage lead to technical defaults
of covenants associated with lines of credit. The sample for the estimation of (1) includes only firm-years
where a line of credit is present, and standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the firm
level.
I estimate equation (1) above using a linear probability specification instead of maximum
likelihood probit or logit specification for two reasons. First, probit fixed effects estimation suffers from
the incidental parameters problem, which leads to intractable estimation of firm fixed effects (see Greene
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(2000), 837). Second, most specifications in this chapter are linear, and I want to remain consistent in
interpretations of coefficients as marginal linear changes at the mean. Finally, I estimate equation (1)
using fixed effects in a maximum likelihood logit specification, and find almost identical results to the
linear probability model reported.
Column (1) shows that a negative earnings shock is associated with a higher probability of default
on a covenant. The coefficient estimate implies that a one standard deviation decrease in earnings (0.28)
increases the probability of default by (0.28*0.44 =) 0.12 on the mean of the left hand side variable of
0.10. In column (2), I examine how a fall in net worth and rise in leverage affects the probability of
default. The coefficient estimates imply that a one standard deviation drop in net worth (1.5) increases
the probability of default by (1.5*0.019 =) 0.03 and a one standard deviation increase in leverage (0.20)
increases the probability of default by (0.20*0.30=) 0.06. Even with the lower coefficient estimate on
profitability in column (3), a one standard deviation in profitability still leads to almost a 0.09 increase in
the probability of default. Using the standard deviation of the right-hand side variables as the measure of
variation, the point estimates imply that a drop in profitability has the largest magnitude effect on the
probability of default.
In columns (3) through (5), I am interested in how default at time t affects the amounts available
under the line of credit at time t+l. More specifically, I estimate:
Lineit = a i + t + Xit_ + y * Defaulti t- 1 + it (2)
The sample includes only those firm-year observations where a line of credit was present at t-l, and
standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the firm level. Column (3) estimates equation
(2) using the total lines of credit (both used and unused) to asset ratio. The point estimate implies a drop
in the total amount of lines of credit, but the result is not statistically distinct from 0 at a reasonable level.
When I break out lines of credit into used and unused, I find that unused lines of credit fall by 0.04 when
the firmn defaults on its covenants, a result that is statistically distinct from 0 at the 5 percent level. In this
sample, the mean of the left hand side variable is 0.15, which implies that a default reduces the unused
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portion of the line of credit by over 25 percent at the mean. It is not surprising that I find no drop in the
used portion of the line of credit after a default; firms that default are usually unable to pay down the
drawn portion of the line of credit, and so it remains on the balance sheet as a debt obligation.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 imply that lines of credit are closely managed by banks. In
particular, a negative shock to earnings leads to default on covenants, which in turn reduces availability
under the line of credit. These results are consistent with the theoretical framework associated with
agency problems and flexibility. Given that lines of credit are flexible debt instruments that are the
incremental source of debt financing, banks carefully manage the unused portion of the line of credit
through covenants. The findings of this section also weaken the assumption in theoretical work that bank
lines of credit are unconditional obligations. Banks appear to have a variety of tools that make restriction
of credit possible.
2.5.2 Anecdotal evidence from 10-Ks
While the results in Tables 4 and 5 present statistically robust large sample evidence of banks
actively managing lines of credit, I document here a few anecdotes directly from language in annual 10-K
SEC filings to support the findings. Covenants on bank lines of credit are common and usually
documented directly in the financial footnotes describing debt obligations. For example, Genessee &
Wyoming reports in its FY 1996 10O-K filing:
These credit facilities are secured by substantially all the assets of the Company and the stock of
certain subsidiaries. The credit facilities agreement requires the maintenance of certain
covenants, including, but not limited to, funded debt to EBITDA, funded debt to net worth, cash
flow coverage, EBIT to interest and minimum net worth, all as defined in the agreement. The
Company is also limited in its ability to incur additional indebtedness, create liens on its assets,
make certain capital expenditures and pay dividends greater than $32,000 in any one quarter. The
Company and its subsidiaries were in compliance with the provisions of these covenants as of
December 31, 1996 (Genessee & Wyomong (1996)).
While I focus primarily on financial covenants, banks contract on a variety of measures when managing
the lines of credit they extend to their corporate clients. Electronics Boutique, in its FY 2002 filing,
reports that its line of credit is contingent on the ownership stake of management (italics added):
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The Company had available a revolving credit facility allowing for maximum borrowings of
$50.0 million at February 2, 2002 and February 1, 2003. ... The revolving credit agreement
contains restrictive covenants regarding transactions with affiliates, the payment of dividends,
and other financial and non-financial matters and is secured by certain assets, including accounts
receivable, inventory, fixtures and equipment. If the Kim family does not own, indirectly through
EB Nevada, at least 25% of the Company's outstanding capital stock, the Company may be
declared in default under the credit facility (Electronics Boutique (2003)).
Although this is only one anecdote, it suggests that banks not only understand the incentive effects of the
dilution of ownership's stake in the firm, but they also attempt to contract on it.
Not only is there anecdotal evidence on the existence of covenants, there is evidence on how
banks manage lines of credit in the event of default. Total Renal Care Holdings addresses the failure to
meet covenants in their FY 1999 10-K filing:
When measured as of December 31, 1999, the company was not in compliance with certain
formula-based covenants in the credit facilities. If the lenders do not waive this failure to comply,
a majority of the lenders could declare an event of default, which would allow the lenders to
accelerate payment of all amounts due under the credit facilities. Additionally, this
noncompliance will result in higher interest costs, and the lenders may require additional
concessions from the company before giving a waiver ... Under these conditions, the company is
currently unable to draw additional amounts under the credit facilities (Total Renal Care Holdings
(1999)).
The language used in annual 10-K SEC filings by corporations confirms the results of the large sample
analysis above. Banks appear to actively manage the unused portion of extended lines of credit. Lines of
credit are contingent on a variety of financial covenants, and banks restrict use of the line of credit when
these covenants are violated.
2.6 Which types of firms use lines of credit?
Conditional on having a line of credit, firms use lines of credit as the marginal source of debt
financing. Given the agency problems associated with the unused portion of a line of credit, banks
employ strict covenants and actively manage the availability of credit. If banks are particularly concerned
with agency problems, then only reputable firms with a solid earnings history should be able to obtain a
line of credit. I examine this hypothesis in this section.
Table 6 examines the unconditional mean characteristics for firm-year observations with and
without lines of credit. Firms with lines of credit have higher levels of book debt and book leverage.
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Firms without lines of credit have a much higher portion of their debt in the form of convertible
securities. Firms with lines of credit are more profitable. The difference in the mean profitability to
assets ratio is 0.27, which is one full standard deviation for the whole sample. The difference in median
profitability shows that this difference is not being driven by outliers. Even the median firm with a line of
credit has profitability to assets ratio 0.17 higher than firms without lines of credit. Firms with line of
credit have lower market to book ratios and are larger. The industry composition of firms with and
without line of credit is quite similar, with the exception that firms with lines of credit are more likely to
be in trade industries and less likely to be in services. Overall, the unconditional means provide direct
evidence that profitable firms use lines of credit more heavily than firms with low profitability.
In order to see if the profitability result is robust to further controls, I estimate linear multivariate
regressions. In particular, Table 7, Panel A presents estimated coefficients from the following
specification:
Debtit a + Xi,t-1 + y * Profitsit_1 + it (3)
The left hand side variables are measures of debt and lines of credit used by the firm, scaled by total
assets. These measures of debt are regressed on a series of lagged firm characteristics. I follow the
existing literature on capital structure that explores the impact of four main firm characteristics on
leverage (Rajan and Zingales (1995)). I am particularly interested in the effect of profitability on debt and
lines of credit. In previous literature, firms with high profitability are found to have lower levels of
leverage in both U.S. and foreign data. The previous literature interprets this finding as evidence that
profitable firms (a) prefer to operate out of cash flows rather than debt (Myers and Majluf (1984)), and (b)
prefer to avoid the disciplinary role of debt (Rajan and Zingales (1995)). Firms with high asset tangibility
are able to pledge more collateral, and are thus found to have higher levels of leverage. Larger firms are
found to have higher levels of leverage, which may be due to the fact that larger firms fail less frequently.
Firnns with high market to book ratios are found to have lower levels of leverage, which is interpreted as
evidence of debt overhang (Myers (1977)). In other words, firms with high market to books may have
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future investment opportunities that require equity financing, and outstanding debt dilutes the value of
future projects to potential shareholders. Specification (3) is initially estimated in pooled regressions with
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the firm level. In specifications below, I
estimate between (group means) and fixed effects regressions to identify the source of variation that is
driving the pooled results.
Columns (1) and (2) replicate the core findings of previous literature and find that firms with
higher profitability have less debt, high market to book firms have less debt, firms with high asset
tangibility have more debt, and larger firms have more debt. Columns (3), (4), and (5) show the estimated
coefficients when the left hand side variable is total lines of credit, used lines of credit, and unused lines
of credit, respectively. While firms with higher profitability generally use less debt, they use more lines
of credit. The point estimate in column (3) implies that a one standard deviation increase in profitability
(0.28) is associated with a (0.11 *0.28=) 0.03 increase in total lines of credit scaled by assets. This
represents almost a 20 percent increase at the mean of the left hand side variable. It is important to note
that this result holds when comparing firms with and without debt. Conditional on having debt, more
profitable firms hold an even greater amount of total lines of credit (results not reported). This finding is
consistent with the findings of Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Driscoll (2004), who find that firms with
higher profits and higher working capital obtain larger lines of credit. Columns (7) and (9) show that
convertible debt and arm's length debt are decreasing in the profitability of the firm. In other words, the
fact that book debt is decreasing in profitability appears to be driven by convertible debt and arm's length
debt.
I interpret the findings above as evidence that firms with low profitability are unable to obtain
lines of credit at a reasonable price. An alternative explanation is that high profitability is a measure of
future growth opportunities, and firms with high growth opportunities desire flexibility in financing.
Firms with lower earnings have lower growth opportunities, and do not desire lines of credit. The point
estimates on the market to book ratio dispute this interpretation. In previous literature, the market to book
ratio is interpreted as a direct measure of growth opportunities (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Baker and
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Wurgler (2002)). I find that firms with high market to book ratios are less likely to employ bank lines of
credit, which suggests that it is not high growth opportunities that are causing some firms to obtain lines
of credit. In other words, if two firms have identical future growth opportunities, the firm with higher
current profitability holds a larger balance of line of credit. The result that firms with high market to book
ratios have lower balances of lines of credit is opposite of the prediction of Martin and Santomero (1997)
that higher growth firms use more lines of credit.
In terms of the specification in Table 7, Panel A, there is one important note. The distribution of
the left-hand side variables in specification (3) is 0 for a number of observations, and positive for others.
The distribution of the left-hand size variable can be viewed as censored. I have replicated all results in
Table 7, Panel A using a maximum likelihood tobit specification, with almost identical results. In
specifications below, I decompose the extensive margin ({0,1 }) and intensive margin (level conditional
on { 1 }) to determine the effect of firm characteristics on the amount of different types of debt employed.
Panel B of Table 7 examines whether the extensive or intensive margin is driving the results in
Panel A. For each of the debt instruments, I estimate the following extensive margin specification:
HasTypeDebtit =at + Xi,t_-l +y* Profitsit- 1 + it (4)
where HasTypeL)ebti, is a {0,1 } variable that measures whether firm i has the type of debt in question in
year t. I then estimate a specification similar to (3) on the sample of firm-years that have the type of debt
in question. In other words, I am interested if profitable firms are more likely to obtain lines of credit
(extensive margin) or, conditional on obtaining a line of credit, more likely to hold more as a fraction of
assets (intensive margin).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, Panel B present evidence that the extensive margin is driving the
results on lines of credit in Table 7, Panel A. Column (1) implies that a one standard deviation in
profitability (0.28) leads to a 0.12 higher probability of obtaining a line of credit. The point estimate on
the intensive margin is positive, but it is neither economically nor statistically significant. Columns (5),
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(6), (9), and (10), show that arm's length debt and convertible debt are used less by more profitable firms,
and this is true on both the extensive and intensive margin.
Taken together, the results in Table 7, Panels A and B support the argument that firms with low
profitability are unable to access the market for lines of credit at a reasonable price. At this point in this
project, I am not able to assert this causal story with certainty. Table 7 measures correlations in the data
that are suggestive of this argument, but further work exploring exogenous shocks to earnings are
necessary to provide compelling evidence that low profitability firms are unable to obtain a line of credit
at a reasonable price. At this point, the evidence suggests that only firms with reputable earnings histories
are able to obtain this financial product. This evidence is consistent with intuition provided by Rajan and
Zingales (1995) who argue that a positive relationship between earnings and cash flows should be
witnessed if debt "suppliers [are] more willing to lend to firms with current cashflows" (1452). The
developed hypothesis follows directly from the analysis on how banks manage the unused portion of lines
of credit. I find that, conditional on having a line of credit, banks extensively use covenants on measures
of profitability to manage the line of credit. Firms with negative profitability shocks lose access to the
unused portion of their line of credit. Given this behavior by banks when firms have lines of credit, it
follows directly that banks may also restrict access to lines of credit by firms with low profitability.
Table 8 examines whether the results in Table 7 are due to within-firm or cross-section variation.
In columns (1) and (3), I estimate fixed effects linear specifications of the following form:
Lineit HasLineit = ai -+ at + Xi,t_ + * Profitsit1 + Git (5)
In columns (2) and (4), I estimate a between, or group means, regression of the following firm
Linei,HasLine = Xi + y * Profitsi + i (6)
where:
-1 TZi -Z it (7)
T t=l
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In other words, in columns (2) and (4), I regress the mean of the usage of lines of credit for each firm i on
the means of the right hand side variables of interest. Fixed effects estimates will measure the degree to
which variation within each firm is driving the results in Table 7, whereas between estimates will measure
the degree to which variation across firms is driving the results in Table 7.
Table 8 presents evidence that the core results in Table 8 are mainly driven by cross-section
variation in profitability. The coefficient estimates on profitability in the fixed effects specification in
columns (1) and (3) are positive and statistically distinct from zero at the 13 percent and 27 percent
confidence level, respectively. Consistent with column (5) of Table 5, I find that a negative shock to
earnings reduces the unused portion of lines of credit in fixed effects regressions (not reported). In other
words, although total amount of lines of credit shows only a marginally statistically significant positive
relationship with within-firm variation in profitability, the unused portion shows a statistically
significantly positive relationship with within-firm variation in profitability. The coefficient estimates on
profitability in the between estimation are very similar to the pooled regression estimates in Table 7, both
in magnitude and statistical significance.
The between- and within-firm analysis in Table 8 demonstrates that it is primarily cross-sectional
variation in profitability that determines the use of lines of credit. Although these results should be
interpreted only as correlations, they imply that firms with low earnings capability are unable to access
lines of credit at a reasonable price. There is, however, also evidence that within-firm variation in
profitability can lead to a reduced line of credit. Although the results are only marginally statistically
significant, they suggest that when a given firm experiences a negative shock to earnings, it loses access
to the line of credit.
2.7 Conclusion
Bank lines of credit are used by more U.S. corporations than any other type of debt financing.
Despite the importance of bank lines of credit in U.S. corporate finance, the empirical evidence on lines
of credit is limited. In this chapter, I explore how firms use lines of credit, how banks manage lines of
credit, and which types of firms have access to lines of credit.
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Consistent with theoretical research on lines of credit, I find that this financial product provides
financial flexibility for the firms that obtain them. I find that firms use lines of credit as the incremental
source of adjustments in leverage ratios and nominal levels of debt. I argue that as the incremental source
of debt financing, lines of credit are particularly prone to corporate abuse. To curb this abuse, banks use
covenants to manage the unused portion of lines of credit. In particular, banks restrict access to the
unused portion of the line of credit when a firm defaults on profitability covenants due to a negative
earnings shock. This finding suggests that the assumption in the theoretical literature that bank lines of
credit are unconditional obligations of banks is not accurate. Banks award certain firms with the
flexibility of a line of credit, but they manage that flexibility by requiring firms to maintain high
profitability.
The evidence presented here on the types of firms that utilize bank lines of credit is largely
consistent with the view that lines of credit are awarded only to profitable firms. Although debt is
generally used less by profitable firms, the amount of used and unused lines of credit are increasing in
firm profitability. This result appears driven by cross-sectional variation at the extensive margin. In other
words, the evidence suggests that only profitable firms are able to gain access to the flexibility of lines of
credit. A more rigorous analysis using exogenous shocks to firm profitability is necessary to assert this
causal interpretation with greater certainty.
The central purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of lines of credit in corporate finance. In
future work, I hope to relate these findings to two areas. First, the traditional view of banks in corporate
finance is that they provide a critical monitoring function that distinguishes bank debt from arm's length
debt (Diamond (1984), Diamond (1991), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984)). The existing research
implies that large, transparent, and reputable corporate borrowers will "graduate" from bank debt to arm's
length debt because monitoring is less crucial. My results imply that bank debt is used by even large,
transparent, and reputable borrowers, and that highly monitored bank debt may still be necessary because
of the flexibility it provides. The findings here may also help to explain why bank debt is almost always
senior to all other debt obligations. Given problems of debt overhang (Myers (1977)) and the fact that
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lines of credit are the incremental source of financing, it follows directly that bank debt should be senior
to all other debt claims.
Second, there is a growing body of research on the role of adjustment costs in the determination
of financial structure (Leary and Roberts (2005); Flannery and Rangan (2005)). In particular, these
papers support traditional trade-off theories of financial leverage by implying that firms adjust toward
target leverage ratios slowly because adjustment costs are quite high. My findings imply that lines of
credit are the marginal source of adjustments in the levels of debt and leverage ratios; an understanding of
the adjustment costs associated with lines of credit is therefore an important part of understanding
whether adjustment costs do in fact explain the slow adjustment to target leverage ratios.
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Table 6
Comparing firms with and without lines of credit
This table presents the mean and median firm characteristics for firm-year observations where a line of credit is present and
not present.
With a line of credit Without a line of credit
(N= 1263) (N = 462)
Mean Median Mean Median
Debt Structure
Book leverage 0.492* 0.494 0.321 0.250
Book debt/total assets 0.248* 0.239 0.098 0.000
Term bank debt/total assets 0.041* 0.000 0.012 0.000
Arm's length debt/total assets 0.075* 0.000 0.021 0.000
Commercial paper/total assets 0.005* 0.000 0.000 0.000
Non-bank private debt/total assets 0.016 0.000 0.017 0.000
Convertible debt/total assets 0.018* 0.000 0.032 0.000
Firm characteristics
EBITDA/assets 0.101* 0.122 -0.174 -0.053
Market to book 1.741* 1.319 2.956 1.880
Tangible assets/total assets 0.293* 0.234 0.177 0.105
Total assets 1760* 224 433 45
Industry composition (SIC 1 digit code)
Mining, construction, agriculture (0, 1) 0.045 0.045
Manufacturing (2, 3) 0.501 0.526
Trans, comm., gas, & electricity (4) 0.092* 0.035
Trade (5) 0.166* 0.037
Services (7, 8) 0.188* 0.351
* Significantly different than firms without lines of credit at the 1 percent level
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Chapter 3
Does Joint Production of Lending and Underwriting Help or Hurt Firms?
3.1 Introduction
Deregulation of restrictions on commercial bank underwriting activities, culminated in the
passage of the Financial Services Modernization act of 1999, has led to major changes in the debt
underwriting markets facing borrowing firms. From 1992 to 2003, the percent of debt securities
underwritten by commercial banks went from 4 percent to 85 percent. Over the same period, the percent
of debt securities underwritten by a financial firm with which the borrowing firm had a recent private
lending relationship went from less than 1 percent to 75 percent. In 2003, 4 of the top 5 lead underwriters
in debt underwriting markets were commercial banks.'
This important change necessitates empirical research because economic theory yields ambiguous
predictions about the welfare impacts on borrowing firms from this major shift induced by regulatory
policy. Firms could potentially benefit; commercial banks with private lending relationships may have a
cheaper cost of underwriting. The introduction of new players in underwriting markets may spur
competition, resulting in lower underwriting fees. Yield spreads on debt issues could be lower if lending
financial institutions better certify public issues by firms with which private lending relationships are
present. On the other hand, dominant financial institutions with large market share in both lending and
underwriting markets could expropriate project rents from borrowing firms by locking them into
relationships. If fixed costs of information collection are high or problems of information asymmetry
severe, financial institutions in a dominant position vis-6-vis the firm may extract rents from profitable
firm projects, as in the model by Rajan (1992). Anecdotal evidence suggests this is a potential problem;
corporate finance executives report being "pressured" into obtaining underwriting services in exchange
J Throughout this paper, a commercial banks refers to a financial institution that is either (1) a U.S. financial firm
filing a Federal Reserve Y9C report, or (2) a foreign financial firm that has an SIC code of 6020 or 6029. Generally,
an investment bank is a financial institution that engages primarily in fee-based services such as underwriting,
M&A, and brokerage services. Commercial banks engage primarily in interest-based services of deposit-taking and
lending.
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for loans from commercial banks (WSJ (2004a)). Investment banks complain that the practice of tying
loans and underwriting services is illegal and harmful to competition (WSJ, (2004b)).
In this chapter, I examine a panel of 4,553 debt issues by 509 firms from 1990 to 2003. I employ
a fixed-effects regression analysis to explore how joint production of lending and public debt
underwriting services affects underwriting fees, yield spreads, and syndicate structure for debt issues.
While a number of papers explore this issue, this paper is the first to estimate key parameters using
within-firm variation over time in the ability, by law, of financial institutions to underwrite debt securities
for firms with which they have a lending relationship. This approach is an important contribution; I show
that fixed effects estimation produces results at odds with findings in the previous literature. I also show
that cross-section estimates reported in the previous literature are likely biased due to unobservable firm
characteristics.
Using a fixed effects estimation strategy to eliminate this bias, I find three results. First, relative
to the period when joint production was restricted by law, underwriting fees charged to a given firm are
10 to 15 percent lower when the issue is underwritten by a commercial bank with which the firm has a
lending relationship in the year prior to the underwriting. This result is strongest among investment grade
and large firms. Evaluated at the mean, the strongest result suggests that investment grade firms enjoy a
cost savings of about $200,000 per debt issue. The evidence suggests that financial institutions that
jointly produce lending and underwriting services do not harm firms, but offer price discounts on
underwriting services. I provide several robustness checks to warrant this claim. I find that lending
commercial banks do not offer an initial cut in fees to capture future business at higher prices; the
underwriting fee is lower when lending institutions first underwrite a debt issue and remain low even into
the future. I also find that underwriting markets are more competitive (in terms of the market share held
by the top 5 underwriters and the herfindahl index) in recent years than in the early 1990s.
Second, the fixed effects analysis finds no evidence that commercial banks with or without recent
lending relationships obtain a lower yield spread when issuing a firm's debt security. This result is robust
when examining large and small firms, and investment grade and high yield firms. This finding is in
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stark contrast to a number of papers in the previous literature. To explain this discrepancy, I show that
cross-section (or pooled) regressions that compare yield spreads on commercial bank underwritten
securities to yield spreads on non-commercial bank underwritten securities produce biased and
inconsistent estimates. The discrepancy between the pooled and fixed effects analysis is important;
estimates produced in cross section regressions, especially early in the sample, are likely biased due to the
fact that commercial banks underwrite for firms of higher unobservable quality. The econometrician,
using only observable characteristics as controls, falsely ascribes lower yield spreads to the fact that a
commercial bank underwrites the issue. A fixed effects strategy that isolates within-firm variation in
spreads removes the bias by removing unobservable characteristics of a given firm that do not vary across
time. In other words, a significant contribution of this paper over the prior literature is that estimation of
key parameters comes from within-firm variation over time driven by exogenous regulatory changes, not
from between-firm variation at a given point in time (likely driven by unobservable firm characteristics).
The fact that yield spreads do not change significantly suggests that both commercial banks and
investment banks produce similar information on firms to certify issues. However, my results on
underwriting fees indicate that commercial banks with lending relationships produce the information
more cheaply.
The final section of this chapter examines whether firms are more locked in to financial
relationships after deregulation and explores the strategies utilized by firms to prevent being expropriated
by financial institutions. I evaluate the evolution of capture probabilities, or the probability that a lead
manager on a debt issue for a given firm is chosen as the lead manager on the firm's next debt issue. I
find evidence that capture probabilities have not increased with deregulation, and are no higher when a
lending relationship is present with the underwriter. Borrowing firms appear to reduce the lock in effect
of a lending underwriter by hiring multiple lead managers. The presence of more than one lead manager
on debt issues has increased from less than 2 percent in 1992 to almost 80 percent in 2003. Further, this
result is driven by debt issues on which one of the lead arrangers has a lending relationship with the
borrowing firm. In other words, a firm rarely hires only one lead manager if it has a lending relationship
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with that lead manager. The results suggest that firms utilize syndicate structure to prevent any one
financial firm from gaining too much power over the firm.
There is a substantial body of research that explores the entry of commercial banks into securities
underwriting markets. This chapter represents a new contribution to this literature for 4 reasons. First, it
is the first paper, to my knowledge, that examines the effects of commercial bank entry for the entire
period of deregulation and for a significantly long period after the Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999. Such an extension is important, because changes in debt underwriting markets have been most
significant since 1999. Second, as mentioned above, this paper is the first to exploit within-firm variation
driven by exogenous regulatory changes to assess the impact of commercial bank entry into securities
activity. The empirical strategy eliminates potential bias due to unobservable firm characteristics. I show
explicitly how coefficients in cross section analyses are biased and inconsistent in yield spread
regressions, which cautions against using these cross section methods to assert causal relationships
between commercial bank entry and outcomes. Third, the analysis of a panel of debt issues through the
entire period of deregulation allows for sharper conclusions with regard to the price effects on firms. For
example, commercial banks could offer only short-term discounts in order to initially capture
underwriting business, only to charge higher prices in the future. This paper is the first, to my
knowledge, that explicitly tests dynamic behavior surrounding commercial bank entry into securities
underwriting. Finally, this paper evaluates new and interesting trends in the syndicate structure of debt
issues which, to my knowledge, have not been explored.2
3.2 Background, Theory, and Previous Research
3.2.1 The deregulation of restrictions on commercial bank underwriting activity
2 Narayanan, Rangan, and Rangan (2004) explore the effect of syndicate structure in equity markets from 1993 to
1997; they find that lending commercial banks co-manage with non-lending banks when lending relationships with
the borrowing firm are present. I discuss their paper in more detail when presenting the syndicate structure results.
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The deregulation of restrictions on commercial bank securities activity through the late 1980s and
1990s is well documented.3 The Banking Act of 1933, four sections of which are collectively known as
the "Glass-Steagall Act," strictly prohibited securities underwriting by commercial banks. On April 30 th,
1987, the Federal Reserve authorized limited underwriting activity for previously prohibited securities
inc luding municipal revenue bonds, commercial paper, and mortgage-related securities. On January 18th,
1989, the Federal Reserve expanded the definition of eligible securities to include corporate debt and
equity securities, and allowed for "Section 20" subsidiaries (named after Section 20 of the Banking Act of
1933) of commercial bank holding companies to underwrite these securities on a limited basis.
The Federal Reserve imposed three important restrictions on commercial bank underwriting
activity. First, the revenue from the underwriting of corporate debt and equity securities could not exceed
10 percent of the subsidiary's revenue. Second, a regulated commercial bank had to apply and win
approval for a Section 20 subsidiary. On December 20, 1996, the Federal Reserve increased the revenue
restriction on Section 20 subsidiary underwriting activity from 10 to 25 percent. All revenue restrictions
on commercial bank securities activity were eliminated in November of 1999 when President Clinton
signed into law the Financial Services Modernization Act (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
The gradual deregulation of commercial bank underwriting restrictions provides the empirical
laboratory for studying the effect of joint production of lending and debt underwriting services. Figure 1
shows how commercial banks responded to deregulation. In 1990, not a single debt security in my
sample was underwritten by a commercial bank. From 1991 to 1996, commercial banks gained market
share in debt underwriting markets, but remained small compared to investment banks. Almost half of
the gain in market share by commercial banks up to 1996 was driven by unregulated commercial banks;
these are foreign banks, such as Credit Suisse and Union Bank of Switzerland which had no depository
branches in the United States. From 1996 to 1999, there is a sharp increase in the percentage of debt
issues underwritten by commercial banks. Finally, in the aftermath of FSMA, commercial banks have
3 See Lown, et al (2000) and Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) for a comprehensive treatment of deregulation up
to and through the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
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dominated debt underwriting markets; by 2003, almost 90 percent of underwritten issues have a
commercial bank lead manager.
The main focus of this chapter is not on commercial bank entry per se, but rather the increasing
practice of jointly producing loans and underwriting services. Figure 2 shows the trend in joint
production. Similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that, prior to 1996, only a small percentage of debt issues
were underwritten by financial firms with which the borrowing firm has a recent loan (defined to be a
loan within the past 2 years). The percentage of debt issues underwritten by a recent lender increases
from 1996 to 1999 from 10 percent to almost 35 percent. The increase is larger after the passage of
FSMA; by 2003, over 70 percent of debt issues are underwritten by a financial institution with which the
borrowing firm has a recent lending relationship. Figure 2 also shows that commercial banks were
constrained to underwrite for only some of the firms in their loan portfolio prior to FSMA. In the early
part of the sample, many firms that had lending relationships with a bank that legally COULD underwrite
the firms debt security did NOT hire the commercial bank. By 2003, over 80 percent of debt-issues by
firms that COULD have hired a commercial bank underwriter did in fact hire the commercial bank
underwriter. This trend suggests that revenue restrictions on commercial bank underwriting had real
effects early in the sample period.
Figure 2 also shows that investment banks, prior to 1996, almost uniquely focus on underwriting
markets. There were never regulatory constraints on investment banks from providing private lending
services. Even so, investment banks almost exclusively focused on underwriting activities up to and
through deregulation; prior to 1997, only 1 percent of all issues were underwritten by an investment bank
with which the borrowing firm had a lending relationship in the past two years. While regulatory
restrictions prevented commercial banks from underwriting, it is likely that competition, size or resource
constraints prevented investment banks from originating loans. There is evidence that investment banks
have recently increased their role in private lending. For example, after 1999, 8 percent of issues were
underwritten by an investment bank that also had a recent loan to the firm.
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Table 1 lists the top 5 lead managers for underwritten debt issues through the sample. In 1990
and even by 1996, the underwriters are predominately investment banks, with Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers maintaining over 10 percent market share each. The shift
in market composition begins in 1996 and is completed by 2003. By 2003, 4 of the top 5 underwriters are
commercial banks, with Citigroup, JPMorganChase, and Bank of America holding the top 3 spots. Table
1 also provides basic measures of market concentration. The market share of the top 5 underwriters and
the herfindahl index of the market have both declined substantially since 1990. This provides initial
evidence that commercial banks have not reduced competition in debt underwriting markets.
3.2.2 Theory
Theory yields ambiguous predictions regarding the effect of joint production of lending and
underwriting on fees and yield spreads. With respect to fees, commercial banks may be able to more
cheaply produce debt underwriting and lending activities through information scope economies. If there
is a fixed cost component of both lending and underwriting for the same firm, commercial banks may
achieve cheaper costs by combining the two functions. The information scope economies assumption is
used in the model by Kanatas and Qi (2003), and seems reasonable given practitioner anecdotal evidence.
The key question remains, will joint producers relay cost savings to the borrowing firms through lower
fees? A darker side of joint production with respect to underwriting fees comes from models such as
Rajan (1992). If information asymmetries are severe and firms are unable to credibly relay information
on projects to financial institutions outside their existing relationship, a joint producing financial firm may
gain a position of power over the firm. By tying lending and underwriting services, the financial
institution may be able to expropriate project profits from firms. In addition, if lending institutions gain
market power in debt underwriting markets, they may charge higher fees.
The previous literature has primarily concentrated on the effect of commercial bank entry on
yield spreads, or the interest rate on public debt issues underwritten by commercial banks. The negative
view holds that an underwriter with an outstanding loan to a firm has an inherent conflict of interest in
issuing securities for that firm. In the extreme example, a lender with private information about pending
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firm default issues a public security on behalf of the firm to pay off the outstanding loan, leaving public
investors with non-performing securities. Investors properly predict such behavior, and demand higher
yield spreads to take on such securities. The positive view holds that commercial bank lenders, with
detailed information on firms from lending relationships, are better certifiers of public issues; investors
reward issues underwritten by lenders with lower yield spreads.
3.2.3 Previous Research
The initial empirical research on the topic begins with the work of Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and
Puri (1996) who study securities underwritten by commercial banks in the 1920s, prior to the passage of
the Glass-Steagall Act. These papers document evidence that commercial banks issued higher quality
securities that were sold for higher prices, which negates the assertion that commercial banks had
conflicts of interest in underwriting securities for firms with which they may have had loans outstanding.
Empirical analysis of the modem era begins with Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997). The sample
includes 670 debt issues between 1993 and 1995, and the authors, using cross-section regressions, find
that commercial banks obtain yield spreads for their clients up to 42 basis points lower than investment
banks when the commercial bank has outstanding loans to the firm. Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999)
employ a sample of all debt issues between 1985 and 1996 and find that overall underwriting fees are
lower after 1989 than before, and again find that yield spreads are significantly lower when the bank has
outstanding loans to the firm. Roten and Mullineaux (2002) extend the analysis by Gande, Puri and
Saunders to debt issues from 1995 through 1998. Their findings are exactly the opposite of Gande, Puri,
and Saunders; in this later period, they find "no evidence that a prior commercial bank lending
relationship influences underwriting yields for any type of issue." They also find no evidence that
Section 20 underwritings produce a favorable competitive effect on underwriting fees. A more recent
paper by Narayanan, Rangan, and Rangan (2003) uses a sample from 1993 to 1997 and finds similar
results to those of Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999).
Schenone (2005) and Drucker and Puri (2005) focus on equity markets. Schenone analyzes IPOs
between 1998 and 2000 and finds that IPOs by firms with a lending relationship with a prospective
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underwriter face a 16 percent lower cost of equity than firms without a banking relationship. Drucker and
Puri (2005) study the joint production of seasoned equity offerings and lending relationships. They find
evidence that commercial banks "tie" lending and underwriting services, and offer cheaper fees for both.
In these papers, the empirical analysis is derived from cross-section regressions where the
underwriting fee, yield spread, or underpricing of equity is the dependent variable, and the key right hand
side variable is whether or not a commercial bank underwrites the issue/has a loan with the issuer.
Identification of the key parameter comes from comparing firms for which commercial banks serve as an
underwriter (and have a lending relationship) to firms with no commercial bank is present. Implicitly, all
papers accept the presence of lending relationships with an underwriter and the choice of underwriter as
exogenous. A worry in this empirical approach is selection bias; firm characteristics unobservable to the
econometrician (but observable to banks and firms) affect which firms choose commercial banks or,
alternatively, which firms are targeted by commercial bank underwriters. If commercial banks target
finrms that are higher quality (based on characteristics unobservable to the econometrician), these firms
will obtain lower yield spreads and lower fees given their higher quality. The econometrician falsely
ascribes the lower spreads and fees to the commercial bank underwriter.
Some settings do not allow for the use of fixed effects estimation strategies. For example, every
firm has at most IPO, and so one cannot estimate a within-firm change in underpricing. In addition, the
previous literature acknowledges this problem and utilizes methods to solve it.4 In this chapter, I only
show that cross-section analyses with regard to yield spreads on debt issues produce biased estimates.
The results in equity markets (Drucker and Puri, 2005) may be robust to a fixed effects strategy. Overall,
the existence of unobservable firm characteristics warrants caution in interpretation of cross-section
results; one cannot assign a causal effect of commercial banks on underwriting fees, yield spreads, or
4 For example, Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997) use maximum likelihood to estimate the probability a firm
has a loan with a bank, and then uses the residuals in the OLS regression of yield spread on commercial bank
underwriter. Drucker and Puri (2005) use a matching technique to attempt to eliminate selection bias. This
matching methodology assumes that all relevant differences between loans jointly offered and loans not jointly
offered are captured by observable characteristics.
113
underpricing. I formalize this concern in the next section and show that fixed effects regressions produce
more reliable estimates.
Yasuda (2005) takes a different approach than these articles. Using debt issues from 1993 to
1997, she employs a multinomial choice model in which the choice of lead manager is a function of
reputation, the underwriting fee, and previous lending relationships. Her results suggest that there is a
trade-off between lending relationships and the underwriting fee in the choice model, especially for junk
bond and first-time issuers. Rather than using the underwriting fee as a dependent variable, she uses the
underwriting fee as an exogenous variable that is used in the choice set by the borrowing firm. Yasuda
(2005) uses an expectation-maximization algorithm to estimate the unobserved fees by underwriters not
chosen. She argues that using only observed fees leads to bias due to the fact that the unobserved fees by
banks not chosen are likely higher than the observed fees. Her approach indicates a potential problem in
using observed underwriting fees as a dependent variable. I address these concerns below when outlining
the empirical strategy.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data
I use three data sources. The core data set on non-convertible debt issues, issue characteristics,
fees, yield spreads, and names of lead managers comes from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC).
Data on lending relationships is from Dealscan by the Loan Pricing Corporation. Finally, firm
characteristics such as book leverage ratio, income, and total assets come from Compustat.
The Dealscan data used to extract lending relationships suffers from two major problems. First,
the coverage before 1990 is sporadic. I therefore begin my sample in 1990. Second, the data from
Dealscan suffer from systematic selection bias; the data do not cover all loans to all firms, but are focused
on large loans to public firms. To address this problem, I limit the sample to the largest firms in
Compustat, firms for which I am confident Dealscan covers all lending relationships. The exact sample is
constructed as follows. First, using the Compustat database, I obtain a list of the top 1000 firms each year
from 1989 to 2002, ranked by the total book value of assets. If a firm is ever in the top 1000 firms in any
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year, then the firm is included in the analysisfor allyears. I limit the sample to firms that are in
Compustat for at least 4 years. This process results in 1340 firms. Using CUSIP identifiers, I find all
debt issues by these 1340 firms from 1990 to 2003, which results in 6979 debt issues by 687 firms
representing $1.1 trillion in total debt issued.5 I drop any floating coupon issue and any issue lacking data
on maturity, underwriting fees, yield spreads, or lead managers. The resulting sample is 4,713 debt issues
by 669 firms. Finally, the focus of this chapter is on a fixed effects analysis, and so only firms with at
least 2 issues are included in the data. The final panel data set of non-convertible, fixed coupon payment
debt issues includes 4553 issues by 509 firms representing almost $900 billion in total debt issued.
I assign syndicate member positions based on codes provided by SDC. A syndicate member is
considered a "lead manager" if its position is described as "book runner" (27 percent), "joint book
runner" (8 percent), or "joint lead manager" (1 percent). A syndicate member is a "co-manager" if its
position is described as "co-manager" (62 percent) or "global coordinator" (1 percent).
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. The mean number of issues per firm is 9. The majority
of firms are from the manufacturing sector (SIC codes of 2 and 3) and the transportation,
communications, gas and electricity sector (SIC code of 4). The key dependent variables are the
underwriting fee as a percentage of total issue amount (mean 0.76) and the yield spread to benchmark
(mean 125 basis points). Approximately 16 percent of debt issues are secured, and 40 percent are
callable. The average amount of a debt issue is $196 million with a maturity of 14 years.
Mergers and acquisitions among financial firms during this time period are common. I track all
relevant mergers for this analysis, and any acquired firm is treated as its acquirer as of the effective date
of acquisition. Acquirers inherit the relationships of their targets, and relationship variables reflect this
algorithm. A list of all relevant mergers and their effective dates is included in a data appendix available
upon request.
3.3.2 Empirical Strategy
5 The total SDC database on non-convertible debt issues by U.S. firms includes 10782 issues representing $1.6
trillion.
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The main difference in debt underwriting markets today and in the early 1990s is that financial
firms are now able to jointly provide lending and debt underwriting services. My empirical strategy
exploits the exogenous removal of legal restrictions to estimate the within-firm change in yield spreads
and underwriting fees due to the joint production of lending and debt underwriting services. The ideal
setting is as follows: suppose financial firms were legally disallowed from lending and underwriting to
the same firm before 1996. Between 1996 and 1999, financial firms were allowed to underwrite and lend
to firms in category x, but not for firms in category y. Finally, after 1999, financial institutions were
allowed to underwrite and lend to firms in both categories x and y. If every firm in category x hires the
same bank for underwriting and private lending services in 1996, and every firm in category y does in
1999, then one can easily estimate the within-firm effect of joint production on underwriting fees or yield
spreads through the following equation:
Spread = ia+ a + lendo,fl + XI + u (1)
The variable lend takes on the value 1 if a financial institution with which issuing firm i has a recent
lending relationship underwrites issuej (and 0 otherwise). In the ideal framework, lend takes on the value
1 for all firms in category x post 1996 and in category x andy post 1999. The coefficient fithen
represents the within-firm effect of joint production on Spread, where the different times of deregulation
for categories x andy allow me to distinguish ,6 from the year indicator variables (a,).
Although the empirical setting of deregulation does not perfectly replicate (1), it represents a
good approximation. Prior to 1996, the joint production of lending and debt underwriting is rare. As
Figure 2 shows, prior to 1994, less than 5 percent of debt issues in the sample are underwritten by
financial institutions with which the issuing firm has a recent lending relationship. The number does
jump slightly in 1995 and 1996, but the percentage of issues underwritten by lending institutions is still
very low compared to the post 1999 period. In 1996, the limits on commercial bank underwriting activity
were eased, and as a result, the percentage of debt issues by lending institutions increases to almost 35
percent by 1999. Post 1999, the number increases to almost 80 percent by the end of the sample. While
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commercial banks may target specific firms at different points in time in the sample, the fixed effects
strategy eliminates the firm specific error that drives endogenous selection. In other words, the control
group in all regressions is the same firm before it hires a lending commercial bank as its underwriter.
Given that almost all firms eventually hire a financial institution with which they have a recent lending
relationship, identification of key parameters comes from within-firm changes. I am able to distinguish
this effect from the year indicator variables given that firms hire a recent lender as an underwriter at
different points in time.
Table 3 offers a detailed glance at how deregulation leads to joint production in the sample over
time. From 1990 to 1992, only 4 out of the 259 firms issuing debt securities hire an underwriter with
which they have a recent lending relationship. The firms that hire a private lender as underwriter are
much larger and have much higher book leverage ratios in this early time period. From 1993 to 1996, the
number increases to 49 out of 345. After the implementation of the FSMA in 1999, 75 percent of firms
have securities underwritten by a recent lender. In 2003 alone, 85 percent of firms have securities
underwritten by a recent lender. By the end of the sample, firms hiring lending institutions to underwrite
their securities appear similar to firms not hiring lending institutions based on observable characteristics.
The third row of Table 3 shows the fraction of firms that hire a recent lender as an underwriter
out of the sample of firms that COULD HAVE hired a recent lender. In other words, this is the sample of
firms that recently loaned from a potential commercial bank underwriter. Before the revenue restriction
was lifted in 1996, firms with recent lending relationships with a commercial bank legally able to
underwrite rarely actually hired the underwriter. This suggests that revenue restrictions limited the ability
of commercial banks to underwrite. After the Financial Services Modernization Act, 93 percent of firms
that COULD HAVE hired a recent lender actually did. This response is the variation I exploit to estimate
the change in underwriting fees, yield spreads, and syndicate structure.
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Table 4 presents lead manager choice probit regressions to demonstrate how deregulation has
altered the choice of lead manager.6 In these probit specifications, the choice set of lead managers
includes all lead mangers with at least percent market share in the year of the issue, and the dependent
variable takes on the value 1 if a given lead manager is chosen. This table demonstrates how previous
lending relationships have become a more important determinant of underwriter choice. Between 1990
and 1992, a previous debt underwriting relationship and the reputation of the lead manager in
underwriting markets are extremely strong in determining which lead manager is chosen (marginal effect
is almost 20 percent). The existence of a lending relationship between the issuing firm and the potential
lead manager has no statistically significant effect in this early period. The existence of a lending
relationship increases in importance through the sample period. By the 2000-2003 period, previous
lending relationships are almost as important in lead manager choice as previous underwriting
relationships. In other words, when financial institutions are legally able to hire the same firm for both
private lending and underwriting services, firms do in fact hire the same financial institution to do both.
I estimate a fixed effects regression that seeks to exploit the change in regulatory environment.
Formally, the exact form of equations I estimate is:
Fee, Spread = aia + t Lendql + XT + (2)
where Lend takes on the value 1 if the lead manager on an issue has a recent loan to the issuing firm.
Lend is restricted by law to be 0 for most firms before 1996, and then takes on the value 1 as firms hire a
lead manager with which they have recent lending relationships. The parameter ao is estimated explicitly,
which means that ,8 can be interpreted as the within-firm change in Fee, Spread that is due to the fact that
the firm hires the same financial firm to jointly provide debt underwriting and lending.
One concern with the equation estimated in (2) is that some firms did not choose some banks, and
these fees are unobserved. As Yasuda (2005) notes, the unobserved fees at financial firms not chosen are
6 1 use a simple probit model instead of a multinomial choice logit model because more than lead manager can be
chosen on a given deal. Amemiya (1974) shows that the proper maximum likelihood technique in such a situation is
to estimate a probit for each lead manager, and allow errors to be correlated within each choice group. See Sufi
(2005) and Corwin and Schultz (2005) for examples.
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likely higher than the observed fee. This point urges caution in interpretation of the results. I am not
testing whether the underwriting fee charged by the selected underwriter is lower than the (unobserved)
underwriting fees that would have been charged by other underwriters on the same issue. It is likely that
this is also true, given that the underwriting fee enters the choice function negatively. My empirical
strategy tests whether the fee charged to a given firm by the selected underwriter after deregulation is
lower than the fee charged to the same firm by the selected underwriter before deregulation. The fixed
effects strategy produces an unbiased estimator of this change in fees. It is possible that comparing fees
before and after deregulation overstates the welfare gains to firms if, for example, firms hire less qualified
underwriters for cheaper fees. The yield spread regressions presented below show that lending
commercial bank underwriters obtain yield spreads no higher (or lower) than investment banks, which
suggests that they are no less qualified. Also, I explicitly control for underwriter reputation in all
regressions; if underwriter reputation is positively correlated with fees, my regression strategy partials out
the effect.
3.3.3 Fixed effects versus cross-section estimates
A key contribution of this chapter is that estimation of key parameters comes from within-firm
variation over time in the ability, by law, of financial institutions to underwrite debt securities for firms
with which they have a lending relationship. The previous literature estimates key parameters from
between firm variation in hiring a recent lender to underwrite an issue at a given point in time. More
specifically, the specification estimated in the previous literature is:
Spreadu = a, + Lendij + XT + ai + e (3)
The firm-specific error term that does not vary across time, a;, is not estimated explicitly and is assumed
to be part of the error term. An unbiased and consistent estimate of fl is possible only if:
E[ai + oe I Lend
.
,Xj] = (4)
This equation does not hold if the firm-specific error term, ai, is correlated with the fact that a firm has an
issue underwritten by a recent lender. If there are unobservable firm quality characteristics correlated
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with the choice of commercial bank underwriter, these quality measures will be captured by ai and
condition (4) will not hold. In other words, condition (4) will not hold if commercial banks target firms
based on unobservable quality; estimates of will be biased and inconsistent. The story is quite simple:
in a cross-section analysis in which commercial banks are legally restricted from widespread
underwriting, they target precisely the firms that are higher quality. Higher quality issues obtain lower
yield spreads and underwriting fees, and the econometrician falsely ascribes the lower yield spreads and
underwriting fees to the fact that the commercial bank underwrites the issue. Indeed, if equation (4) holds
and one finds that l < 0 then standard arbitrage behavior contradicts the existence of a control group; if
two firms are identical and ,6l < 0, then why does any firm not hire a lending financial institution to
underwrite issues?
Fixed effects estimation requires a much weaker condition. More specifically, fixed effects
estimation requires only that:
E[cij Lend o ,Xij] = 0 (5)
Equation (5) holds true as long as lending financial institutions don't have private information on one of a
given firm's issues as opposed to a different issue by the same firm. In other words, equation (5) holds
true as long as commercial banks do not "cherry-pick" high quality issues within a given firm. I do
several robustness checks to demonstrate that this is not what is taking place.
Cross-section analyses are important in understanding how different firms may be affected by
deregulation. For example, a cross section analysis before deregulation might show that large firms are
charged lower fees than small firms. A cross section analysis after deregulation might show that this
discrepancy has diminished. However, a fixed effects strategy that isolates within-firm variation before
and after deregulation more accurately estimates the desired effect on firms from regulatory policy.
Finally, in all specifications, estimated standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered
at the firm level.
3.4 Results: Underwriting Fees and Yield Spreads
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3.4.1 Underwriting Fees
This section presents evidence that borrowing firms face lower fees in the aftermath of
deregulation, and that lower fees are a result of commercial banks jointly producing loans and debt
underwriting services. Underwriting fees are a function of the underlying risk of the security and the
costs of issuance. The exact specification of equations estimated in this section is:
Feei = ai + a, + Lendon/ + IssueVarsI Fl + FirmVarsiF2 + .(6)
where Fee
.
is the underwriting fee on issuej by firm i. All specifications include firm fixed effects and a
year indicator variable for each year (a,). The key variable of interest, Lend, is an indicator variable
taking on the value if the firm hires an underwriter with which it has a recent lending relationship,
defined both in terms of a loan in the past year, or a loan 1 to 2 years ago.
IssueVars are control variables that are specific to each issue. They include the following
variables:
(a) Moody's Credit Rating Indicator Variables: lower credit rated issues could possibly have higher
expenses given increased research costs and increased risk by the managers who must underwrite and
market the lower rated issues.
(b) Natural Log of Maturity of the Loan, in years: Longer maturity debt instruments are less desirable
given increased default and interest rate risk. Underwriters bear this risk partially, and so expenses
are likely to increase.
(c) The Amount of the Issue: Following Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) I allow for a fixed component of
the amount of the issue (1/amount) and a variable component (amount/book value of assets). The
evidence presented there suggests a U shaped cost curve, with high fixed costs and increasing
variable costs of issuance.
(d) Secured and Callable Indicators: Secured securities may increase or decrease the expenses based
on required expertise or lower risk of issuance. Callable issues are riskier due to prepayment risk and
so are likely associated with higher fees.
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(e) Number of syndicate members: The number of syndicate members could increase expenses due to
fixed costs per syndicate member. It could also decrease the total underwriting fee if more syndicates
mean less risk per syndicate. As I show below, the average number of lead managers changes sharply
through the sample; I include the number of syndicates in all regressions but remain agnostic on its
effect.
(f) Underwriter reputation and previous lead underwriter: Underwriter reputation, measured as the
market share of the underwriter in the previous year, can affect fees if reputable underwriters certify
issues at lower cost, or if reputable underwriters extract surplus through fees for lower yield spreads.
A previous lead underwriter is an underwriter that has underwritten a security for the same firm in the
two years prior to the issue in question. Repeated interactions likely reduce risk and issuance costs.
Firm Vars includes standard measures from Compustat of profitability (Income to Assets ratio, or data1 8
divided by data6), size (natural log of total assets, or data6), and risk of the firm (book leverage, or data9
+ data34, all divided by data6). All Compustat measures for a given firm are for the fiscal year prior to
the issue to avoid mechanical endogeneity.
Table 5, Panel A reports the results. Column (1) estimates the specification in equation (6) with
only rating controls. The estimate implies that a firm that hires a commercial bank underwriter with
which it has a lending relationship within the past year faces a underwriting fee that is 0.07 lower than
when the same firm does not hire a recent lender. Columns (2) through (4) add control variables
incrementally. Column (4) is the full specification. It shows that firms that hire recent lenders enjoy a
0.08 lower underwriting fee, which is about 10 percent evaluated at the mean. This result is significant at
the percent level, even after adjusting standard errors. Column (4) also indicates that higher maturity
issues have higher fees and that the fixed cost component of the underwriting fee is more important than
the variable cost. Secured debt issues have lower underwriting fees whereas callable securities have
higher fees. Finally, while the number of lead arrangers does not influence the underwriting fee, a larger
number of co-managers leads to higher fees. In the next section I show that more co-managers lead to
lower yield spreads, which suggests firms pay higher fees to get larger market coverage and lower yield
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spreads. The firm characteristics all have the expected signs, but are not statistically significant at the 5
percent level or below. This is not surprising, given that these are fixed effect specifications and these
variables have limited variation within a given firm.
As noted above, investment banks, to a lesser degree, also jointly produce lending and debt
underwriting services. Column (5) allows Lend to be 1 if the borrowing firm has a lending relationship
with any underwriter, not just if the underwriter is a commercial bank. The strength of the coefficient is
diminished, which suggests that investment banks do not offer the same price discounts when jointly
providing debt underwriting services and lending.
Table 5, Panel B splits the firms into groups based on beginning of period characteristics. I rank
all firms based on assets in the initial sample period ( 990 for almost all firms) and split the sample into
large firms (top half) and small firms (bottom half). I also split the sample based on initial sample period
credit rating (data280 in Compustat). Firms with an initial S&P long term credit rating of BBB or higher
are considered investment grade and those below BBB are considered high yield. Table 5, Panel B shows
that the main results are even stronger among large firms and investment grade firms. The strongest
result suggests that investment grade firms receive a 12 percent discount at the mean (0.09/0.76) when a
lending commercial bank underwrites a debt issue. The coefficient estimates for recent lending
relationships are almost identical for small firms and high yield firms, but the standard errors increase
enough to overrule statistical significance. However, I use caution in interpreting these results, because
the sample size for small firms and high yield firms is substantially smaller, which is the primary reason
the standard errors are larger. The estimates for small versus large firms and high yield versus investment
grade firms are not statistically distinct.
Table 5, Panel C provides robustness checks. Column (1) addresses the concern that commercial
banks with lending relationships with firms offer only a one time discount to "capture" underwriting
business which is followed by higher fees. I split the CB lending relationship indicator variable into two
separate variables based on the timing of the initial issue underwritten by a lending commercial bank.
The variable First year CB lending relationship takes on the value if it is the first year for a given firm
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that any commercial bank with which the firm has a lending relationship underwrites a debt issue. After
first year CB lending relationship takes on the value 1 if it is after the first year in which any commercial
bank with a recent lending relationship with a given firm underwrites a debt issue. Column 1 shows that
the initial effect is stronger, but the effect remains significant at the 10 percent level after the initial year
in which a lending commercial bank underwrite an issue. In other words, firms enjoy lower fees by joint
producers even after they initially hire them as debt underwriters. Column (2) evaluates only firms that at
some point hired a commercial bank with which they had a recent lending relationship. The result is
slightly weaker, but still significant at the 5 percent level.
Columns (3) and (4) split the sample based on when firms first hired a commercial bank
underwriter with which they had a recent lending relationship. Column (3) estimates the core
specification on the 49 firms that initially hire a commercial bank lender as underwriter in 1996 or before,
and column (4) estimates the specification only on the 206 firms that initially hire a commercial bank
underwriter in 1997 or after. The results show a slightly stronger effect among the later group, but the
results are not statistically different from each other. Columns (5) and (6) address the concern that
commercial banks with lending relationships "cherry-pick" the best firm-issues which drives the result
that they charge lower fees. Column (5) follows all firms up to and through the first year that firms hire a
recent commercial bank lender as underwriter. Column (6) then follows firms in years after they hire a
recent commercial bank lender as underwriter. In other words, the identification in Column (5) is driven
by the first time a commercial bank jointly produces a loan and underwrites an issue for a given firm.
Implicitly, Column (5) is capturing the effect of the relaxation of regulatory restrictions. The results are
driven by the initial year in which a lending commercial bank underwrites an issue, with an estimated
coefficient of-0.10, or a 13 percent discount at the mean. The results are weaker in years after the initial
year. Column (5) provides evidence that it is the initial commercial bank entry into underwriting, driven
by relaxation of regulatory restrictions, driving the key results on underwriting fees.
3.4.2 Yield Spreads
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This section addresses the question, do commercial banks with recent lending relationships obtain
lower yield spreads for debt issues? The exact form of equations estimated in this section is:
Spread' = ai + a, + Lendof + IssueVarsijF1 + Firm VarsijF2 + c (7)
The coefficient of interest is fl, which measures the within-firm effect on the yield spread from having a
recently lending commercial bank underwrite a debt issue. The issue and firm control variables are
identical to the specification in (6), with the exception that I control for the size the loan using the natural
log of the total amount of the loan in the yield spread regressions.
Table 6 provides evidence that cross-section estimates of the effect of a commercial bank
underwriter on yield spreads are biased and inconsistent. In order to replicate the previous literature as
close as possible, I use the full sample of debt issues from 1993-1997, and I exclude firms with a 1-digit
SIC code of 4. 1 use only debt issues by firms with at least 2 issues in the sample in order to directly
compare the OLS and fixed effects results. I also use controls similar in the previous literature. Column
(1) reports an OLS specification that most closely follows the previous literature. No firm fixed effects
are included, and errors are not clustered. Column (1) indicates that commercial banks obtain a yield
spread that is 7 points lower, and this difference is significant at the 10 percent level.7 Column (2) shows
that the OLS result is not robust when the sample is expanded to all years, which is consistent with the
work by Roten and Mullineaux (2002). More importantly, columns (3) and (4) show that the result is not
robust to a fixed effects specification. A Hausman test comparing columns (1) and (3) or columns (2) and
(4) rejects the null hypothesis that pooled OLS regressions yield consistent estimators. The conclusion
from the Hausman test is that estimates in the OLS specification are biased and inconsistent. This
suggests that results estimated from a cross section of issues should be viewed with caution and that only
fixed effects estimates of parameter values are consistent.8
7 This estimate is almost exactly the same as the one reported by Naranyan, Rangan, and Rangan (2003).
8 The Hausman test works under the assumption that the firm-issue specific error term () is orthogonal to right-hand
side variables. Under this assumption, the test compares a consistent estimator (fixed effects) and a possibly
inconsistent estimator (OLS) to test the assumption that the firm-specific error term () is orthogonal to the right
hand side variables.
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It is important to note that not all coefficients change when I add fixed effects. The coefficient
estimates for maturity, call status, shelf registration, and rating dummies are all similar in the fixed effects
estimation. This provides evidence that the commercial bank indicator variable is correlated with the
unobservable firm-specific error term; the effect is not just due to reduced power.
Table 7 estimates equations on the sample described in Section 3 and provides further evidence
that commercial bank underwriters with recent lending relationships do not obtain lower or higher spreads
in public markets. Column (1) includes only basic controls, and the coefficient on a recent CB lending
relationship with the underwriter is basically 0. Column 2 includes all controls; the point estimate on
recent lending relationship is negative, but it is neither statistically nor economically significant. The
signs on controls follow predicted patterns. Lower rated issues have much higher yield spreads, as do
long maturity issues and callable securities. Secured issues have lower spreads, which reflects the higher
value of secured issues in states of default. A larger number of co-managers is associated with a decrease
in the yield spread, which is possibly due to a wider market acceptance. Firms obtain lower yields when
they are more profitable or less levered. Column (3) tests whether commercial banks affect yield spreads
independent of previous lending relationships. Again, the coefficient is not statistically distinguishable
from 0. Finally, columns 4 and 5 split the sample into large and small firms and find no effect of recent
lending relationships with the lead manager in either sub-sample. The same is true if I split the sample
into high yield and investment grade issues (not reported).
The evidence in Table 7 contrasts directly with the finding in the previous literature that
commercial banks, with or without lending relationships with issuers, obtain lower yield spreads in debt
markets. I provide evidence that findings in the previous literature are attributable to bias in coefficients
induced by unobservable firm characteristics. The evidence suggests that commercial banks targeted
higher quality firms (based on unobservable characteristics) in the early period, which explains why the
yield spreads appear lower.
3.5 Capture Probabilities and Syndicate Structure
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The evidence presented above suggests that commercial bank underwriters with lending
relationships do not unfairly tie products and charge higher fees. This section seeks to further explore
whether or not firms are more locked in to underwriters that also provide lending to the firm. The main
statistic used in this section is the capture probability. The capture probability on a given issue represents
the ex-post realized probability that the next issue by a given firm is underwritten by the same lead
manager. It is a measure of how locked in the firm is to a given underwriter. Capture probabilities are
motivated by models in which information asymmetry problems between a firm and other potential lead
managers prevent the firm from breaking out of a relationship with the existing lead manager.9 In the
model by Rajan (1992), financial institutions expropriate firm project profits given this position of power
over the firm.
As a caveat, capture probabilities may measure more than simple lock-in. If one lead manager
focuses in the area of a given firm, the firm may choose to repeatedly hire the same lead manager. Also,
repeated interactions with the same firm likely result in lower costs of underwriting. If some of the
surplus is passed to the firm through lower fees, then capture probabilities might be high even though
there is no expropriation of firm profits. With these caveats in mind, if capture probabilities increase
sharply when a borrowing firm hires a lending institution, there is a need for further analysis to see if
financial institutions are indeed using information advantages over the firm to capture future business.
For the data analysis in this section, I consider only debt issues by firms that have at least one
future debt issue in the sample. This is necessary to obtain the ex-post capture probability. In addition, if
more than one lead manager is present on an issue, I treat each lead manager separately and calculate a
capture probability for each lead manager. The final sample in this section includes 3,779 debt issues and
4,406 lead managers (out of the original sample of 4,553 issues by 5,595 lead managers). As a robustness
check, I also calculate the capture probability using the probability that a firm hires a given underwriter
on its next 2 or 3 issues. All results are almost identical.
9 The classic example of such a model is Rajan (1992) in which commercial banks use their information advantage
over the firm to extract rents from profitable projects.
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Table 8 presents cell means of the capture probability for different groups across time. The
probability that a firm hires the same lead manager on its next issue is 40 percent and appears quite steady
through the sample period (although there is a slight upturn in 1997 to 1999). High yield firms have
higher capture probabilities than investment grade firms, and small firms have higher capture probabilities
than large firms. These differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and provide some
support to the view that capture probabilities represent information advantages over firms. In the overall
sample, debt issues underwritten by commercial banks are not associated with higher capture
probabilities. The same is true for debt issues underwritten by a lead manager with which the borrowing
firm has a recent lending relationship (past 2 years). For the total sample, commercial bank lead
managers with recent loans to the issuing firm have a 38.5 percent probability of being selected on the
next issue, compared to 39.2 percent for other firms. The trends in capture probabilities across time
exhibit interesting variation. Between 1990 and 1996, commercial banks appear to have some success in
capturing future business, especially if they have concurrent lending relationships with firms (45 percent
versus 37 percent). However, by the late period, the trend is reversed. Capture probabilities from 2000 to
2003 are actually lower when the lead manager is a commercial bank with which the firm has a recent
lending relationship (35 percent versus 39 percent).
Commercial bank underwriters with recent lending relationships appear no more likely to capture
future business of a given firm than other underwriters. Figure 3 offers preliminary evidence to explain
this fact. Figure 3 graphs the percentage of issues with more than one lead manager, and shows a sharp
trend upward that moves almost in tandem with the percentage of issues underwritten by commercial
banks with recent lending relationships. Before deregulation in 1996, the presence of more than 1 lead
manager on an issue is extremely rare. After deregulation, it becomes the norm. Figure 3 provides
evidence that borrowing firms are not replacing investment banks with commercial banks, but are simply
adding them as lead managers. From 2000 to 2003, of the 459 lead managers on issues with only one
lead manager, 180 have a lending relationship with the firm in the past 2 years (39 percent). Of the 1355
lead managers on the 588 issues with more than one lead manager, 841 of the lead managers have a recent
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lending relationship with the issuing firm (62 percent). In other words, the evidence suggests that when
previous lending relationships are present, the firm is much more likely to hire more than one lead
manager.
The last 4 rows of Table 8 show the effect of such behavior on capture probabilities. In the
overall sample, commercial bank underwriters with recent lending relationships are much more likely to
capture the future business of the firm if the commercial bank is the only lead manager (45 percent).
When commercial banks share the lead managing issues, the capture probability drops sharply (35
percent). This is driven almost entirely by the period after 1999, when firms begin hiring more than one
lead manager. When the underwriter is not a commercial bank recent lender, the capture probabilities do
not appear to vary with the number of lead managers. The results suggest that firms reduce the ability of
commercial banks to lock-in future business by hiring more than one lead manager.
Table 8 and Figure 3 offer evidence that commercial bank underwriters with recent lending
relationships are no more likely to capture future business AND are much more likely to be on issues with
more than lead manager. To more rigorously test these findings, I estimate the following fixed effects
regression:
Capturedij = ai + a, + Lendfl + Days y + Sharejy2 + Xi F + . (7)
Captured is an indicator variable taking on the value if the lead manager on issuej for firm i is a lead
manager for issuej+l for firm i. Days is the natural logarithm of the number of days between the issuej
and issuej+l. I employ this as a control under the assumption that the same lead manager is more likely
to be chosen if the issues are closer together in time. I estimate a linear probability specification instead
of maximum likelihood for two reasons. First, fixed effects estimation in a maximum likelihood setting
has a variety of econometric problems. The fixed effect for each group is treated as an independent
parameter to be estimated in maximum likelihood estimation; adding groups therefore adds parameters to
be estimated, and consistency bounds are much harder to obtain in medium sized samples. Second, the
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mean of the left hand side variable is 0.40, which suggests that maximum likelihood estimation using
probit or logit specifications will likely yield similar results, an assumption that I confirm in the results.' °
Table 9 presents the estimates. Column 1 and 2 confirm that commercial bank underwriters with
recent lending relationships are not more likely to capture future business. The only control variable
coefficient estimate that is significant at the 5 percent level is underwriter reputation suggesting that
reputable underwriters are more likely to capture the future business of a borrowing firm. Column (3)
shows that a larger number of lead managers reduces the probability that any one of the lead managers is
chosen on the next debt issue for the same firm. The coefficient on previous lending relationships
between the underwriter and issuer increases slightly when including the number of lead managers. The
point estimate offers weak evidence (statistically significant at the 12 percent level) that, after controlling
for the number of lead managers, commercial bank underwriters with recent lending relationships are
more successful at retaining future business. Columns (4) and (5) include the OLS pooled estimates and
the maximum likelihood probit specification for completeness. The results in the cross-section are
similar.
The evidence suggests that firms hire more than one lead manager when lending relationships are
present in order to reduce the lock in effect on future business. There are important alternative
interpretations of the evidence. First, commercial bank lenders might be forcing their clients to add them
to underwriting syndicates as lead managers for higher fees. The evidence presented in Section 3
provides evidence against this interpretation. Commercial bank lenders reduce overall fees and the
number of lead managers does not increase fees. If lenders are "forcing" their way onto syndicates, it
appears to help, not hurt, the firm. A second interpretation comes from Narayanan, Rangan, and Rangan
(2004). Commercial banks with outstanding loans to a firm face a potential conflict of interest that could
lead to misinformation when selling public securities. Using seasoned equity offerings from 1994 to
'0 Drucker and Puri (2003) estimate a nested logit model in which firms first decide whether or not to issue a
seasoned equity offering, and then decide whether or not to hire the same lead manager. I use the linear model as
opposed to a nested logit for two reasons. First, more than one lead manager can be chosen on a given deal.
Second, almost all surviving firms continue to issue debt securities until the end of the sample period or until the
firm ceases to exist. Firms trivially "decide" not to issue new securities because the sample period ends.
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1997, the authors show that lending banks commit against opportunistic behavior by co-managing issues
with reputable investment banks. In both interpretations, lending commercial bank underwriters are more
likely to pair up with other lead managers. In my interpretation, the firm desires such an arrangement to
prevent lock in by the lending commercial bank. In the interpretation of Narayanan, Rangan, and Rangan
(2004), co-managing is the choice of the commercial bank. An obvious difference is that the authors
examine equity markets instead of debt markets; both interpretations could hold in their respective
markets and both could be partly true in both markets.
One way to distinguish between these stories is to examine whether other lead managers have
lending relationships with the firm. The interpretation by Narayanan, Rangan, and Rangan (2004) implies
that the other lead managers do not have lending relationships with the firm. If the other lead managers
also have lending relationships, then they also cannot commit against opportunistic behavior. From 2000
to 2003, there are 434 debt issues with exactly 2 lead managers. Of these 434 debt issues, the issuing firm
has a lending relationship in the past 2 years with both lead managers on 204 of the issues (or about 47
percent). Of the 120 debt issues with exactly 3 lead managers, the issuing firm has a recent lending
relationship with all 3 lead managers on 50 of the issues (42 percent).
In debt markets, the evidence suggests that firms place more lead managers on issues when
lending relationships are present for reasons other than those described by Narayanan, Rangan, and
Rangan (2004) in equity markets. The evidence presented here suggests that underwriters add lead
managers to prevent any one lending commercial bank from gaining too much power over the firm. A
further exploration of this trend is matter for future research.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Work
Regulatory policy has induced a major change in debt underwriting markets. Firms now are able
to hire the same financial firm to jointly provide private lending and debt underwriting services. The joint
production of lending and debt underwriting services is now common, with almost 80 percent of issues
underwritten by a lending financial institution by 2003. The predicted cost effects for issuing firms are
ambiguous; lending financial institutions could use information scope economies to more cheaply
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underwrite securities and pass savings on to the issuing firm. On the other hand, lending firms could gain
significant market share and exploit information asymmetries between the issuing firm and other financial
institutions to expropriate firm profits. Lending commercial banks may obtain lower yield spreads given
their ability to better certify public issues. On the other hand, commercial banks could use private
information on the firm to systematically fool public investors. Investors, predicting such behavior, may
demand higher yield spreads on the firm's securities.
My analysis shows that commercial banks with recent lending relationships offer issuing firms an
average fee discount of 10 to 15 percent relative to the underwriting fees charged before deregulation.
This estimate is a result of within-firm variation driven by exogenous relaxation of regulatory restrictions.
The strongest result suggests a cost savings of up to $200,000 per debt issue for investment grade firms.
Lower fees are not a one-time discount to capture business; fees are lower on the initial issue underwritten
by a lending commercial bank and stay lower in the years afterward. Issuing firms appear to use
syndicate structure to prevent any one financial institution from gaining too much power over the firm.
More specifically, firms hire more lead managers on debt issues when lending relationships are present.
In doing so, firms are able to reduce the lock-in effect of hiring the same financial firm to produce both
lending and debt underwriting services. The average number of lead managers has increased sharply after
the 1997 and 1999 relaxation of restrictions on commercial bank underwriting activity, which is
consistent with this interpretation.
The findings of this chapter suggest that lending commercial bank underwriters obtain yield
spreads that are no different than investment banks. This finding is in contrast to the previous literature,
and I explain the difference by showing that cross-section estimates of bank entry on yield spreads are
biased and inconsistent. An important contribution of this chapter is therefore a methodological one;
fixed effects estimates that isolate within-firm variation produce more reliable estimates of the effect of
commercial bank entry on spreads and fees given the likely presence of important unobservable firm
characteristics.
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For future research, a more comprehensive examination of syndicate structure is warranted by the
findings of this chapter. My findings on the evolution of syndicate structure are an important initial step
to influence future research. Syndicate structure in debt underwriting markets has significantly changed
in the since 1997, as the average number of lead managers per issue has more than doubled. I offer an
interpretation of this evidence based on firms attempting to reduce the ability of financial institutions to
lock in future business. This interpretation is supported by the data, but future work is needed to more
fully evaluate this trend.
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Table 1
Top Lead Managers in Debt Underwriting Markets
This table lists the top 5 lead underwriters, by market share of amount underwritten, for four different years
of the sample. If more than one lead manager is present on an issue, the total amount is divided evenly
among the lead managers. An underwriter is considered a commercial bank (CB) if its parent is either a
U.S. financial firm filing a Y9C with the Federal Reserve or a foreign financial firm with an SIC code of
6020 or 6029.
1990
Rank Name Market Share CB? Top 5 Mkt Share Herfindahl
1 Morgan Stanley 0.19 0.85 1509
2 Salomon Brothers 0.18
3 Goldman Sachs 0.18
4 Merrill Lynch 0.18
5 First Boston Corp 0.12
1996
Rank Name Market Share CB? Top 5 Mkt Share Herfindahl
1 Goldman Sachs 0.21 0.64 1069
2 Morgan Stanley 0.12
3 Salomon Brothers 0.12
4 Merrill Lynch 0.11
5 JP Morgan 0.08 Y
1999
Rank Name Market Share CB? Top 5 Mkt Share Herfindahl
1 Citigroup 0.17 Y 0.70 1131
2 Goldman Sachs 0.16
3 Morgan Stanley 0.14
4 Merrill Lynch 0.14
5 JP Morgan 0.09 Y
2003
Rank Name Market Share CB? Top 5 Mkt Share Herfindahl
1 Citigroup 0.20 Y 0.62 1092
2 JPMorganChase 0.18 Y
3 Bank of America 0.09 Y
4 Merrill Lynch 0.08
5 Credit Suisse 0.07 Y
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Table 2
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for a sample of 4,553 debt issues from 1990-2003 by 509 firms. All
firm characteristics come from the Compustat Annual Industrial Database, and all issue characteristics
come from the Securities Data Corporation. Lending relationships come from Dealscan; they are indicator
variables that are 1 if the firm has a lending relationship with one of the lead managers on a given issue.
An underwriter is considered a commercial bank if its parent is either a U.S. financial firm filing a Y9C
with the Federal Reserve or a foreign financial firm with an SIC code of 6020 or 6029.
Distribution
Mean St. Dev 1 0 th 5 0 th 90 th
Firm characteristics (509 firms)
# issues per firm 9 11 2 5 22
Total assets (book, $ mln) 15983 28967 1600 8223 31362
Income to total assets ratio 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.22
Debt to total assets ratio (book leverage) 0.35 0.14 0.20 0.35 0.51
S&P debt rating (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) 7.13 2.69 4.00 7.00 11.00
Industry composition (SIC 1 digit code)
Mining, construction, agriculture (0, 1) 0.08
Manufacturing (2, 3) 0.44
Trans, comm., gas, & electricity (4) 0.30
Trade (5) 0.10
Services (7, 8) 0.07
Issue characteristics
Underwriting fee, % of total issue amount 0.76 0.54 0.35 0.65 1.00
Yield spread to benchmark (basis points) 125 93 45 97 232
Maturity (years) 14 10 5 10 30
Amount of issue ($ mln) 196 164 20 150 450
Secured 0.16 0.36 0 0 1
Callable 0.40 0.49 0 0 1
Moody's rating (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) 7.2 2.9 4 7 10
# of lead managers 1.2 0.6 1 1 2
# of co-managers 2.3 2.6 0 2 5
Lending relationship variables
Commercial bank underwriter 0.34 0.47 0 0 1
Lending relationship, past year 0.21 0.40 0 0 1
With commercial bank 0.19 0.39 0 0 1
Lending relationship, 1 to 2 years ago 0.15 0.35 0 0 1
With commercial bank 0.15 0.35 0 0 1
Other controls
Underwriter reputation (market share) 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.19
Recent underwriter (last two years) 0.48 0.50 0 0 1
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Table 4
Lead Manager Choice Probit Regressions
This table reports coefficient estimates for the probability that a given underwriter is chosen as the lead
manager on a debt issue. The choice set includes all debt underwriters with at least 1 percent market share
in a given year. Standard errors are clustered on the borrowing firm, so that the errors are allowed to be
freely correlated among issues and potential underwriters
variable is 0.10.
for a given firm. The mean of the dependent
Dep. Var.: 0,1 } chosen as underwriter
Time period:
(1)
1990-
1992
(2)
1993-
1996
(3) (4)
1997- 2000-
1999 2003
Previous relationship (last two years)
Lending relationship
Debt underwriting relationship
Reputation (market share)
Ln[amount of issue]
Ln[maturity (years)]
0.043 0.067* 0.103* 0.135* 0.113*
(0.062) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010)
0.188* 0.200* 0.230* 0.185* 0.200*
(0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.014)
0.650*
(0.038)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.008
(0.006)
Secured indicator
Callable indicator
Firm characteristics
Ln[total assets]
Income to total assets ratio
Book leverage
-0.012*
(0.002)
0.008
(0.013)
0.017
(0.040)
0.527*
(0.036)
0.005*
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.007
(0.004)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.015*
(0.001)
-0.024
(0.010)
-0.026
(0.027)
0.681 *
(0.048)
0.011*
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.016
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.017*
(0.002)
-0.051*
(0.018)
-0.113
(0.045)
0.874*
(0.072)
0.025*
(0.004)
0.000
(0.003)
0.034
(0.013)
0.013
(0.007)
-0.015*
(0.003)
-0.024
(0.027)
-0.021
(0.064)
0.694*
(0.028)
0.011*
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.004
(0.004)
0.007*
(0.002)
-0.015*
(0.001)
-0.034*
(0.010)
-0.063
(0.029)
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(5)
Total
N 9672 14791 13738 13169 51370
Psuedo R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17
* Statistically significant from 0 at the 1 percent level.
Table 5, Panel A
Underwriting Fee Fixed Effects Regressions
This table presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects specification relating the underwriting fee
(mean 0.76) to the presence of recent lending relationships between the underwriter and the issuing firm.
Lending relationship variables take on the value 1 if the issuing firm has a lending relationship with of
the lead managers of the debt issue. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the firm
level.
Previous lending relationships
CB lending relationship, within past year
CB lending relationship, 1-2 years ago
Any lending relationship, within year
(1)
-0.07*
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
(2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.07**
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
-0.08**
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.08**
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
Any lending relationship, 1-2 years ago
Underwriter reputation (market share) 0.04
(0.15)
-0.01
(0.02)
Recent underwriter (last two years)
Issue characteristics
Ln[maturity (years)]
1/(Amount of Issue)
Amount of Issue/Book Assets
Ln[ # lead managers]
0.22**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.01)
0.32
(0.27)
Ln[1 + # co-managers]
Secured indicator
Callable indicator
Firm characteristics
Ln[total assets]
Income to total assets ratio
Book leverage
Issue rating dummies (Moody's)
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B or lower
-0.54
-0.57
-0.54
0.07
0.77*
-0.46
-0.48
-0.42
0.23
0.90*
-0.06
(0.14)
0.00
(0.02)
0.20**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.01)
0.23
(0.22)
-0.01
(0.04)
0.06*
(0.02)
-0.21**
(0.08)
0.09**
(0.02)
-0.42
-0.49
-0.47
0.18
0.81**
-0.03
(0.14)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.20**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.01)
0.15
(0.20)
-0.01
(0.04)
0.06**
(0.02)
-0.21**
(0.07)
0.09**
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.60
(0.32)
0.07
(0.17)
-0.40
-0.47
-0.46
0.17
0.80**
-0.05*
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.14)
0.00
(0.02)
0.20**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.01)
0.15
(0.20)
-0.02
(0.04)
0.06**
(0.02)
-0.21 **
(0.07)
0.09**
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.60
(0.32)
0.07
(0.17)
-0.40
-0.47
-0.46
0.18
0.80**
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N 4533 4533 4533 4533 4533
Number of firms 509 509 509 509 509
- Adjusted R2 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57
*Statistically significant from 0 at 5 percent level, **Statistically significant from 0 at 1 percent level
\ . \ . \ , \ , \ ,
Table 5, Panel B
Underwriting Fee Fixed Effects Regressions, by Size and Credit Rating
This table presents coefficient estimates of regressions relating underwriting fees to lending relationships
on sub-samples of the data. Small firms (large firms) are firms in the bottom (top) half of the size
distribution, based on beginning of period total assets. High yield firms (investment grade firms) are firms
with a S&P LT credit rating of BBB or lower (BBB+ or higher), based on beginning of period credit rating.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small Firms Large Firms High Yield Inv.Grade
Previous lending relationships
CB lending relationship, within past year -0.07 -0.08** -0.06 -0.09**
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
CB lending relationship, 1-2 years ago -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Underwriter reputation (market share) -0.84* 0.27* 0.12 -0.15
(0.37) (0.13) (0.39) (0.14)
Recent underwriter (last two years) -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Issue characteristics
Ln[maturity (years)] 0.13** 0.22** 0.10** 0.21**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
1/(Amount of Issue) 0.04 0.07** 0.08** -0.01
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)
Amount of Issue/Book Assets 0.01 -0.09 0.17 -0.61
(0.14) (0.60) (0.24) (0.40)
Ln[ # lead managers] 0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.05
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Ln[1 + # co-managers] 0.04 0.07** 0.06 0.07**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Secured indicator 0.07 -0.23** -0.09 -0.28**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09)
Callable indicator 0.15** 0.06** 0.13** 0.09**
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Firm characteristics
Ln[total assets] -0.20** 0.06 -0.08 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Income to total assets ratio -1.11 -0.28 -0.97 -0.06
(0.60) (0.33) (0.60) (0.32)
Book leverage 0.35 0.03 -0.01 0.05
(0.27) (0.20) (0.26) (0.18)
Issue rating dummies (Moody's)
Aa -0.73* -0.38 -0.34 -0.32
A -0.62* -0.50 -0.38 -0.43
Baa -0.73* -0.45 -0.41 -0.43
Ba -0.35 0.30 0.07 0.48
B or lower 0.24 0.91** 0.57** 1.14**
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N 1231 3298 1273 3098
Number of firms 254 255 199 293
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.51 0.79 0.40
*Statistically significant from 0 at 5 percent level, **Statistically significant from 0 at 1 percent level
Table 5, Panel C
Underwriting Fee Fixed Effects Regressions, Robustness Checks
This table presents coefficient estimates from a robustness checks to the fixed effects specification in Table
5, Panel A. A firm is considered "treated" from the first time it hires a commercial bank underwriter with
which the firm has a recent lending relationship. Column (1) examines whether fees are only lowered at
initial treatment, and then increases afterwards. First year CB lend rel. is an indicator variable for the first
year that a commercial bank jointly produces a loan and debt underwriting for a given firm. Column (2)
examines only firms that at some point treated. Column (3) and column (4) examine firms treated up to
1996 and after 1996, respectively. Column (5) examines firm-issues up to and through the first year a firm
was treated. Column (6) examines firm-issues after the first year a given firm was treated. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the firm level. Rating dummies are included but not reported.
Previous lending relationships
CB lend rel., within past year
(1) (2)
Timing Some
treatment
CB lend rel., 1-2 years ago
First year CB lend rel.
After first year CB lend rel.
-0.07**
(0.03)
-0.06
(0.04)
-0.06*
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
(3)
Early
(4)
Late
treatment treatment
-0.05
(0.03)
0.04
(0.04)
-0.08*
(0.04)
0.04
(0.04)
(5)
Initial
treatment
-0.10*
(0.04)
0.03
(0.05)
(6)
Post
treatment
-0.06
(0.04)
0.05
(0.05)
Underwriter rep. (market share)
Recent underwriter (2 years)
Issue characteristics
Ln[maturity (years)]
1/(Amount of Issue)
Amount of Issue/Book Assets
Ln[ # lead managers]
Ln[ 1 + # co-managers]
Secured indicator
Callable indicator
Firm characteristics
Ln[total assets]
Income to total assets ratio
Book leverage
N
Number of finrms
Adjusted R2
-0.04
(0.14)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.20**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.01)
0.15
(0.20)
-0.01
(0.03)
0.06**
(0.02)
-0.21**
(0.07)
0.09**
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.60
(0.32)
0.07
(0.17)
4529
509
0.57
0.21
(0.15)
0.02
(0.02)
0.21**
(0.02)
0.09**
(0.01)
1.17*
(0.45)
-0.04
(0.04)
0.05*
(0.02)
-0.25**
(0.08)
0.08**
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.07)
-0.57
(0.39)
0.21
(.21)
3049
255
0.51
0.39
(0.36)
-0.06
(0.04)
0.20**
(0.04)
0.41
(0.28)
0.82
(0.70)
-0.03
(0.11)
0.08
(0.04)
-0.41 **
(0.15)
0.13**
(0.03)
-0.22*
(0.11)
-1.03
(0.62)
0.40*
(0.17)
802
49
0.65
0.25
(0.17)
0.04
(0.02)
0.21**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.01)
1.38**
(0.50)
-0.05
(0.04)
0.05*
(0.02)
-0.15**
(0.05)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.0
(0.07
-0.2
(0.4
0.21
(0.24
224'
206
0.4
0.08
(0.14)
0.02
(0.02)
0.17**
(0.03)
0.04**
(0.01)
1.26**
(0.48)
-0.05
(0.05)
0.03
(0.02)
-0.18**
(0.06)
0.10**
(0.02)
0.05
7) (0.08)
5 -0.56
2) (0.39)
0.37
4) (0.20)
7 2141
255
0.58
145
0.98**
(0.37)
-0.04
(0.04)
0.29**
(0.06)
0.18**
(0.05)
-1.46
(1.15)
-0.04
(0.08)
0.08*
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.10)
0.19*
(0.09)
0.01
(0.07)
1.03
(0.87)
0.20
(0.37)
*Statistically significant from 0 at 5 percent level, **Statistically significant from 0 at 1 percent level
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0.56
Table 6
Bias in OLS estimates of Commercial Bank Effect on Yield Spread
This table presents evidence that OLS coefficient estimates of the effect of a commercial bank debt
underwriter on yield spreads is biased and inconsistent. The sample is limited to firms that have at least 2
debt issues in the sample, and firms with an SIC one digit code of 4 are eliminated. Column (1) replicates a
similar regression reported in the previous literature, where the full sample of debt issues from 1993 to
1997 is used. Column (2) shows that the OLS result is not robust when later years are included, and
columns (3) and (4) perform fixed effects specifications (grouped on cusip) to show that the results in (1)
are biased due to the unobservable firm specific error term.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: Yield spread (mean 131) OLS OLS FE FE
1993-1997 1990-2003 1993-1997 1990-2003
Commercial bank underwriter -7.1 * 3.7 0.4 3.4
(3.8) (2.6) (4.2) (2.5)
Underwriter reputation (market share) -5.5 -15.9 -13.0 -16.6
(30.0) (20.2) (33.8) (18.6)
Ln[maturity (years)] 9.4*** 16.8*** 11.3*** 15.0***
(2.0) (1.5) (1.8) (1.3)
Ln[amount of issue] 0.4 2.0** -0.7 1.7
(1.3) (1.0) (1.6) (1.1)
Secured indicator 35.6*** 32.4*** -4.3 13.9
(8.3) (7.6) (9.1) (8.7)
Callable indicator 19.7*** 26.6*** 17.6*** 21.4***
(3.7) (2.8) (3.8) (2.6)
Shelf registration -25.3*** -9.8*** -16.2*** -2.5
(4.0) (3.5) (4.9) (3.6)
Issue rating dummies (Moody's)
Aa 21.4 21.9* 15.5 16.9
A 38.5*** 50.2*** 19.7 28.0*
Baa 68.6*** 100.7*** 53.0*** 73.0***
Ba 191.0*** 229.1*** 133.1*** 164.3***
B or lower 343.5*** 339.0*** 224.8*** 244.9***
N 1548 3893 1548 3893
Number of firms 446 575 446 575
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.68 0.90 0.82
*,**,*** Statistically significant from 0 at 10, 5, and 1 percent level
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Table 7
Yield Spread Fixed Effects Regressions
This table presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects specification relating the yield spread (mean
125) to the presence of previous lending relationships between the underwriter and the issuing firm.
Lending relationship variables take on the value 1 if the issuing firm has a lending relationship with one of
the lead managers of the debt issue. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the firm
level.
Previous lending relationships
CB lending relationship, within past year
CB lending relationship, 1-2 years ago
Commercial bank underwriter
Underwriter reputation (market share)
Recent underwriter (last two years)
Issue characteristics
Ln[maturity (years)]
Ln[Amount of issue]
Ln[ # lead managers]
Ln[ I + # co-managers]
Secured indicator
Callable indicator
Firm characteristics
Ln[total assets]
Income to total assets ratio
Book leverage
Issue rating dummies (Moody's)
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B or lower
(1)
-1.0
(3.8)
1.1
(4.4)
6.0
(22.4)
1.3
(1.9)
8.6*
25.0**
64.2**
169.2**
267.8**
Small
Firms
(2) (3) (4)
-3.2
(3.7)
-0.7
(4.4)
-2.2
(20.5)
1.3
(1.8)
13.0**
(1.3)
3.7
(2.9)
8.3
(6.6)
-4.9*
(2.5)
-6.3
(6.0)
14.6**
(2.6)
3.0
(5.4)
-134.9**
(47.6)
55.7*
(27.5)
19.5*
32.0**
68.5**
172.7**
261.7**
0.9
(3.6)
0.3
(22.6)
1.5
(1.9)
13.0**
(1.3)
3.7
(2.9)
6.6
(6.7)
-5.0*
(2.5)
-6.4
(5.9)
14.6**
(2.6)
2.8
(5.4)
-134.0**
(47.7)
56.5**
(27.5)
19.5*
31.6**
67.9**
172.5**
261.1**
2.8
(8.9)
10.5
(9.8)
23.0
(43.0)
7.7
(4.4)
10.2**
(3.0)
3.0
(2.9)
6.3
(12.0)
-7.5
(5.7)
1.0
(16.9)
17.5**
(6.7)
-20.1 *
(10.0)
-201.9
(119.9)
60.4
(37.8)
-9.8
-16.2
15.6
91.7
205.1 **
Large
Firms
(5)
-4.5
(3.8)
-3.5
(4.8)
-0.3
(23.1)
-0.6
(2.0)
14.0**
(1.3)
4.0
(3.6)
10.6
(7.6)
-3.8
(2.8)
-6.4
(6.3)
12.8**
(2.6)
12.0*
(6.1)
-116.0*
(50.4)
49.7
(32.8)
21.2*
35.7**
73.3**
190.3**
262.38**
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N 4533 4533 4533 1231 3398
Number of firms 509 509 509 254 255
- Adjusted R2 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.73
*Statistically significant from 0 at 5 percent level, **Statistically significant from 0 at 1 percent level
Table 8
Capture Probabilities
This table reports the probability that a lead manager on a given debt issue for a given firm is hired on the
next debt issue by the same firm. I refer to this probability as the "capture probability." The sample
includes only those debt issues after which the firm has at least one more issue. If there is more than one
lead manager on an issue, each lead manager is considered separately.
relationship with the lead manager within the past 2 years of the issue.
managers on 3,779 debt issues. Standard errors in parentheses.
A lending relationship is any lending
The sample includes 4,406 lead
1990-
1996
1997- 2000-
1999 2003
0.390 0.373 0.439 0.370
(0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
High yield firms
Investment grade firms
Small firms
Large firms
Not underwritten by commercial bank
Underwritten by commercial bank
Issues without any lending relationship
Issues with any lending relationship
Issues without CB lending relationship
Issues with CB lending relationship
Issues with 1 lead manager, no CB lend. Rel.
Issues with lead manager, CB lend. Rel.
Issues with >=2 lead manager, no CB lend. Rel.
Issues with >=2 lead manager, CB lend. Rel.
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Full sample
Total
0.421
(0.014)
0.377
(0.009)
0.480
(0.016)
0.365
(0.008)
0.422
(0.022)
0.354
(0.012)
0.452
(0.024)
0.352
(0.012)
0.368
(0.011)
0.415
(0.034)
0.367
(0.011)
0.462
(0.046)
0.369
(0.011)
0.452
(0.052)
0.367
(0.011)
0.460
(0.054)
0.426
(0.073)
0.333
(0.211)
0.473
(0.027)
0.423
(0.017)
0.513
(0.028)
0.412
(0.016)
0.446
(0.018)
0.426
(0.023)
0.430
(0.017)
0.455
(0.025)
0.441
(0.016)
0.431
(0.030)
0.426
(0.018)
0.450
(0.040)
0.492
(0.035)
0.407
(0.045)
0.367
(0.026)
0.372
(0.018)
0.488
(0.034)
0.341
(0.016)
0.404
(0.026)
0.353
(0.018)
0.427
(0.025)
0.338
(0.018)
0.389
(0.021)
0.352
(0.020)
0.487
(0.033)
0.430
(0.048)
0.318
(0.027)
0.334
(0.022)
0.392
(0.009)
0.386
(0.013)
0.391
(0.009)
0.388
(0.014)
0.392
(0.008)
0.385
(0.016)
0.392
(0.009)
0.446
(0.027)
0.391
(0.020)
0.349
(0.020)
Table 9
Capture Probability Regressions
This table presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects specification relating the capture probability to
the presence of previous lending relationships between the underwriter and the issuing firm. Lending
relationship variables take on the value if the issuing firm has a lending relationship with one of the lead
managers of the debt issue. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the firm level.
Dep. Var.: Capture Probability (mean 0.39)
Previous lending relationships
CB lending relationship, within past year
CB lending relationship, 1-2 years ago
(1)
FE
0.029
(0.033)
0.017
(0.038)
(2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE OLS PROBIT
0.045
(0.033)
0.021
(0.038)
Number of lead managers
0.051
(0.033)
0.025
(0.038)
0.035
(0.034)
0.016
(0.038)
0.035
(0.036)
0.017
(0.040)
-0.042* -0.019 -0.019
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
Underwriter reputation (market share)
Ln[Number of days to next debt issue]
Issue characteristics
Ln[Amount of issue]
Ln[maturity, years]
Secured indicator
Callable indicator
Firm characteristics
Ln[total assets]
Income to total assets ratio
Book leverage
Issue rating dummies (Moody's)
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B or lower
0.660**
(0.167)
-0.011
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.016)
0.014
(0.010)
-0.059
(0.043)
-0.023
(0.022)
-0.042
(0.042)
0.495
(0.389)
0.105
(0.173)
-0.003
-0.027
-0.021
0.004
-0.077
0.642**
(0.168)
-0.011
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.016)
0.012
(0.010)
-0.057
(0.043)
-0.022
(0.022)
-0.037
(0.042)
0.501
(0.394)
0.064
(0.173)
0.000
-0.026
-0.017
0.007
-0.074
0.691**
(0.160)
0.005
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.015)
0.025*
(0.012)
-0.033
(0.041)
-0.047
(0.025)
-0.070**
(0.012)
-0.054
(0.258)
-0.027
(0.099)
-0.112
-0.137*
-0.086
-0.026
-0.035
0.730**
(0.167)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.016)
0.026
(0.012)
-0.036
(0.044)
-0.049
(0.026)
-0.074**
(0.013)
-0.071
(0.270)
-0.035
(0.101)
-0.116
-0.149
-0.093
-0.031
-0.040
-0.027
-0.042
-0.031
-0.009
-0.104
N 4406 4406 4406 4406 4406
Number of firms 466 466 466 466 466
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.07 0.06
*Statistically significant from 0 at 5 percent level, **Statistically significant from 0 at 1 percent level
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